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This dissertation inquires into ethical, embodied subjectivity in American
literature since World War II. It demonstrates how texts that register embodiment operate
at the limits of the human and the literary, exposing those limits. I argue that this
exposure itself can function ethically, even as it calls into question conventional modes of
and categories in literary work and epistemology more generally. Emmanuel Levinas
comprehends this conflict between established forms of speech and the newness of ethical
speech with his terms "said" and "saying." In Otherwise Than Being,  Levinas argues that
the vigilance of the subject's responsiveness to the Other, revealed in the renewal of
language that is "saying," is crucial to ethical behavior. Levinas's structure of thinking,
which I amend in dialogue with Jacques Derrida, Julia Kristeva, and others, is applied to
texts from a variety of genres--the novel, poetry, nature writing--and to texts that resist
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generic categorization. Hybrid generic work, like situated subjectivity, is shown often to
derive from the authors' ethical, worldly concerns.
My readings of Ernest Hemingway's later books connect his awareness of
heterogeneous, embodied subjectivity to his ethical desires. Frequently in Hemingway,
ethical action is enabled by awareness of the subject's physicality. Analysis of three
participants at the 1955 Six Gallery poetry reading in San Francisco--Allen Ginsberg,
Jack Kerouac, and Gary Snyder--demonstrates their uneasy efforts to bring abjected
elements of American culture into the literary, thereby remaking both culture and
literature. Their anxieties of identity center on the status of the body and the status of
other marginalized identity attributes like race. Terry Tempest Williams's work in mixed
genres is read as indicative or symptomatic of the unspeakable in embodied subjectivity.
She reveals the ethical requirements of patience and silence implicit in the recognition
that language can only ever partially communicate. Leslie Marmon Silko's revolutionary
novel Almanac of the Dead reveals the transformative potential of stories. Silko's
advocacy for hybrid subjectivity has its correlative in the hybrid novel/political
tract/statement of sovereignty that is Almanac of the Dead, revealing (and renewing) how
the literary utterance, embodied in text, forges identity.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: A BREATH OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing
befalleth them; as the one dieth so dieth the other; yea, they have all one
breath; so that man hath no pre-eminence above a beast.
(Ecclesiastes 3.19-20)
The openness of space as an openness of self without a world, without a
place, utopia, the not being walled in, inspiration to the end, even to
expiration, is proximity of the other which is possible only as
responsibility for the other, as substitution for him.
(Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being 182)
Where we breathe, we bow.
(Gary Snyder, Mountains and Rivers Without End 77)
Critical discourse, as announced by several recent works, has taken an ethical turn.
Two collections of essays, in fact, use the figure of the turn to describe this change: The
Turn to Ethics (2000) and Mapping the Ethical Turn (2001). In his recent article "Falling
Towers and Postmodern Wild Children: Oliver Sacks, Don DeLillo, and Turns against
Language," James Berger situates the resurgence of ethics in the theoretical landscape.
The "ethical turn," he reminds us, follows on the heels of the linguistic turn that
characterized much twentieth-century theory (343-44). Berger points out that the ethical
turn evinces suspicion about language's capacity to fully constitute or describe the
subject, and that this suspicion marks the difference between linguistic and ethical
approaches. The ethical turn acknowledges the limitations of language. This suspicion
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justifies Berger's term "counter-linguistic turn," which he believes characterizes the larger
configuration of which the ethical turn is part (344-45). Also among that configuration
are the studies focused on "materiality" and embodiment (344).
This recurrent phrase--the ethical turn--embodies in language the ethical
ambivalence that many of its advocates believe it denotes. An "ethical turn" is a trope
that figures discourse as a single body capable of turning. The trope thus reminds us of
the embodiment and materiality of language in general_ Like all names, however, this
term unites a plural and heterogeneous reality into a singular. The discourse that the term
describes is precisely the set of conversations and disputes about what such a change
might mean. The ethical turn, in other words, is a set of turns that happen in language.
The phrase thus both gestures back to the Real beyond language and bears out Berger's
eventual claim that the "counter-linguistic turn" does not so much overthrow the
linguistic position as elaborate it (354).
This embodied, linguistic ambivalence characterizes the turn to ethics, as Geoffrey
Galt Harpham explains, because it complicates the urge to universality that had earned
ethics a bad name. In his 1995 entry for Critical Terms for Literary Study, "Ethics,"
Harpham writes that "For most of the "Theoretical Era (c. 1968-87), ethics, the discourse
of 'respect for the law,' had no respect" (387).' Rather, the theoretical work of that period
tended to make ethics "the proper name of power, hypocrisy, and unreality" (387).
1 Lawrence Buell points out Harpham's "wittily self-conscious extravagance" in marking
the changes of theoretical discourse with such specific dates ("What We Talk About
When We Talk About Ethics" 11, note 4). Buell also presents a tentative sketch of this
growing interest in ethics. He remarks on the growing number of conferences on ethics
and the fact that "ethics" was added to Critical Terms for Literary Study in the 1995
edition, though it was absent from the 1990 edition.
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Harpham continues, "sinister and silent collusion between particular, concrete
arrangements of power and an abstract and 'universal' style of representation seemed to
many the peculiar specialty of ethics," making ethics not the realm of "'respect,' but
rather, quoting Derrida's terms, of Thonrespect.'" Harpham further reports that "virtually
all joined Derrida in seeing ethics as a combination of mastery and delusion" (388,
original emphasis).
However, Harpham rather wryly takes the 1987 revelation of Paul de Man's
collaborational work with the Nazis to mark the turn in theory back toward ethics. That
revelation raised doubts about the prevailing theoretical beliefs precisely on the grounds
of how they translated into worldly practices. This concern is key, in some sense, to all
versions of the ethical turn. Thus, Harpham finds that an ethical turn appeared in several
areas of theory: in Derrida's work in the 80s and after (391), among French feminists like
Kristeva (393), and in what Harpham calls Foucault's "conversion to ethical humanism"
late in his life (394). 2 Importantly, these were all different understandings of ethics,
which we have seen is a signal part of the ethical turn: it is a plural, consisting of turns.
The turn itself is also contested. Judith Butler's essay in The Turn to Ethics, offers
what she calls a "map" of her resistance to the ethical resurgence. For one thing, she
worries that "the return to ethics has constituted an escape from politics," a somewhat
ironic concern in light of Harpham's history (15). With politics in mind, much of Butler's
essay is devoted to a comparative discussion of Nietzsche and Emmanuel Levinas.
Levinas is one of the most frequently discussed theorists of the ethical turn, especially his
2 Foucault discusses this change directly in the late interview "The Ethic of Care for the
Self as a Practice of Freedom."
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Otherwise Than Being. For Butler, Levinas's account of the subject produced in a
traumatic encounter with the Other seems to indicate that "there is no becoming ethical
save through a certain violence." If that is so, Butler asks, "how are we to gauge the value
of such an ethics? Is it the only mode for ethics, and what becomes of an ethics of
nonviolence?" (26). She suggests that "Certain kinds of values, such as generosity and
forgiveness, may only be possible through a suspension of this ethicality and, indeed, by
calling into question the value of ethics itself' (27). Finally, taking up this key figure and
example in ethical discussions, breathing,' Butler remarks that the Levinasian account
"puts the life of the ethical subject at risk," that his ethics "degrades the biological
conditions of life" and may be a kind of "'bad air'" in seeming to deny essential human
needs. In this way, she claims Levinas's work resembles the slave morality that Nietzsche
criticized. Thus, she concludes, "it may still be necessary to continue to call for 'good air'
and to find a place for the value of self-preservation, if one wants, for instance, to breathe
and to sleep" (27).
The relationship between ethics and the biological conditions of life is indeed
crucial, though not only in the way Butler suggests. Butler's worry about bad air reverses
the use of Levinas's figure for ethics, breathlessness, importantly reminding us of humans'
basic requirements. But her reversal is itself subject to another reversal in the age of air
pollution and increasing environmental toxicity. It may be, if we want to breathe good
3 Each of my three epigraphs relies on breathing to figure and to argue for an ethics.
There are many other examples, including these three: Butler's use of breathing comes
from Nietzsche's critique of Hegel (Butler 15); Beatrice Hanssen's essay in The Turn to
Ethics begins with an epigraph from Frantz Fanon that associates breathlessness with an
uncertain "moral law" (127); Derrida, in a passage quoted below, talks about animal
genocide as taking "one's breath away."
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air, that we will need the rather stringent account of ethics Levinas provides. A key
problem, we will see more clearly below, is whether or how Levinas's ethics, predicated
on human-to-human encounters, can be useful for theorization of human-to-nonhuman
relationships, including those with the environment.
In this chapter, I argue that they can. My claim depends largely on the embodied
and practical understanding of language that Butler implicitly utilized above. Her answer
to Levinas's breathlessness makes that trope literal as a way of complicating the claim
made by the trope. In effect, she returns language to the body to refresh its meaning, as I
did above with regard to the "ethical turn." My readings of Levinas and of the other
authors treated in this dissertation repeatedly rely on this same phenomenological strategy
that restores language to the body. I argue that the effectiveness of this approach in cases
like Butler's signifies the embodiment of understanding.' I also use "embodiment" to
refer to texts. In collecting a set of ideas together in one unit, texts embody thoughts.
Butler's turn on the meaning of breathing also marks the limits of the ethical
subject by reminding us that a subject must survive in order to perform ethical actions.
Ethical systems are not boundless for the individual agent, though the desire for a
boundlessness or a universality should not be too easily dismissed either. This
dissertation approaches limits from several perspectives and with several different terms.
Frequently I argue that ethics entail admitting an awareness of limits of some sort as well
4 Maurice Merleau-Ponty's work, such as Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible
and the Invisible, demonstrates the embodiment of human perception. In Metaphors We
Live By and Philosophy in the Flesh, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson also show
reason's inherence in the body. Carol H. Cantrell in "'The Locus of Compossibilty':
Viriginia Woolf, Modernism, and Place," and Louise Westling in "Virginia Woolf and
the Flesh of the World" offer guiding examples of how these ideas can be applied in
literary readings.
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as shifts in actions. Thus, for example, a language user must recognize the limits of this
form of communication and so adapt her or his linguistic usages and/or the character of
nonlinguistic acts in response to this recognition. Or, an ethical agent, who is always
embodied, must acknowledge the physiological limits that attend embodied status, as
with Santiago in Hemingway's The Old Man and the Sea, as we will see in Chapter II.
With "limits," however, I also frequently characterize discourses that operate at the edges
or limits of the subject: ethical discourses that acknowledge Others, sentimental
discourses that recall the pathos of all modes of communication and so mark the limits of
pure logic, environmental discourses that contextualize human activity in a broader world
with Other beings, abject discourses that bring the unspeakable into language. These
discourses frequently overlap (and there are other examples too, of course).
Discourses that operate at limits recall the limitations of language in general, as
we have seen in Berger's discussion above. The meaning inherent in the sign therefore
becomes less certain; it depends on context, speaker, the material circumstances more
broadly. Butler's turn on Levinasian breathlessness, or her reframing of it, exemplifies
this ambivalence of the sign. Such ambivalence--also made visible by her resisting and
doubting approach to ethics named by the title to her essay, "Ethical Ambivalence"--itself
functions in an ambivalent way in this dissertation: I acknowledge Butler's argument that
the subject's needs must be recognized in any effective account of subjectivity, thereby
complicating the Levinasian notions, but I will also take this very ambivalence itself to be
ethical at times.
Subjecting the possibility of ethics to questioning is crucial for Derrida too. He
claims that "casting doubt on responsibility, on decision, on one's own being-ethical" is
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"the unrescindable essence of ethics" ("And Say the Animal Responded?" 128). "Doubt"
is the key word here. In setting up this claim, Derrida asks, "Would an ethics be
sufficient, as Levinas maintains, to remind the subject of its being-subject, its being-
guest, host or hostage, that is to say its being-subjected-to-the-other, to the Wholly Other
or to every single other?" (121). Derrida's answer: "I don't think so" (121). Harpham
makes a similar point, suggesting that "every 'ethical' decision violates some law or other,
and violates it precisely because it is 'ethical' (396). Harpham draws our attention here
to the fact that ethical decisions always issue from a set of choices and therefore from
contrasting sets of possible reasoning. To make one decision is to refuse another, or
many others. Ultimately, then, the account of ethics taking shape here distinguishes it
from a simpler morality that would have adherents obey a set of laws, the kind of ethics
seen with suspicion in Harpham's "Theoretical Era." Ethics, then, will only make sense
when held alongside doubt, deconstruction, ambivalence. Situated in this way, we will be
able to discern the value of the term "ethics" in the context of doubt.
Levinas's conceptions of ethics also leave room for doubt by privileging alterity
(and therefore ethics) over ontology. He understands philosophy as "a drama between
philosophers and an intersubjective movement" (Otherwise Than Being 20). This view
evokes the dialogical and therefore doubting character of philosophy: Real dialogue
depends on an open listening that can be described as questioning one's own views. This
is why, following Levinas, I generally do not mean by "ethics" "the science of morals," as
one of the definitions in the Oxford English Dictionary defines the word, since it is
precisely this reduction of regard for the Other to a set of rules, to a science, that concerns
Levinas greatly. Closer to the idea of ethics at work here is the meaning derived from
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Greek root of the word that points to "character." in this sense, those who behave
ethically do so in accord with their good character and with their memberships. This
definition is functional when we keep in mind contemporary analyses of the human
subject, such as Levinas's, that have upset ideas of a permanent or unchanging character.
If, following this idea, we recognize that the subject is situational, contingent, and fluid,
then "character" and therefore ethics can be understood to share those characteristics.
The contingency of subjectivity includes the subject's embodiment. Judith
Butler's work has been important here, especially Bodies that Matter, where she resists
the view of the body as a "simple fact or static condition" (2). 5 Rather, she claims that the
body is materialized through historical, social practices. Generally, this approach can be
aligned with Levinas's treatment of the body. Levinas summarizes his position on the
body in Ethics and Infinity (65-72). A key example in this discussion is erns, which he
understands as "neither a struggle, nor a fusion, nor a knowledge" (68). The embodied
communication in erns instead aligns with "mystery" and "the future" (68). This type of
relationship begins to clear space for Levinas's later conceptions of ethics as "otherwise
than being," a phrase that resonates with Butler's view in Bodies that Matter. Ewa
Plonowska Ziarek emphasizes the importance of Levinas's conceptions of the body,
arguing that his innovation "lies in his elaboration of ethical responsibility in terms of
embodiment, passion, or even delirium" (78).
Conventionally, the body is associated with anxieties about irrationality,
mortality, obscurity, animality, and the like, but, as Ziarek asserts, Levinas makes
5 Another important text that complicates conceptions of embodiment is Elizabeth
Grosz's Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism.
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mystery and even irrationality potential signs of the ethical. Levinasian ethics, at the
limits of knowledge, therefore aligns with sentimentality in underscoring the importance
of the feeling body and pathos to ethical subjectivity.' I will apply Levinas's notion of an
embodiment that is "neither a struggle, nor a fusion, nor a knowledge" to conceptions of
physical nature more generally. This application is valuable because theories of nature
figure importantly in questions of ethics: The common idea of nature as "red in tooth and
claw" is often used (at least implicitly) to support the idea that ethics are unnatural. In
Tennyson's stanza where these lines appear, he opposes "God [who] was love indeed" to
"Nature, [that] red in tooth and claw / With ravine, shreiked against his creed" (In
Memoriam, 56: 13-16). Indeed, Levinas himself felt it necessary to separate the human
from the rest of nature in order to make a place for his ethical claims.
In an interview with three graduate students in 1986, Levinas makes this element
of his work clear. The interviewers ask, "Is there something distinctive about the human
face which, for example, sets it apart from that of an animal?" For Levinas, the face-to-
face encounter is the key to ethical subjectivity.' Levinas responds, "One cannot entirely
refuse the face of an animal. It is via the face that one understands, for example, a dog.
Yet the priority here is not found in the animal, but in the human face" (Wright, Hughes,
and Ainley 169). As I take it, Levinas means that (human) subjectivity begins in the
encounter with the human face and that the characteristics of that encounter are thus
6 This point is drawn partly from Suzanne Clark's argument that "The sentimental acts as
a pivotal ground in a battle over literary and moral value" in Sentimental Modernism (2).
7 See Ethics and Infinity 85-92 for more discussion of this idea.
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primary, or prior. In "Am I Obsessed by Bobby?" John Llewelyn reaches the same
general conclusion about Levinas's notions of animals, tracing them back to Kant, whose
ideas he believes Levinas's resemble.
But in the 1986 interview, Levinas momentarily leaves room for doubt. He
explains, "I don't know if a snake has a face. I can't answer that question. A more
specific analysis is needed." Further, he claims that "without considering animals as
human beings, the ethical extends to all living beings" (172). Yet, when pressed, he
marks the human/animal difference:
I would say, on the contrary, that in relation to the animal, the human is a
new phenomenon t. . I want to emphasize that the human breaks with
pure being, which is always a persistence in being. This is my principal
thesis. A being is something that is attached to being, to its own being.
That is Darwin's idea. The being of animals is a struggle for life. A
struggle for life without ethics. (172)
The ethical doubt that precedes this claim is important because it enables this chapter's
complication of Levinasian ethics as a complication rather than as an overturning. Such
an approach to criticism and discourse is attentive to doubts, suggestions, the unspoken
and underspoken, in addition to the central message of discourse. It is therefore part of
what I understand to'be an ethical criticism because it resists reducing the embodied and
situated "saying" to a singular claim, to a "said" (to use Levinas's terms). However, I
write "resists" here rather than "refuses" because, in certain situations, ethical uses of
discourse demand a clarity that is a kind of reduction to a singular claim. Any number of
everyday examples--"look out!"--can be adduced.
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With Harpham's depiction of critical discourse from the late 60s to the late 80s in
view, it seems understandable that Levinas took steps to earn his claims about ethics that
seem less necessary now. He had to consider not only that ethics were widely understood
as suspect, but also that nature was, and in a large measure is, considered unethical. If
there were to be a place for ethics, it had to be outside of nature and it had to
acknowledge the critiques of ethics as "nonrespectful." Thus, while animals deserve
ethical treatment, Levinas claimed, they could not behave ethically. This tendency in
Levinas's work led Roger Gottlieb and John Llewelyn to argue that Levinas's ideas do
not easily transfer into environmental ethics discourse.
This view has been questioned by several recent analyses, however. An essential
part of this challenge depends on how we approach the human/nonhuman differences (a
point which recalls more generally the importance of our notions of identity to ethical
conceptions). Cary Wolfe, for example, usefully situates Levinas's work in the
contemporary theoretical landscape as he seeks grounds for a wider notion of ethics that
would extend beyond the human. Wolfe remarks that Levinas's notion of ethics as "'total
responsibility' to the Other 'without waiting for reciprocity"' has advantages over a social-
contract, "fair-exchange" model of ethics because it creates a space for differences
(Introduction xvii). It allows for ethics without expecting sameness or equivalence.
Christian Diehm, answering more specifically to Levinasian ethics, argues that "the
tenderness of the flesh calls to me from every direction" (183). This call comes from all
sorts of nonhuman animals, plants, and even perhaps stones. Diehm locates the
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vulnerability that (for Levinas) implies ethics in corporeality, in "the passivity of the body
that is structurally destitute, of necessity 'capable' of being laid low, of being
incapacitated" (177).
Revising Levinas's notion of nature allows Diehm to apply Levinas's account of
ethics more broadly. Attending to the way plants and animals necessarily exchange and
interrelate with their environments, Diehm resists the idea that all nonhumanity partakes
of "pure being." He argues that "the organism does not simply 'undergo' change but
actively participates in its changing, a point that can be expressed by saying that the
organism is a selective system" (179, original emphasis). This leads him to conclude that
"Through its metabolic activities, therefore, the organism breaks from a state of sheer
material continuity with its environment," but that it practices "an activity that it must
perform," a "needful freedom" (179, original emphasis).
Diehm pointedly writes these formulations of organisms' lives in key Levinasian
terms like "needful freedom." Thus, he can further and more generally claim that "As
soon as the body takes its stance at a distance from its environment, that distance is
capable of being traversed, of falling under siege, and hence every body's 'strangeness' is
at the same time destitution, naked vulnerability" (181). Diehrn marks difference itself as
indicative of destitution and so of ethical responsibility. The permeability of boundaries
that makes difference tenuous also implies that soil, even stone, call for ethical
responsibility because what befalls them involves their Others, humans, animals, plants,
stones. Erosion is a clear and serious example.
A brief reminder of Levinas's motive for writing Otherwise Than Being can also
further problematize his human/nonhuman distinction. While he insists that ethics is
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exclusively human, his impetus was the inhuman behavior of humans in the Holocaust.
For Levinas, then, though ethics are inherently human, humans are not inherently,
universally ethical. Levinas believed that this unethical behavior could be attributed
partly to a philosophy of essence that misunderstands human subjectivity. He believed a
better philosophy would show the ethical, relational nature of subjectivity and allow
people to act in accordance with it. If humans can misperceive our own subjectivities, is
it not likely humans misperceive animals' various subjectivities, indeed partly because of
the conventional misunderstanding of human subjectivity?
What place do such concerns have in literary scholarship? Literary knowing is an
important way for humans to enrich our ideas of nature. Lawrence Buell is an important
advocate of this view. His approach to textuality by way of ecocriticism in Writing for an
Endangered World and in its predecessor The Environmental Imagination is oriented by
the task of understanding nature differently and more thoroughly. The central argument
of both books is that a reimagining of nature facilitated partly by literary understanding is
vital to improving human/environment relations. In The Environmental Imagination
particularly, he considers how genre can enable or disable certain kinds of perceptions,
which justifies his extended treatment of nature writing in that book. He also briefly
gestures toward a wider application of Levinasian ethics in Writing for an Endangered
World, though he does not indicate there how it might be done (202).' John Tallmadge
presents similar thinking in "Toward a Natural History of Reading." He quotes what he
8 Buell's essay in The Turn to Ethics reiterates his desire to see more work on Levinas.
He suggests connecting a Levinasian ethics with the conception of the text as friend,
which is Wayne Booth's metaphor in The Company We Keep, as one possible way to do
SO.
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calls Lopez's "famous statement" that nature writing would "provide the foundation for a
reorganization of American political thought" (Tallmadge 283; Lopez . "On Nature" 297).
In an interview with David Thomas Sumner, Lopez makes an extended case for the
importance of nature writing on these grounds (209-262, and especially 213 and 221).
Central to these arguments is the more-than-human perspective typical in nature writing,
which allows for more complex views of reality and even of the human.
More generally, considerations of genre function in this dissertation in two ways.
For one, I argue that an ethical criticism must be concerned with its worldly applications
in specific ways. Criticism oriented by generic conventions, however, can (and
frequently does) de-emphasize the specificities of application in favor of formal
interpretations.' At the very least, then, an ethical criticism should try to recognize how
generic work can conflict with ethical work. Second, I read these limitations in the
potential of generic conventions as an example of the behavior of language more
generally. Any form of representation involves distance between the medium and what is
represented. Recognizing this distance has multiple ethical implications. One of them,
discussed in several places in ensuing chapters, involves including a measure of
skepticism with ontological claims about Others and about nature more generally. Genre,
because it both enables and disables types of perceptions, influences the types of claims
that can be made about the Real.
Buell's, Lopez's, and Tallmadge's thoughts on nature writing can be described
with the broad label vostliumanism, which is also practiced by critics like Donna
9 I treat an example of this in Chapter VI on Silko. I find John Skow to belittle the
political work of her text because of his generic expectations.
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Haraway and N. Katherine Hayles. Posthumanism, though it takes many forms,
consistently returns to the idea that the "human" is produced by and interdependent with
the nonhuman. Derrida's recent writing has spelled out some of the primary elements of
this thinking. For instance, in "The Animal That Therefore I Am {More to Follow)," a
kind of animal autobiography, he treats the human/animal distinction with an aim "to
multiply its figures, to complicate, thicken, delinearize, fold, and divide the line precisely
by making it increase and multiply" (398). Further, in "'Eating Well': An Interview,"
Derrida explains that "the difference between 'animal' and 'vegetal' also remains
problematic" and that "The question also comes back to the difference between the living
and the nonliving" (106). The question of the animal thus proliferates into a whole set of
questions. I take this to be a signal move that will help us read the literary treatments of
human/nonhuman relations in the ensuing chapters.
Derrida points out the worldly consequences that can issue from such distinctions.
A rigorous human/nonhuman divide enables human behaviors destructive of the
nonhuman. Den-ida makes this point witheringly clear with reference to animals in "The
Animal That Therefore I Am":
(there are also animal genocides: the number of species endangered
because of man takes one's breath away). One should neither abuse the
figure of genocide nor consider it explained away. For it gets more
complicated here {in application to animals]: the annihilation of certain
species is indeed in progress, but it is occurring through the organization
and exploitation of an artificial, infernal, virtually interminable survival, in
conditions that previous generations would have judged monstrous,
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outside of every supposed norm of a life proper to animals that are thus
exterminated by means of their continued existence or even their
overpopulation. As if, for example, instead of throwing people into ovens
or gas chambers (let's say the Nazi) doctors and geneticists had decided to
organize the overproduction and overgeneration of Jews, gypsies, and
homosexuals by means of artificial insemination, so that, being more
numerous and better fed, they could be destined in always increasing
numbers for the same hell, that of the imposition of genetic
experimentation or extermination by gas or by fire. In the same abattoirs.
(394-95)
While such behavior between humans has been condemned, Derrida recalls its persisting
application to animals. Derrida's account of this behavior is meant to expose its
unnatural and, indeed, inhuman character. The human/animal distinction has therefore
strangely enabled a set of "infernal" procedures which remind us of the human/animal
proximity: Relying on this distinction in this case muddies the distinction. Derrida's
point about this human/animal nearness is brought home uncannily with the final
reference to the "same abattoirs."'
10 These structures ' are so entrenched that concerns for individual animal's rights can
seem naive, especially when concerns for individuals weigh against species concerns
more generally (debates about hunting overpopulated deer herds are an example). This
problem recurs throughout Derrida's animal writings. Animals, like Derrida's better
known concern of language, depend on, operate in, and are disciplined by systems, human
and nonhuman. We need to do more to consider how these structural relations affect
ethical questions and our applications of ethics. We will vividly see such conflicts in
Hemingway's work.
17
This is not to say that Derrida refuses the differences between these categories of
reality. In "The Animal That Therefore I Am," for example, Derrida strongly resists the
simplistic idea that humans and animals are the same: "I have thus never believed in
some homogeneous continuity between what calls itself man and what he calls the
animal" (398, emphasis in original). Certainly a primary element of ethics is Derrida's
recognition of difference (and of the politics of speaking). Yet Den-ida's work on the
animal prevents us from forgetting the hybridity of all living relationships. His work
reminds us to locate the constructed elements of the human/animal distinction, so that an
ethics can orient our application of this distinction from situation to situation.
Also at stake for Derrida in his work on the animal is the status of philosophy.
This is perhaps surprising at first. In "The Animal That Therefore I Am," he suggests
that the usage "the animal," in which a heterogeneity of beings are designated under this
singular noun, "seems to me to constitute philosophy as such" (408). When he upsets
this singular with his analysis and with his playfully serious neologism "le animaux," a
term which combines the sound and article of the singular with the spelling of the plural,
Den-ida interrogates the discourse of philosophy as practiced in the west." Such
interrogation of its very own premises is, of course, well suited to philosophy and so can
be understood as a disruption that does not really break the rules. But it can be
understood to exemplify this chapter's argument. Derrida's demonstration of the
animality of philosophy exposes the (animal?) drives in reason's very bodies (where
11 For more on "1- animaux" see "The Animal That Therefore I Am" 409, and "And Say
the Animal Responded" 143 and passim.
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philosophical texts are bodies of reason). Den-ida thus shows that in the very thickness or
unreasoning of philosophy is an animality (or, really, are animalities), an unthinking
gesture, driven by desire, that refuses distinctions.
In other words, Derrida points out the animality of philosophy in its discursive
treatment of the animal. This animality appears in two senses. First, reducing the
multiplicity of actual animals in the world to a singular category--animal--is a form of
unreasoning presumption. The very gesture is what it attempts to abject onto the animal.
We notice this point in Den-ida as a critique of philosophy, but this point also leads to the
second sense of animality here. We notice how philosophy (especially Derrida's
philosophical claims) responds to the animal Other and depends on ideas of animality to
make sense as a discourse. The body of reason therefore bears regard for the animal.
Such regard, according to Levinas's accounts of human-to-human ethics, is always-
already ethical; the question is whether or not we acknowledge it.
Derrida's effort to thicken the line dividing the human from the nonhuman, part of
his explicit challenge to Levinasian ethics, as we saw above, also has literary
implications. By materializing the boundary at work in systems of meaning, Derrida
reminds us of the materiality of language. For Derrida, this reminder involves ethical
concerns, for animals and beyond. It also lends his philosophical work a literary modality
in the sense that literature is most clearly where language functions not as simple tool or
transparent medium but as substance or density, itself subject to concern and analysis.
This is a general claim about discourse that entails some complications.
Distinguishing language from the Real has sometimes been understood to mean words do
not affect reality. Indeed, more specifically, the New Critical methods of Cold War
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America produced a strong sense that literature is completely outside of the political and
worldly.'' Recognizing language as a thick medium that inflects whatever it
communicates, however, does not require sustaining the literary/worldly distinction. In
fact, I am arguing the opposite. Recalling that language is material restores the
production of language to embodied subjects who live in material, political
circumstances. In such circumstances, then, literature can in fact function as a tool, but
the tool itself has a history and a substantiality that effects its operation {it is not a simple
tool).
More specifically, in my literary analyses, I likewise attend to moments when the
subject's consciousness of embodiment enables ethical understandings and practices, as
we have already seen above. Such moments are often presented in a liminal language, in
a terminology of obscurity, blurring, doubt, or the like, which I read as language {and
frequently subjectivity) operating at its limits. These moments admit the limits of
ontology, an admission which is itself ethical. In most of the texts I interpret, this
measure of intellectual humility, rather than inducing paralysis, also drives specific,
worldly acts, revealing another dimension of the ethicality of acknowledging
embodiment. The embodiment of language also often appears in the thickness of style,
which materializes linguistic expression by adding to the "message" of discourse appeals
to rhythm, temporality, pleasure, and so on. As Butler has reminded us above, appeals to
pleasure are persistently opposed to ethics, but I will show ways in which style, even
pleasurable style, can register an ethical regard for alterity.
12 Suzanne Clark demonstrates and critiques these interpretive habits in Cold Warriors,
a text important to many of this dissertation's readings and discussed more fully in
ensuing chapters.
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A literary approach to discourse suits this treatment of Levinas in another sense
too. When Levinas privileges the "saying" over the "said" in his philosophy, he makes a
case for a localized language--temporally, geographically, formally, culturally--that is
characteristic of literature. The emphasis on the particularities of literary expression
characteristic of literary judgments can be called a focus on the "saying." Literary
practices, in other words, can be understood to register this need to say again that Levinas
sees as the core of ethics.'
That conception of literature is opposite the one Levinas puts forth in his critique
of art and of images in the 1948 essay "Reality and Its Shadow." Sean Hand reports that
this essay suffered considerable rebuke when it was published in Les Temps Modernes;
the editors prefaced the argument with their objections to it (129). In the essay, Levinas
distinguishes art from criticism. He argues that the former uses images that efface life
because they efface the context in which art lives. By freezing time in its images, art
promotes an unthinking appreciation. It promotes "irresponsibility" (141). Criticism, on
the other hand, "integrates the inhuman work of the artist into the human world" (142).
Historical reality is not lost to criticism, or philosophy, in this account. Instead,
"philosophy discovers, beyond the enchanted rock on which it [the artistic image] stands,
all its possibles swarming about it. It grasps them by interpretation" (142).
For Levinas in 1948, philosophy avoids reifying a false image because it relies on
concepts. While an image works by gathering substance and meaning to itself at the
expense of its surroundings, a concept more clearly must be used in discourse, with
evident context. The move away from the reification of an image helps criticism be more
13 Jill Robbins investigates this point in Altered Reading: Levinas and Literature.
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responsible. But, as Levinas recognizes in ending "Reality and Its Shadow," artists such
as Shakespeare have evinced self-consciousness about their production of images. Such
artists not only produce more responsible works by Levinas's definition, they also erode
the absolute distinction between the use of images and concepts his essay makes.
This distinction, indeed, has begun to erode even as it is formulated. When
Levinas describes how philosophy moves beyond the "enchanted rock" of art, he must
rely on images. Granted, this is a deliberate, self-conscious usage designed to mock art,
but we can see nevertheless that philosophical discourse momentarily becomes imagistic.
If it is to be responsible in such inevitable instances, we might say, philosophical
discourse must have a responsible practitioner, in the same way that the category of art
Levinas seems to condemn can be redeemed by a responsible artist. The problem
Levinas saw as rooted in discourse (i.e. artistic discourse) can, thus, begin to appear
rather as a personal one, an ethical one. Images or imagistic usages are not inherently
flawed.
The danger that philosophy can congeal into a kind of conceptual image became a
central concern for Levinas by the time he wrote Otherwise Than Being. That book
applies directly to philosophical discourse his concern more crudely expressed in the
above critique of images. To articulate this issue in Otherwise Than Being, Levinas
relies on his distinction between the static or congealed "said" and the "saying," where
the former applies to language or statements already formed, whether spoken or written,
and the latter refers the very situation of speaking, to the conditions in which speaker
addresses auditor. In his discussions with Philippe Nemo, for example, Levinas indicates
that the "saying" "is important to me less through its informational contents than by the
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fact that it is addressed to an interlocutor" (42). In Otherwise Than Being, Levinas
explains, "Our whole purpose was to ask if subjectivity, despite its foreignness to the
said, is not stated by an abuse of language through which in the indiscretion of the said
everything is shown. Everything is shown by indeed betraying its meaning, but
philosophy is called upon to reduce that betrayal [...J (156).
For Levinas, the beginning of subjectivity cannot be articulated, by definition. It
is "anarchic," to use his term; it begins before it can possibly be stated or conceptually
grasped ("arch" comes from the Greek "archein" meaning "begin" or "rule"). The 1948
critique of one mode of language thus appears as a general problem in the function of
language itself. The magnitude of this problem registers at the level of style in Otherwise
Than Beint, as Levinas writes his philosophy in what Buell calls a "rhapsodic" mode that
circles around its argument, that rephrases and says again, but that cannot name what it
seeks to describe: the origin of the subject (Writing for an Endangered World 202).
Thus, as Levinas explains in the passage quoted above, the effort of philosophy must
miss its own goal in the very achievement of its own expression, by showing, by
beti its meaning.
This second word choice, "betraying," particularly conveys both senses suggested
here. Meaning is betrayed in the sense of being revealed or uncovered from hiding, but
that very uncovering'is inherently a betrayal in the sense of being false, a
misrepresentation. The compression of language here, which at moments can be called
poetic, recurs throughout Otherwise Than Being.' That characteristic can likewise be
understood as a complication of the strident position against images and art in his early
14 Tina Chanter says Levinas "is a poet despite himself' (8).
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essay. Levinas thus has widened his concern about freezing reality. He also recognizes
that, despite this stylistic attention, his own philosophical book was being formulated as a
"said." Throughout the text, he practices the ethical self-consciousness he recognizes in
Shakespeare partly by pointing out the paradox of his effort--to describe an "abuse of
language" by committing another betrayal, another abuse.
That Otherwise Than &in, cannot completely succeed in giving an account of the
origins of subjectivity does not condemn the effort. Rather, its self-consciousness on this
matter is part of its success. Self-consciousness, a doubled and uncanny sense of the
writerly self, is crucial to ethical awareness. Otherwise Than Being enacts an
understanding of philosophical discourse as an evolving conversation rather than as a
grasping of essential truths. Indeed, as I mentioned above, Levinas follows Husserl to
conclude the first chapter of Otherwise Than Being by arguing against the closure of
philosophical discourse:
Philosophy thus arouses a drama between philosophers and an
intersubjective movement which does not resemble the dialogue of
teamworkers in science, nor even the Platonic dialogue which is the
reminiscence of a drama rather than the drama itself. It is sketched out in
a different structure; empirically it is realized as the history of philosophy
in which new interlocutors always enter who have to restate, but in which
the former ones take up the floor to answer in the interpretations they
arouse, and in which, nonetheless, despite this lack of "certainty in one's
movements" or because of it, no one is allowed a relaxation of attention or
a lack of strictness. (20)
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In this conception, philosophy loses its comfortable distance from what it describes. It
becomes the actual enactment of ideas, a real drama. Philosophy and art thus come closer
together. Moreover, responsibility for the practice of discourse falls on its users, who are
inheritors. With this move in particular, Levinas has earned David Wood's assertion that
"Levinas's writing more than most lives only at the mercy of its reader" (2). A merciful
reading of Levinas should locate his work in order to understand its limitations as "saids."
Only in doing so, in reading toward its "saying" in the context of the drama of
philosophy, can its full range of implications and applications be found.
Levinas's suing/said terminology is important to him, we saw above, because it
evokes the exposure of the subject to the presence of the Other, in body, in the
phenomenological terms of everyday speech. Julia Kristeva's work on language similarly
distinguishes formalized language ("saids") from its living element ("saying"), but in a
way that can enrich and complicate Levinas's terminology. She positions language in its
broader context, pointing out how the development of the subject in language acquisition
is accompanied by losses (especially the separation of the child from its mother) that
leave a set of symptoms both in the subject and in language (see Powers of Horror). She
resists the idea of language as a pure symbolic system, finding it to partake of both
bodily, rhythmic characteristics she calls the semiotic, and the more traditional,
representative characteristics she terms the symbolic (see The Kristeva Reader 89-136).
Language is heterogeneous rather than pure ("The Speaking Subject is not Innocent"
155). In Powers of Horror, she argues that the construction of the symbolic depends upon
the abjection of the bodily and of bodies. This abjection is at the root of the separating
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function of language. Levinas's separation of the human and the nonhuman is a form of
abjection that reduces the nonhuman to a pure self-interest, to a "persistence in being."
Kristeva's claim that symptoms of this fundamental abjection remain in language
indicates the space between text and bodied life. Levinas's movement toward the
"saying" beyond the "said" is comparable. For Levinas, this space between word and
world is filled by ethics. Thus, the reading beyond Levinas's "saids" that I am arguing for
requires us to complicate the very basis of Levinas's ethics on its own terms. We must
answer his distinctions--the human/nonhuman divide, discursive separations (philosophy
versus art), temporal separations ("saids" versus "sayings"), and so on--with the mercy of
ethics.
The enactment of such a criticism in this dissertation I thus understand both to
involve specific claims responsible to particular literary and worldly circumstances, and
to suppose the ethical regard for interlocutors of saying. To summarize some of my
primary arguments (or saids): Ernest Hemingway's thickening of the human/animal
divide could not always be accurately described as merciful, even in the book often
understood to be his most gentle, The Old Man and the Sea. That text is the subject of
my second chapter, where I complicate the polarized readings that understand its
protagonist Santiago either as a triumphant hero whose capacity is proven in his fishing
quest or as a sign of the absolute failure of Hemingway's approach to human subjectivity.
My reading demonstrates the heterogeneity of Hemingway's presentation of the bodied
human subject. His depiction of Santiago's relationships with environment, language,
and body are characteristically estranged in a way that acknowledges the importance of
alterity in all relationships, as the synecdoche of the uncontrollable, cramping left hand
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represents. While critics like Glen Love have read in the violence of Santiago's fishing a
failure of ethics, I argue that the fishing trip actually represents the shock of ethical
experience coming home to the subject. I am not concerned to defend Santiago's
particular acts of killing in my chapter, though; rather, I resist an overly simple
application of what ethics are, as I do throughout my literary analyses. My version of
ethical criticism acknowledges the appetite and the needs of the bodied subject, and
embodiment more generally, much as Butler encourages ethical thinkers to do. This
criticism is not driven merely by theoretical concerns, then. Since the actual practice of
ethical subjectivity requires this strict attention to local circumstances, ethical behavior,
even when it derives from larger principles, can only be discerned in a situated way.
The importance of situation and place to human subjectivity are key to my third
chapter, also on Hemingway. This chapter applies and expands the key claim from my
treatment of The Old Man and the Sea under the title of Hemingway's term
"homesickness." I take "homesickness" as a metaphor for ethical sensibility.
"Homesickness," which I have also come to think of as the ethical uncanny, connotes the
self-awareness central to ethical behavior that is an estrangement of one from one's self.
It also connotes the desire for inhabiting one's body and home place in a way that permits
self and world to flourish. I read Hemingway's later work with attention to the frequent
conflicts between these two definitions of the term, claiming that Hemingway frequently
relies on consciousness of his embodied life inmrder to drive his and his characters'
ethical acts, but also that embodied life is frequently in conflict with the production of
texts in Hemingway's late work. I read the pressure of this conflict between life and text
as motivating Hemingway's use of multiple genres. I also read this pressure as a sign of
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Hemingway's cultural critique of the overly strict separation between the literary and
worldly. At stake is the possibility of the "true" text that can present or influence the
world. Hemingway's writing lives in this space between the desire for the true text and
the awareness of the gap between representation and the Real. That space is filled with
homesickness.
My fourth chapter follows literary cultural critiques to the Beat writers. I treat
three of the figures who appeared at the Six Gallery poetry reading in San Francisco in
1955, which is often taken as a foundational moment for the countercultural movement
more generally. I argue that these writers, Allen Ginsberg, Jack Kerouac, and Gary
Snyder, bring abjected elements of American culture into the visible with their work,
often by recourse to discussion of the body, and that each of them understands this task to
be driven ethically. While I find Ginsberg's and Kerouac's revelations of the body to be
fraught with anxiety, I claim Snyder's work reveals more ordinary possibilities for
embodied subjective practice that he calls bioregionalism. The pragmatic approach of
Snyder's work, I further claim, leads him to produce generically hybrid texts whose
success is determined by their worldly work rather than by their adherence to conventions
of genre.
If Hemingway's work is taken to articulate a homesickness that a writer like
Snyder hopes to cure with his program of bioregionalism, in Terry Tempest Williams we
find an especially sharp awareness of how the practice of a Snyderian ecological
intersubjectivity can expose a person to greater risk in the age of environmental crisis.
She testifies to greater homesickness. Williams's ironically titled book Refuge, I
therefore argue, demonstrates the doubleness of embodiment at the level of language. In
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its status as cultural critique, it renders pain and abject suffering legible, making them
potential participants in cultural renewal, which several critics have recognized. I focus
on the other side of this doubleness: As a generically hybrid autobiography of personal
and ecological loss, Refuge stands as a symptom of cultural disease. It is an utterly
singular account of pain. Such writing at the limits of possible communication reminds
us, I further argue, of the position of all language use, both reducing the world and
making possible new worlds. Ethical literary practice must keep both these
characteristics of language in mind.
My final chapter, on Leslie Marmon Silko's Almanac of the Dead, provides
another perspective of the cultural work and cultural critiques housed in the texts of all
the writers considered here. Silko shares the critical position of these writers, but
inhabits a possibly even more marginal stance than the rest as an American Indian author.
Her text, we might indeed say, is beyond the limits of the "American" literary altogether
in its political critique of the cultural practices that made and sustain "America." I argue
that, in her text, story takes a form of agency that subordinates speaker to story. For
Silko, this conception of story entails a political potency: Stories can and will transform
human life.
CHAPTER II
THE LEFT-HANDED CRAMP OF ETHICS IN THE OLD MAN AND THE SEA
He rubbed the cramped hand against his trousers and tried to gentle the
fingers. But it would not open. Maybe it will open with the sun, he
thought. Maybe it will open when the strong tuna is digested. If I have to
have it, I will open it, cost whatever it costs. But I do not want to open it
now by force. Let it open by itself and come back of its own accord. After
all I abused it much in the night when it was necessary to free and untie the
various lines. (Ernest Hemingway, The Old Man and the Sea 60)
Readings of Ernest Herningway's The Old Man and the Sea are restrained on
either side by opposite concerns in the criticism. On the one hand, many critics find it
sentimental (which is to say, too sentimental), as I show below. On the other, some
critics, looking to the text for an environmental ethics, find it too brutal. Between these
positions, of course, is the body of the text itself, and it is most especially the relationship
between body and text that can present a new approach to this keystone book. I hope the
epigraph suggests a way. In this passage, Santiago is neither completely at home in his
body nor able to inhabit some disembodied self. His ethical position with regard to his
left hand--"let it open by itself'--is driven by the implicit understanding that the hand will
function best when its needs are acknowledged, whatever the desires of the organizing
subject who would have it do as he pleases.
In Santiago's cramping hand, Hemingway reveals the heterogeneity of the human
subject. The relationships with language, the physical environment, human culture, and
with the subject's own body in The Old Man and the Sea likewise demonstrate this
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heterogeneity. They are relationships premised on alterity, on difference that cannot be
reduced to a sameness. This chapter argues that in Santiago's encounter with the marlin,
he is shocked into intensified awareness of this more general alterity. This is, after all,
the fish that cannot be brought in or commodified in the novel. Yet, Santiago's traumatic,
bodily exposure of himself to the fish and otherness more generally explicitly produces
love. Such sentimentality, often disdained in the criticism, signifies an ethical awareness
of the subject's limits and the limits of the literary. Thus, strangely (to use a key
Hemingway word), Santiago's masculinist courage drives a sentimental and ethical
inscription, a thick writing at the limits of the human. It is perhaps in the act of writing
itself, like Levinas's "saying," that we can most clearly read Hemingway's ethical impulse
because writing signals his awareness that, despite the impossibility of complete
knowledge or representation, meaningful action, that is, writing, is still possible.
One way to understand the history of this book's criticism centers on the human
subject's alterity from itself, the differences between the subject as body and the linguistic
subject. Most initial reviews were celebratory and were often presented in terms of a
Hemingway comeback, especially at the level of style. That later reviewers and critics
demoted the book somewhat can be interpreted, at least in some cases, as an example of
how artistic language can appeal to readers at the level of the body or instinct in a way
that "reasonable" criticism cannot explicate. The book did something to many readers
that they could not•identify, and this difficulty led some to moderate their initially purple
praise.
This reading of the criticism, which I will present in closer detail momentarily,
can seem to depend on a tacit claim for the text's greatness. I want to clarify that my
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purpose is not so much a claim of "greatness" as it is to bring forth several of the
accomplishments of the text that are, at most, dimly presented in the criticism. Doing this
reinforces one of the larger claims in this dissertation that the heterogeneity of the human
subject, the unrest of the subject in its own body, points to a need for an ethics of bodily
inhabitation, an ethical relationship of the subject to the body. Why an ethics? Such
circumstances show that the body can sometimes sense realities that reason is ill-
equipped to address, or at least slower to address. An ethics of the sort advocated here
would have the human subject admit this body/reason difference, but would encourage
the subject to self-consciously keep reason and the body in dialogue. This dialogue
improves both body and reason. In other words, an ethics marks the limits of the purely
reasonable subject in much the same way that sentimentality does. This treatment of the
criticism also substantiates the claim I have made above that noticing the rhetorical
function of "reason" in circumstances like a text's critical history locates reason in a thick
body, not transparent to itself or to the exterior world, and therefore reminds us of
reasoning's dark spots, materiality, and blanknesses.
The Old Man and the Sea appeared at a moment when Hemingway's reputation
was under attack. Harvey Breit, for example, reminds us in his review of the perception
common in the early fifties that Hemingway was in "decline." Breit suggests that The
Old Man and the Sea shows this to be untrue (Stephens 343)) He calls the book
"momentous and heartening" and says it "reveals the artist as having gained stature"
(344). Henry Seidel Canby opens his review with the sentence, "This is one of the best
1 Subsequent citations from reviews refer to the Stephens text, unless otherwise
indicated.
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stories that Ernest Hemingway ever wrote." He goes on to claim that "It has no superiors
in the art of writing about the sea in any language I know, unless it is the great conclusion
of Melville's Moby Dick" (339). Numerous, similarly laudatory claims can be found in
other reviews. Many readers were happy to have their heroic writer back in fine form.
Philip Rahv's much less effusive review, published in October of 1952 (the
earliest reviews came out in late August), states rather safely that "Though the merit of
this new story is incontestable, so are its limitations" (360). Rahv says the story is "at its
best in the supple and exact rendering of the sensory detail called for by its chosen
theme," but it is partly because of this theme--a fishing trip--that Rahv finds the story
limited. He goes on to say that "its quality of emotion [is] genuine but so elemental in its
totality as to exact nothing from us beyond instant assent" (360). I doubt that the things
Rahv imagined himself assenting to match what I understand the book to claim for
readers. Also, the common position that nature and nature stories are simple seems to
lurk here, especially in word choices like "elemental," though Rahv does not elaborate the
claim. In any case, the brevity of this critique, probably required by the organ of
publication, seems to elide a lacuna between the visceral response and the reasoned one.
The fascinating drama played out around Hemingway the man, to which Rahv
alludes, contributes intensity both to the praise and its retraction. The lauding of
Hemingway as a returned hero was bound to produce more skeptical responses like
Rahv's that would look more reasonable. The critical circumstances thus establish what
reasonability is. Rahv writes, "Publicity is the reward as well as the nemesis of
celebrities, but it has nothing in common with judgment" (360). Rahv's use of
"judgment," of course, appeals to reason in order to separate the common from the refined
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response to the text. "Publicity" refers to what might be called the animal body of the
population, whose opinions Rahv dismisses as underdeveloped. This dismissal simply on
the grounds of popularity can be understood to resemble the dismissal of a fishing story
as "elemental"--simple, physical, noncultural--in depending uncritically on the body/mind
distinction. Critical attention to the operation of this distinction reveals a different set of
interpretive possibilities.
We can see the agonized alternation of critical opinion happening in the same
critic in Philip Young. His important doctoral dissertation was published as the book
rnest Hemingway in two editions, first in 1952, and then again in 1966. This first
edition had left Young very little time to consider his response to The Old Man and the
Sea, since Hemingway's book came out the same year. In that edition, Young calls the
book "unmistakable Hemingway," aligning it thematically and stylistically with previous
texts. He goes on to say that "where characteristic methods and attitudes have on rare
occasion failed him in the past, or have been only partly successful, this short novel is
beyond any question a triumph" (125).
When Young revised and re-released his book in 1966, he explained his desire to
"greatly tone down the praise for The Old Man and the Sea" (274). He writes, "The
feeling is now that although the tale is here and there exciting it is itself drawn out a little
far. Even the title seems an affectation of simplicity, and the realization that Hemingway
was now trading on and no longer inventing the style that made him famous came just too
late" (274). A few pages prior to this passage, Young agrees heartily with a quotation
from Dwight Macdonald. Macdonald writes that, in The Old Man and the Sea, "Nothing
is at stake except for the professional obligation to sound as much like Hemingway as
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possible" (Young 271-72). Young fits all this discussion under the familiar belief in "the
declination of Hemingway's powers--physical, mental, hence literary," which Young
believed to be "clearer by hindsight than it was at the time" he first addressed The Old 
Man and the Sea (264).
These critics help us see how readings of content connect to and reinforce
readings of style. Macdonald's feeling that little is at stake in this text underlies Harold
Bloom's more recent dismissal (1999) of the book as sentimental, a claim which he
supports partly with an interpretation of its style. Indeed, that connection is visible in
Bloom's definition of sentimentality: "emotion in excess of the object" (3). 2 For Bloom,
the pathos of The Old Man and the Sea derives not from legitimately artistic concerns but
from the author's desire to present an "idealization of Hemingway himself' (2). Bloom
roots this claim in the close association between Hemingway and Santiago and says that
"Hemingway himself is so moved by Hemingway that his famous, laconic style yields to
uncharacteristic overwriting" (3). This overwriting is most apparent in its "repetitive"
character.
My concern is less whether Bloom's condemnation is wrong than what the
grounds of the condemnation are. While few would disagree that self-praise is
2 Other critics who view The Old Man and the Sea as sentimental include Robert P.
Weeks, in "Fakery in The Old Man and the Sea," and James H. Justus. Weeks argues
that, judging from factual errors in the text, Hemingway's style has "gone soft in The Old 
an and the Sea" (39). He goes on to claim that the novella is "tricked out in an effort to
extort more feeling than a reasonable person would find there" (40). Weeks's argument
relies on a view of the universe and nature as cold, and on a polarized rhetoric about the
human subject, as we see in the key word "soft." Suzanne Clark reminds us in Cold
Warriors that the boundaries of the subject were anxiously being policed in this period
(Weeks's essay was first published in 1962), so that as the freestanding, independent
subject came more and more into question, assertions for the coherence of the subject (a
"hard" subject in Weeks's implicit logic) grew more vehement.
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unattractive, this rejection--Hemingway's being moved by Hemingway-- seems tacitly to
disavow the heterogeneity of the subject by recourse to the author/text divide
characteristic of New Criticism. Moreover, because I see an association between a text's
ethical work and its sentimentality, dismissing the latter can entail dismissal of the
former.
In other words, in the context of my reading, Bloom's critique looks ironic.
Bloom considers the self-consciousness in The Old Man and the Sea to be arrogant. I
read the self-awareness of this book works in exactly the opposite way. Santiago's self-
obsessed monologues, which Bloom understands as Hemingway being moved by himself,
actually expose the limitations of the subject. To notice this, however, readers must
recognize the difference between the words presented and their meaning as implied by
context. In earlier works, Hemingway tended to use laconic speech and understatement
to signal irony and complexity. The method here is less caustic or directly contrary,
making it, in my view, harder to read. Obviously this reading stands in stark contrast to
the feeling that this is a simple story. Moreover, in Hemingway's circumstances most
particularly, the often invisible subject of power--in this case of power over animals--is
coming into view, so a self-awareness here is very much a part of the point. It would not
be unethical, but rather a sign of ethical regard, an acknowledgment of the alterity of the
Other. It is an important example of ethical doubleness, of the ethical uncanny I
discussed in Chapter 1. My readings of the text below will bear these points out.
Bloom's critique also returns us to Macdonald's claim that the book treats an
insignificant theme. Glen Love is one of several critics, however, who find more value in
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this treatment of human/world relationships.' Love points out that "Among the high
praise for the novel is the claim that it is Hemingway's final testament of acceptance, his
coming to peaceful terms with the natural world" (206). While Love agrees that the
concern with "right relationships between self and earth" is crucially important to us and
to Hemingway, and that it is very much at issue in The Old Man and the Sea, he disagrees
that the text ultimately presents a peaceful relationship. He argues that Santiago's
relationships with the lives of the sea are determined by "how they serve or hinder him"
(207). This world view he calls "anthropocentrism" (207), and for Love the book is
therefore valuable insofar as "it has dramatized to us how we have reached our precarious
present" ecologically (210). At the core of Santiago's behavior is a "tragic individualism"
that is too eager to live at the edge of death, to kill or be killed. While I accept many of
Love's points, I am complicating his position somewhat by showing Santiago to have an
ethical uneasiness in the text in his relationships with language, his body, and so on.
Recognizing this enables us to read ethical significance in Santiago's thinking and
Hemingway's act of writing.
Other critics have sought to complicate Love's view differently. Charlene
Murphy, for example, answers Love's essay by arguing that it was possible for
Hemingway to both sincerely love and kill the animals he hunted. In a sense, Love had
acknowledged this view by admitting it is "unfair to hold Hemingway accountable to the
ecological standards of a later time" (210). Love's hope, he explains, is to show the
dissonance between Hemingway's strong feelings for nature and the practices presented in
3 Bickford Sylvester, Clinton S. Burhans, Jr., Susan F. Beegel, and most recently, Cary
Wolfe also find this theme significant.
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his texts. Further, Love points to various signs of a change in Hemingway's hunting
practices "at about the time of the writing" of The Old Man and the Sea (209).
Hemingway had published his belief that "it is a sin to kill any non-dangerous game
animal except for meat" and had spoken against other wanton killing (qtd. in Love 209).
Rose Marie Burwell corroborates this view. She explains that Hemingway's guide on his
second African safari, Denis Zaphiro, reported Hemingway's preference for watching
animals rather than killing them (137). 4 Love's concern was indeed Hemingway's
concern. It is my concern too.
But, as I have suggested above, the question of ethics in The Old Man and the Sea
is not so simple as whether or not to kill animals. Indeed, this question occurs to
Santiago several times in the text. Relatively early in the ordeal he thinks, "Perhaps I
should not have been a fisherman" (50). This thought is spurred by his regard for the
marlin and for fish generally; it is a profession of an ethics strong enough to lead Santiago
to potentially regret his whole life's work. Although the immediate answer to himself
seems to contain the doubt--"But that was the thing I was born for"--this internal dialogue
intensifies through the course of the book (50).
While Santiago's conflict does seem to indicate the change in Hemingway's own
hunting practices, as Love asserts, it also marks how ethical regard can conflict with a
moral code. We are encouraged to read into Santiago's reaffirming answer all the
conditions of his life: his poverty, his cultural home in a Cuba that depended on such
4 Christopher Ondaatje also supports this characterization of Hemingway's second safari
(see 179 for example), and Hemingway discusses his concerns with killing animals in his
letters (see 772 for example).
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fishing practices, and so on.' The necessities of his particular life force him into the
experience of trauma that The Old Man and the Sea presents. The trauma of this
experience signifies the role of ethics. If Santiago could easily say he would quit fishing,
a clear moral code would be established. It is the conflict between the life he knows and
the regard he has that necessitates the type of ethical sensibility under consideration in my
argument. As I discussed in my first chapter, Derrida claims that this very "casting doubt
on responsibility, on decision, on one's own being-ethical" is at the center of ethics (128).
This account of ethics enables a new perspective on Hemingway's relationship to
trauma, which is at the center of Philip Young's book mentioned above. Young's
biographical and psychoanalytic analysis claims that Hemingway's work persistently
returns to his unusually traumatic experiences, especially his wounding in Italy during
World War I. Young argues that Hemingway tries to contain and repress these
experiences in his work: "life must be constantly forced under the most intense and
rigorous control, and held in the tightest rein, for it is savage and can get out of hand"
(209). This control characterizes Young's view of Hemingway's style, so that "Learning
to write well was a way of learning defense" (209). Furthermore, Young claims that this
"style the man" (210, original emphasis). These reductive accounts of style and
language in Hemingway express the anxiety about war and trauma characteristic most
especially of that period. In equating the style with "the man," Young reduces
5 Murphy's disassociation of a simple moral code (whether or not to kill) from an ethical
impulse (Hemingway loved animals) seems to derive from a similar, implicit recognition.
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Hemingway's work to literary artifice--style--and collapses the author into that artifice in
order to dismiss or at least downgrade all of them--work, style, man. Hemingway's style
was merely the defense mechanism of an injured psyche.
There are, of course, interpretive and linguistic frameworks other than those of
war and conflict. In Cold Warriors, Suzanne Clark reminds us how dominant a war
mentality was during the Cold War, helping us recognize those interpretive approaches as
historical rather than universal. She discusses the rigid separation of the literary from the
worldly during the period and alerts us to the tendency to disavow the worldly work of
texts by "locating the political in the personal" (Cold Warriors 64). In such disavowals,
the problems considered by texts are blamed on the writer rather than on the political
situation or the wars and traumas produced by it. Making politically driven voices look
aberrant is a way of containing those voices. Relatively disempowered groups of all sorts
(women, ethnic peoples, and so on) have, of course, frequently been silenced in this way,
often in bodily and/or animalistic terms. Clark argues that as the world and national
political situation came under greater pressure during the Cold War, more and more
voices were silenced. Her chapter on Hemingway shows that even this well-known,
canonical author could be effectively silenced by reading approaches that contained
political implications within the personal. This is true, Clark explains, in two ways:
Political elements of his work were neutralized, or, worse, made invisible by the climate
of literary reception; and Hemingway himself was literally silenced--he had difficulty
writing--because of this climate. Clark shows how this approach to criticism also
effectively silenced or contained many other writers of the Cold War period.
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So while Young locates in trauma the failure of Hemingway's work, I look to its
treatment of trauma to note one of its accomplishments. The style--to return to Young's
point above--is indeed crucial to this issue of trauma. One of the ways The Old Man and
the Sea draws attention to style is its plot. Though on the surface level it is an exciting
tale of a fishing exploit, the looming failure of the trip is present from the first page,
where Hemingway likens Santiago's sail to "the flag of permanent defeat" (9). In a
careful reading, the plot thus seems predictable. Hemingway makes this failure explicit
later, when Santiago, in the throes of exhaustion, addresses the marlin: "'Fish,' the old
man said. 'Fish, you are going to have to die anyway. Do you have to kill me too?"' (92),
After a paragraph break that emphasizes the following words, Hemingway then writes,
"That way nothing is accomplished, he thought" {92). Of course this is precisely what
happens. Both are killed.'
This type of plot reinforces the strong tendency to attend to Hemingway at the
level of style and word. Here we find a deft stylist who is nonetheless alien to his words.
This alienation appears at several levels in the book. One example comes in the form of
Hemingway's reminders that his characters speak Spanish. Early on, for instance,
Manolin asks Santiago to "'Tell me about the great John J. McGraw.' He said Jota for J"
(22). Of course, this detail presents the scene more accurately. But the detail also upsets
the narrative movement at the level of the word by reminding readers that, despite our
listening in on this intimate talk, we are outsiders too. Language shows itself as alien to
English readers; it shows its alterity.
6 Many readers have missed Hemingway's strong suggestion that Santiago will die at the
end of this text. In "Hemingway's Extended Vision," Bickford Sylvester clarifies the case
for this reading (see 91 especially).
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This technique is used even more significantly in two key passages later in the
text. First, Santiago ponders the significance of his left hand cramping, having already
decided (in the passage quoted in the epigraph) to let it come back on its own: "I hate a
cramp, he thought. It is a treachery of one's own body. It is humiliating before others to
have a diarrhoea from ptomine poisoning or to vomit from it. But a cramp, he thought of
it as a calambre, humiliates oneself especially when one is alone" (61-62). Here the
alterity of language present in the strangeness of the Spanish word helps us notice how
language is functioning more generally in the text.
Santiago has already decided to "let it open by itself," and this is what he
ultimately does (60). Thus, despite his avowed hatred, Santiago practices a careful
inhabitation of his body that recognizes the difference between his desire for its absolute
strength and the reality of human weakness and mortality. The claim to hate his cramp,
then, appears as a kind of overstatement to vent spleen. Almost opposite to the simple,
macho posturing it is often read to be, Santiago's language acts as a comfort. Its function
within the dramatic space of the story, speaking to no one, is not to convey meaning so
much as to help him cope with his bodily limitations.' And in communication to readers,
the frustrations of this passage show the space between Santiago the desiring subject and
Santiago the body, just as the strange word alienates the story from itself by revealing the
7 In this regard, language is positioned much as it is in "The Killers." The concluding
lines of that story--"'you better not think about it"--in reference to Ole "waiting in the
room and knowing he's going to get it," are sometimes read as Hemingway stoicism (The
Complete Short Stories 222). But that reading ignores the fact that the whole story has
been precisely the opposite of not thinking about it, and also ignores the earlier moment
in the story, when Hemingway encourages us to understand Nick's tough talk ("'What the
hell?'" he says) as his attempt "to swagger it off' after the killers leave (220). Tough talk
indirectly reveals vulnerability.
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layers implicit in it. It is Santiago's ethical response to the alterity of his own body that
ultimately enables his hand to function again. Similarly, the key word "treachery" here
was used a few pages prior to describe how the old man had hooked the fish. Neither
form of exalting the self in this text--physical achievements like successful fishing or
effective language use--provides a way for the subject to feel triumphant.
Presenting these forms of alterity--in language and in body--at the same moment
in the text encourages us to find more than a casual or analogical association between
them. Hemingway seems to be suggesting a subjectivity that is always out of phase with
its world. The subject in this text is represented both by an account of Santiago, whose
body is upset by cramps of alterity, and by the text more generally, which can be
characterized to contain linguistic cramps. The likeness here between text and subject
indicates Hemingway's desire for a close, honest, ethical correspondence between text
and world, most particularly in the way the text presents the experience of the subject.'
Yet, the prevalence of alterity shows that this desire for correspondence cannot be fully
appeased.
Focus on alterity reveals the subject as a kind of trauma, which is Levinas's view
of human subjectivity. Levinas argues that, because of the centrality of trauma to
subjectivity, an ethics is necessary in which the subject always turns back to the world she
or he is alienated from. Indeed, it is Levinas's view that the subject does not exist outside
of trauma, because the subject is rooted in language and sensibilities that themselves are
8 This concern with text/world correspondence is presented with greater intensity, and in
slightly different form, in The Garden of Eden, which I discuss in the next chapter.
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traumatic.' Such an ethical return is apparent in Hemingway's writing at this point within
the text because, as I mentioned above, Santiago has vowed to allow the hand to behave
as it must. An ethical return is also implicit in the existence of the text itself, which
Hemingway wrote in response to and inclusive of his awareness that the narrative could
not fully present the story.
The Spanish interruptions of this English text are a synecdoche for all language in
the book, and they resemble the cramped hand in representing alterity more generally.
That is, this Spanish word is a kind of linguistic cramp that upsets the proper body of the
narrative text. But Hemingway neither ignores the cramp nor succumbs to it; he writes
the story in English while acknowledging the Spanish--really a Cuban--alterity. This is
an ethical response to alterity. Thus, Hemingway's style, which Malcolm Cowley says is
presented "as if English were a strange language that he had studied or invented for
himself and was trying to write in its original purity" actually signifies engagement with a
hybrid world (Stephens 346).
I will delay my related discussion of the book's ending, which centers on
miscommunication, to further elaborate how Hemingway bodies forth the alterity of
language and the subject. We have seen how Santiago's self-directed speech buoys him
up at physically difficult moments or when he feels loneliness most keenly. In Derrida's
terms, Santiago's language functions as a symptom of suffering in these moments. It does
not communicate to anyone in the narrative; rather, it marks and emphasizes his misery.
9 Labeling this situation a "trauma" conveys this alterity clearly, though the word is also
problematic and begs complication, more of which below, and in Chapter
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But, of course, such soliloquies are a conventional method for revealing the invisible
interior of a character. In this sense, they are especially, even excessively,
communicative. They extend the possibilities of language.
Thus, both extremes of the linguistic act are demonstrated in The Old Man and the
Sea because the words both address no human (except Santiago in relation to himself), a
pure subjectivism, and address, as it turned out, the book's millions of readers. This
doubleness is revealed at the limits of language. As Derrida shows in The Work of
Mourning, words responding to loss must fail to be lucid because they indicate the
incommunicability of the mourner's pain, and they must be excessively lucid because they
reduce the life of the lost to words. Any speech in the circumstances of loss is such a
reduction and exaggeration. Derrida reminds us that this complex doubleness is the
position of the speaking subject in general.' Here, then, is another instance of the ethical
uncanny.
This doubleness in language appears at other moments in The Old Man and the 
Sea. Santiago first speaks aloud in the early morning of the first day, when he notices a
man-of-war bird circling and diving at prey: "He's got something,' the old man said
aloud. 'He's not just looking' (33). This statement reveals the depth of Santiago's
knowledge: Not only can he read the signs of birds, he can distinguish whether or not the
bird actually has prey in sight. Or he thinks he can. As in the example of his hated
cramp, and as will become clearer yet with additional examples below, every speech act
10 See Chapter V for more on this element of Derrida's work.
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must be understood with some caution and with attention to the context of its
enunciation. In this case, Santiago is shortly proven correct when flying fish emerge from
the water, under the pursuit of the bird.
But even here, when his speech act marks Santiago's competency, the limits of
that competency are inscribed within it: He must rely on the bird to locate the fish. Thus,
the speech act is driven by an encounter with difference, so that this characteristic act of
the human subject--speaking--is motivated by a bird and by fish. The importance of this
scenario becomes apparent when we take this text's species discourse seriously, as Cary
Wolfe suggests we must do with The Garden of Eden ("Fathers, Lovers, and Friend
Killers" 225 and passim). Language use here marks the porosity of the human/nonhuman
boundary. Further, language itself seems to function as a difference within the subject, or
at least to mark an internal division. Santiago speaks as if to encourage himself to pay
attention to the bird. He is, in effect, encouraging himself to behave according to what
part of him knows. Language, pointing to this doubleness or, perhaps more accurately,
this heterogeneity, in his subjectivity, reminds us of the existence of choices and so of
ethics. Ethics derives from the heterogeneous subject. Though he does not have to attend
to the signs of the sea so carefully, he elects to, and speaking reinforces the possibility of
his choice. Readers are alerted to Santiago's (and the human subject's) options on the
previous page, where, via internal monologue, we hear Santiago think about how he
keeps his lines "straighter than anyone" (32). "Others let them drift with the current," he
considers, but "I keep them with precision" (32).
In this example, Santiago's language indicates his localized discipline developed
from long-term observations. These habits have, in one way, confirmed him as a
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champion among fishermen. In my view, though, central to Hemingway's task here is to
indicate the relative insignificance of even exceptional subjective practices like
Santiago's. The difficulty critics have had in discerning this reflects in the tendency to
find this book either heroic or antiheroic. Leo Gurko, for instance, celebrates The Old
Man and the Sea because it presents a "hero" who is willing to "dare more than other
men" (66). Gurko finds this story significant in part because he believes it the
"culmination of Hemingway's long search for disengagement from the social world and
total entry into the natural" (69). Good technique is valuable in this search because it "is
the quickest and surest way of understanding the physical processes of Nature, of getting
into the thing itself' (68). For Gurko, this movement away from "society and its artifices
is not motivated by the desire to escape but by the desire for liberation" (70).
Crucially at issue in Gurko's partly correct account is what this type of
engagement with the natural means, both to Hemingway and more generally. Gurko's
analysis, emphasizing a subject who is both confirmed and "liberated" by encounters with
the natural world, who is able to "free his moral and emotional self' in such encounters,
ignores the way Santiago, and so many of Hemingway's characters, are unsettled in their
subjectivity by encounters with the world, whether cultural or natural (70). Exile, alterity,
ultimately intersubjectivity--these might be better terms for this scenario. The kind of
"liberation" that happens in the recognition of alterity and intersubjectivity arises from the
clarity of specific, local relationships. It is not the kind of absolute liberation addressed
by Gurko. This liberation is not opposed to culture generally, though it is opposed to
certain types of culture in Hemingway.
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Other readers do not take it to be heroic at all. Nemi D'Agostino, in a moslty
unfavorable reading of the text, says The Old Man and the Sea is about "absolute failure"
(42). James H. Justus makes a similar claim, but more broadly, titling his essay: "The
Later Fiction: Hemingway and the Aesthetics of Failure." He argues that failure is a key
theme in all of Hemingway, and especially in the late work. He warns us not to "accept
too readily the notion of a mellow Hemingway in The Old Man and the Sea" (125-26).
He explains, "the rhythms of mythic parallels, the quasi-biblical diction, and the stark
Homeric courage of its protagonist cannot disguise the central fact of the fable: the grand
victory is brief. Santiago loses the great fish [. . .]" (126, original emphasis). Justus
delivers this last claim as though it were a surprise, indicating the persistence of the
"mellow" Hemingway reading of The Old Man and the Sea (Justus's essay was first
published in 1983). Justus makes the suggestion of duplicity, implicit in "disguise," more
explicit later in his essay. He argues that the successes of The Old Man and the Sea and
^, Moveable Feast show how "Style [. . .] becomes one strategy of countering content" in
the late work, since we all know, according to Justus, that Hemingway's late vision was
dark (127). Indeed, "The work of the late Hemingway, like the early, reveals no
satisfactory alternatives to the vision of failure" (127, original emphasis).
A complexity beyond mere, duplicitous polarity, is apparently not possible
according to the codes of reader reception operating here. The paralysis of this reading
climate is further emphasized when Justus goes on to say that Santiago, the "simple old
fisherman," is "an explicit dalliance with sentimentality" (127). This, along with the
"famous literary style that gives a patina of success" to "fables of failure" in The Old Man
and the Sea leads Justus to claim that "The story of Hemingway's art is the spectacle of
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failure both personal and existential" (127). The "unconscious" assumption that literary
achievement is and must be divorced from reality has come to crisis in arguments like
Justus's." For Justus, style and plot are in direct conflict because a plot that dramatizes
the limits of the human subject could only be the antagonist to so sensitive a style.
A question left unasked throughout this criticism is what style does. How does it
function in the world? I am arguing partly that the embodied sensitivity of Hemingway's
style derives exactly from his sense of the human's limitation. Style as a mode of
conveying rhythm and human sense literally operates at the boundaries of the self. The
Old Man and the Sea dramatizes the intensity of sensibility that locates the individual in a
much larger world and within a culture she or he depends upon, and this is key to the
text's ethical work. Hemingway's code of honesty about experience perversely leads to
accusations of "disguise" or dishonesty, as Justus shows us, because his honesty has,
apparently, taken him beyond where at least some others can go, perhaps mostly because
of prevailing reading codes.
In the perceptive essay "The Social Basis of Hemingway's Style," Larzer Ziff
reverses some of these claims about style. He argues that Hemingway's early style,
characterized by understatement and repetition, derived from "a disapproval of the
sensibility that would want to express feeling directly in whatever language" (150). Ziff
relates this suspicion toward language to social circumstances following the war, in
which soldiers especially could not successfully convey their traumatic experiences to
11 Clark suggests in Cold Warriors that "Hemingway's return to the problem of a 'real'
defined in terms of death . . . may be seen as the very unconscious of criticism" during the
Cold War (93).
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those who had not shared them. This is language operating at its limits.' Ziff goes on to
claim that the "blank," understated modifiers of this style depend on their context much
more than is common: "the modifier is modified by what it presumably modifies rather
than the reverse" (152). For Ziff, then, when Hemingway recommitted himself to the
social and political world in his late work, his style became self-imitation because it
clashed with its social aims (153). Though I will critique this particular point
momentarily, Ziff s argument is an advance beyond Justus's in that it recognizes the social
function of style.
Ziff s approach to language in his essay is rhetorical. In keeping with such an
approach, he might not be surprised to see his final conclusions shifted when set in a new
critical and historical context. While the idea that Hemingway has strengthened his social
commitment in his later work is broadly accepted, this commitment should not be too
strictly contrasted with his earlier work for two primary reasons. One, that earlier work
relied on commitment for the strength of its critiques, as I discuss in the next chapter.
Two, and more importantly for my purposes here, even in works broadly condemned for
being antisocial, such as Green Hills of Africa, Hemingway is frequently measuring the
human alongside the animal and the natural. What Gurko had called a search for
"liberation" may well have begun in that spirit for Hemingway, but it does not end there.
These investigations reach a critical point in The Old Man and the Sea.
Most frequently in Hemingway, the "liberated" self is a self not more alone but
more in relation with specific elements of community, with a friend or a lover, with the
12 As Ziff points out, Hemingway's style is an extension of Mark Twain's campaign
against excessively rhetorical writing; Ziff reminds us that Twain was an important
influence on Hemingway.
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sea, with a trout stream. Hemingway characteristically mistrusts generalities of any kind,
including large communities, but his characters attend carefully to actual relationships.
Gurko, for instance, seems to dimly acknowledge this community element of The Old
Man and the Sea when he points out the "sensation" made among the fishermen (and even
in a vague way among the tourists) who look at the marlin's skeleton (66). Following this
point, however, Gurko proceeds to make his arguments about escaping from society.
Hemingway, however, makes us very aware of this social context, both with the opening
and closing of the text that reveal Manolin's care for him, and with the key moment late in
the story, when Santiago punctures any illusions of liberated independence. Musing the
difficulty of his struggle, he thinks, "Fishing kills me exactly as it keeps me alive. The
boy keeps me alive, he thought. I must not deceive myself too much" (106).
Other critics recognize the social dependency indicated by such moments. But I
suggested above that we should see human/nonhuman relationships in terms of
community too. More specifically, it is especially important to note that Santiago lives
and dies by his fishing here too. Hemingway is quite clear that Santiago regards himself
as a member of the ocean community as well as the human. Recognizing this allows us
to move beyond the notion of escaping society by entering nature because, especially in
this text, the two are presented as interdependent. Fishing is participation in that
community where society and nature interlace. The craft of fishing, then, reveals
Santiago not as a purity of self but as consistency in practices that take him out of
himself. These practices themselves, we can safely assume, were formulated by full-
bodied observation, which is itself an encounter with others. One learns to watch the
5 1
birds hunting by noticing that birds find fish and are visible to a viewer on the surface of
the water--or one's culture teaches this lesson learned in the past from observation.
Linguistic repetition is one of Hemingway's methods of revealing disciplinary
practice developed in intimate relationships. Discipline, then, ultimately, signifies love.
We will have to continue to work up to this last point. The following moment, just prior
to Santiago's hooking the marlin, as Santiago surveys the scene, presents some of the
functions of discipline:
He could not see the green of the shore now but only the tops of the blue
hills that showed white as though they were snow-capped and the clouds
that looked like high snow mountains above them. The sea was very dark
and the light made prisms in the water. The myriad flecks of the plankton
were annulled now by the high sun and it was only the great deep prisms in
the blue water that the old man saw now with his lines going straight down
into the water that was a mile deep. (40)
He is too far out to see the shore, which suggests, of course, his immersion into the
ocean-surface environment. The tremendous alterity of the ocean is further signaled by
the repetitions of "deep" and "water" in a sentence crossed through with marks of sharp,
practiced observation visually and physically (by way of craft). Santiago is
simultaneously shown as knowledgeable and as relatively insignificant. The paratactical
style conjures these things together, producing a textual environment not sorted
hierarchically. Thus the qualifiers like "myriad" and "great" align with "straight" to
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encourage us to see how the accurate fishing parallels and derives from Santiago's
awareness of the unfathomable otherness of the ocean. Appreciating the greatness of the
sea is keeping straight lines.
The understated affection here, which does not even seem like understatement
(Bloom calls the book overwritten) until we recognize the effects of the style, is perhaps
more technically achieved than the moments celebrated by Ziff, not only because it is
more subtle, but also because it has larger implications. Ziff points out how Jake Barnes
is able to celebrate the cafe in Bayonne in The Sun Also Rises with doubled intensity
because he so underwrites the praise. Jake is an exile looking for a culture and a life that
seems truer to him. The quotation above extends this technique by showing how a
complex, cultured life-practice can signify long-term, ethical and loving inhabitation of
places, without transforming those places into the simple familiarity. The thick language
practice, furthermore, with its rhythmic repetition of simple words like "deep" and
"water" makes the familiar of language strange too. Hemingway inhabits language like
Santiago inhabits the sea.
It is not that Hemingway advocates escape from society, then, despite caricatures
of him, nor that his more worldly committed, later work must conflict with his style, as
Ziff and Justus argue. Rather, style enables him to acknowledge the complexity of
relationships between the individual and society. Most of his characters resemble
Santiago in being outsiders who value the society they critique. Frederick Henry leaves
the war, to take a key example, but only when it is clear he is about to be killed. The
deciding moment in that text depends on Henry recognizing that "The questioners had
that beautiful detachment and devotion to stem justice of men dealing in death without
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being in any danger of it" (224-25). Their simple conception of duty and of how social
groups behave--in this case a group of soldiers harried by retreat--forces Henry into exile.
Santiago's exile is milder: He and Manolin "sat on the Terrace and many of the
fishermen made fun of the old man and he was not angry. Others, of the older fishermen,
looked at him and were sad" (11). His poor luck, his age, his traditional approach to
fishing make him an outsider. But this sadness marks a mourning that is not just for a
good man's decline_ Santiago embodies a different relationship with the sea, a
relationship the older fishermen would be aware of partly from their own experiences.
The rest of the text dramatizes this relationship and so functions as implicit social
critique. His ordeal has proved his ability, since at the end, "Many fishermen were
around the skiff looking at what was lashed beside it and one was in the water, his
trousers rolled up, measuring the skeleton with a length of line" (122). His community
recognizes him again. But it is a Pyrrhic proof, because this measured skeleton is only
the barest remains of the whole trip embodied in the story.
Earlier critics of The Old Man and the Sea were not prepared to notice this
complex treatment of nature and community in Hemingway's work. It is difficult not to
hear in arguments like Gurko's the logic of separation, containment, and existentialism at
work during the Cold War (Gurko's essay was first published in 1955). We have seen
that other critics operating under the same general interpretive conditions reached less
complimentary evaluations. Clinton S. Burhans, Jr., for another example, recognizes
Santiago's dependence on community, but claims that the larger point of  The Old Man
arid the Sea is to show "Hemingway's mature view of the tragic irony of man's fate" (51).
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Those who resisted readings like Burhans's tended to argue that The Old Man and
the Sea is not really about community. Bickford Sylvester, for instance, in "Hemingway's
Extended Vision: The Old Man and the Sea," challenges Burhans's view by pointing out
that The Old Man and the Sea is a story about "man's experience of the rest of nature" and
that, therefore, the community element of the story should be considered "somehow
ancillary" (83). Sylvester instead restores the heroic approach to the book, arguing that
"several species" among those Santiago encounters "include exceptional individual
members" (84). Most notable here is the marlin, who proves to be Santiago's match. For
Sylvester in this reading, "opposition to nature" is a necessity because nature itself
functions according to a dramatic tension (85). Sylvester concludes by saying that "the
need for extended effort in the face of inevitable darkness is not merely a man-made
hypothesis, not a masochistic sop to the unmoored human ego, but the reflection of a
natural law man is permitted to follow" (94).
It is especially telling that Sylvester's analysis finds a contradiction between
community and natural concerns. This contrariety also surfaces in the way he theorizes
Santiago's relationship with nature as a kind of tension. Nature gives us firm rules that
we can either accept or reject, and "man," in the quotation above, if he is wise, will obey
those rules. The organizing feature of this debate is a rigid conception of meaning. The
text either concerns community or nature, but certainly not both because they are
exclusive categories. The human is a "man" who must stoically, rigidly confront his
world. Santiago is presented as tough, but also as good-humored and ironic. His jokes
disrupt his stoicism, but it has been difficult for criticism to recognize both sides of this
version of subjectivity.
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Generally, then, Sylvester's approach to The Old Man and the Sea like many of
the critics discussed in this chapter, begins to reveal the book's complex treatment of
nature, community, and subjectivity. But these critics' interpretive frameworks tend to
deny the possibility of interrelationships among these concerns. We should recognize in
Sylvester's view a sense of the alterity of nature, an awareness of difference that enters
into human/world relationships.° But Santiago's statements of contrariety and tension
must be read alongside his love, his embodied conduct toward the world, which answers
to alterity without denying it.
All of this is conveyed by Hemingway's self-consciously thick language, a
language that bodies forth the materiality of the subject and of language. This materiality,
like a cramped hand, demands acknowledgment. Ethically implored acknowledgment is
a kind of partial recognition that sustains alterity. The presence of the Other is admitted
without assuming full knowledge about the Other. This conception locates ethics outside
the purely reasonable. Furthermore, in the example of Santiago's hand, ethical
acknowledgment partakes of a natural necessity, like hunger or the basic drives that
underlie language and other forms of communication. But The Old Man and the Sea also
dramatizes the role of choice. Santiago did not have to let his hand open of its own
accord; he could have forced it open, as he threatened to do, whatever the effects.
The cramped tissue of the sensing body driving to its limits, in short, demonstrates
the embodiment and the thickness of the knowing subject. The intense desire of the
13 The "kinship" approach to human/world relationships, to adopt Ted Toadvine's term,
emphasizes continuity between people and environment (142). In "The Primacy of
Desire and Its Ecological Consequences," Toadvine argues for complicating such a view
by recognizing the "radical Outside" of nature (150).
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subject exposes the inability to fully appease desire, all the more so as desire further
intensifies. Noticing this can help us see how this book navigates between extremes. At
the plot level, Hemingway sustains both the importance of worldly interaction like
Santiago's, the kinds of journeys often taken to be heroic, and the recognition, present in
all of his work, of the limits of the heroic human subject. Indeed, The Old Man and the 
Sea accentuates both these extremes: Santiago is one of Hemingway's most directly
heroic characters whose very heroism exposes him to ridicule from others and from
himself. We are encouraged, therefore, both to respect the impulse to heroism and to
share in the critiques of it.
At the level of the word, in a parallel way, this book permits key terms to enter the
text in a way Hemingway often avoided in earlier books. An example is the introduction
of Manolin: "The old man had taught the boy to fish and the boy loved him" (10). This
direct statement, early in the book, might seem simply to state what should be shown.
Couple the seemingly unearned revelation of love with the theme of love and it becomes
less surprising that Bloom and others might see such claims as relying on "emotion in
excess of its object.""
But I do not think Hemingway has simply lost control of his language here.
Rather, this characteristically paratactical Hemingway phrase functions as understatement
because this brief revelation of their relationship balances against the long, fatally trying
fishing trip in solitude. This phrase, to return to Ziffs point mentioned above about the
earlier fiction, depends greatly on the full context of the book. These human exchanges
14 Bloom does not actually specifically address this moment, nor does he provide
examples of what he reads as this book's sentimentality in the introductory essay where he
makes that claim.
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locate Santiago in a living culture, but the fishing trip locates culture in a broader world
of other species and of the ocean, the extent of which is signaled in part by length of the
fishing accountand Santiago's persistent longing for Manolin's help. In this context,
sentimentality signifies a human lineage that grows despite the limitations of the human
subject. The direct revelation of love early in the book magnifies the presentation of
Santiago's suffering. Sentimentality, then, rather than indicating a person gone "soft," is
directly connected to and part of the courageous element of this tale. The love signifies
beyond the self and can only be conjured with an inadequate, blurry language of regard,
self-consciously, ironically simple and direct. Moreover, as we will now consider,
precisely this type of language is important to the story's fight to the death.
The fight begins with Santiago's reiteration of his focus, which is difficult to
sustain: "Now is the time to think of only one thing" (40). That he repeats this type of
encouragement to himself connects to the previous line--"Now is no time to think of
baseball"--to testify to the difficulty of focusing. Likewise, the claims to knowledge
about the fish in this moment bridge desire and precision. Santiago keeps his lines
carefully, so is better prepared to know "exactly what it was" when the hundred-fathom
line shows a bite (41). However, this knowledge is immediately put into question on the
next page:
"Come on," the old man said aloud. "Make another turn. Just
smell them. Aren't they lovely? Eat them good now and then there is the
tuna. Hard and cold and lovely. Don't be shy, fish. Eat them."
He waited with the line between his thumb and his finger, watching
it and the other lines at the same time for the fish might have swum up or
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down. Then came the same delicate pulling touch again.
" He'll take it," the old man said aloud. "God help him to take it."
He did not take it though. He was gone and the old man felt
nothing, (42)
These four final, parallel sentences mark the end of what Santiago knows about the fish,
and encourage us, furthermore, to read some doubt into all his professions of knowledge.
Not just awareness earned by craft but desire connects Santiago with the fish across a gulf
of darkness. This desire is apparent in the pathos of Hemingway's rhythmic language,
which states its points simply yet with parallel phrasing that circles and restates.
Temporality is crucial to this passage. Repetition in language marks out and fills
narrative time with estranged sameness and appeals to a reader's sense of rhythm.
Imploring the fish aloud to take the sardines he has prepared carefully on the hook,
imagining what would appeal to the marlin, Santiago says, "'Make another turn. Just
smell them. Aren't they lovely?" These circling thoughts duplicate what Santiago
imagines the fish is doing, revealing the fish dimly by recourse to analogy between the
turning of phrases and the turning of fish. "Just smell them" supposes the fish to likewise
have a desire, a partial knowledge, and a fallibility. Both are making turns in time, a
point reiterated by the paragraph break and the phrase "He waited with the line between
his thumb and his finger [. .1." Here Hemingway presents a bodied subject of desire,
connected to the fish across the possibility of sensation, of "the same delicate pulling
touch." An especially relevant phrase in this regard is "and then there is the tuna," which
imputes onto the fish this awareness of appetite's duration: The fish can sharpen its desire
by imagining eating that will last over time, first sardines, then tuna. Perhaps this marks
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again the limits of the likenesses between Santiago's and the marlin's thinking patterns,
perhaps not.' The thickness of desire is signified, in any case, by the place-holding
words "and then there is." This phrase understates desire and reminds us of the distance
between desire and the desired Other because the simple words mostly mark time's
passing (even if this is merely Santiago's expression of his desire to know what the fish
wants). These are, that is to say, thick words that embody time without supposing to
reveal all that happens in it.
The likeness between fish and man muddies the differences between them, calling
into question both categories. They are related across a space of words that ethically
acknowledges difference without easily or simply reducing difference into a category of
knowledge. Such ethical language practice, aware of the physical or bodily dimensions of
sense, can offer new revelations about the "objective" world and reveal the limits of
knowing.
This border crossing, under the pressure of trauma and exhaustion as the story
proceeds, leads to an essential inversion. After the cramps in his hand have been
bothering him, and after the fish has shown itself by jumping, Santiago thinks, "I wish I
could show him what sort of man I am. But then he would see the cramped hand. Let
him think I am more man than I am and I will be so. I wish I was the fish, he thought
[. . .1 " (64). Identity in this sequence of sentences moves from an expression of desire to
15 We are learning more and more about complex thinking patterns and behaviors in
animals. We know from several sources that great apes are capable of duplicity, which
perhaps suggests an awareness of temporality. Whether a marlin is capable of this
awareness is hard to discern largely, or perhaps entirely, because of the linguistic barriers
between humans and fish. See Hillix and Rumbaugh for more on this, as well as Slater
and Halliday.
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a fiction. The desire--"I wish I could show him what sort of man I am"--is undercut by a
realistic awareness of his crampy, old body, and that awareness inspires a fiction. Like
speaking aloud, the fiction told to the fish over the line organizes and drives Santiago's
activity. Santiago does not believe it to be true so much as potentially true from a certain
perspective. But significantly, this acknowledgment of the fiction of the subject, rather
than confirming the subject, drives Santiago's desire further outside himself. He wants to
become the fish.
This pattern is replayed and its significance extended over the next several pages,
as Santiago's exhaustion grows. After contemplating the size and strength of the fish, he
insists,
"I'll kill him though," he said. In all his greatness and his glory."
Although it is unjust, he thought. But I will show him what a man
can do and what a man endures.
"I told the boy I was a strange old man," he said. "Now is when I
must prove it."
The thousand times that he had proved it meant nothing. Now he
was proving it again. Each time was a new time and he never thought
about the past when he was doing it.
I wish he'd sleep and I could sleep and dream about the lions, he
thought. Why are the lions the main thing that is left? (66)
This dialogue swings wildly from position to position, even in the sense that it alternates
between words spoken aloud to the self and internal dialogue. The first spoken words
make a brave claim that Santiago hopes to live up to--"'I'll kill him"'--and the thoughts,
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like a Greek chorus internalized, immediately undercut the spoken words. The "thousand
times" paragraph, however, which reasserts his purpose, is quieter than the first claim.
By the "I wish" response, the fiction of the subject again has modulated into a surrender
to the animal Other, a desire for dreaming that is a key to the story.
The dream motif not only evokes the subject's unconscious and so marks the
limits of will and control, it also softens or "gentles" the depiction of the subject's limits.
Thus, though the plot of this story can appear to be a trauma, the story's recourse to the
involuntary appeal of animal dreams accompanies the pleasures of the book's style to
show ethical intersubjectivity differently. More than a violence, the subject's limits are a
liminal space, a bodied language of style or a rich and curious dream world. The end of
the story, with the old man "dreaming about the lions," figures death not as a trauma, but
quietly (for many readers, invisibly), and as a dream.
The prominence of lions certainly suggests the ferocity of appetite and of nature,
but Santiago's dream lions "played like young cats in the dusk and he loved them as he
loved the boy" (25). Surely for many readers such a suggestion is mere sentimentality.
But our conduct toward nature hinges on the acknowledgment here that nature is more
than merely "red in tooth and claw." It is vital to acknowledge that, in fact, lions do play
as well as hunt. This dream of nature haunts the story, quietly encouraging Santiago's
move beyond the exigencies of hunger toward love for his ostensible adversary the
marlin. This movement is visible in the long passage quoted above (from page 66).
Santiago is a hunter who recognizes his place in his world, who knows what he must do
to survive, but he also recognizes how much more there is to nature than killing.
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The passage following the quotation above reveals Santiago's sense of himself
growing more diffuse. Feeling this way, he failingly turns to a whole series of "tricks" to
sustain his activity. His attention moves from an imagined "picture" of "the fish
swimming in the water" and wondering about how the fish sees at great depth, to thoughts
of baseball, to "the great DiMaggio" (67-68). DiMaggio sharpens his focus briefly, but
Santiago must again shift his thoughts to memories of his arm-wrestling tournament
when he "was not an old man but was Santiago El Catppeon" (70), in order "to give
himself more confidence" (68).
It is his utter exhaustion, caused by and so in physical acknowledgment of the fish
that pushes Santiago's thinking another step: "There is no one worthy of eating him from
the manner of his behavior and his great dignity."` 6 Nonetheless, "his determination to
kill him never relaxed in his sorrow for him" (75). Across the fishing line, the fish has
interrupted Santiago's subjectivity and exposed another fiction as fiction--that of
commodity value. This point is reiterated both comically and dramatically once he has
killed the fish. Thinking that the marlin is "over fifteen hundred pounds" and wondering
how much he is worth, Santiago says aloud, "'I need a pencil for that' (97). And when
the sharks hit, the gradual stripping of the marlin is recognized piece by piece: The Mako
shark, for example, takes "about forty pounds" (103). This reckoning is zeugmatic in
reducing the magnificent fish to pounds of meat, yet the whole story hinges on the
unavoidable reality of animal appetite that drives Santiago, the marlin, and the sharks, a
reality that complicates a zeugmatic reading. Death, at the center of this story and crucial
16 In Hemingway's e elephant-hunting tale, David likewise explains
that "Tiredness brought the beginning of understanding" (182).
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to all appetite, can flatten hypotactical modes of thinking into a parataxis, even while
death reinscribes significance and difference in the subject by showing limits. These
losses are practical, registered financially and in terms of the people they could feed, so
that the irreducible beauty of the fish--the big one that cannot be brought in--is coupled
tightly to all ordinary animal needs.
There is a strange doubleness, then, both in the worth of the fish and in the worth
of Hemingway's other elusive prey: the story. The dignified fish itself can only endure in
a compelling fiction, and there only partly. Thus, an effective, aesthetically pleasing story
that accurately conveys the marlin is called for. But, conversely, part of sustaining that
dignity requires an honest (i.e. an ethical) admission of the fish's unknowability. The fact
that it cannot be brought in or possessed in the plot reminds us of this absolute alterity.
Expressing this unknowable otherness drives Hemingway to the limits of language and
Santiago to the limits of body, so that Santiago's suffering and Hemingway's thick
language signify the alterity of the fish. We can read the pragmatic function of language
for Santiago in a a similar way because his use of words as tools, another sign of the
fishing trial's difficulty, shifts the significance of language itself. Instead of indicating
humanity's superiority over other animals, language in this case is inflected by an animal
Other. Moreover, art, the most triumphant of language uses, shows a lack of artfulness, a
sheer utility and banality.
The description of killing the marlin reinforces the evasive character of story (and
ontology), since Santiago is brought to the edge of death himself as the fish is. The
suggestion that Santiago will ultimately die completes Hemingway's suggested parallel
between man and fish, carried on from the first tentative bite at the bait to the final
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landing of the skiff. This parallel also muddies the human/animal division. At these
limits, Santiago makes his fullest surrender to the fish, "Come on and kill me. I do not
care who kills who," which leads him to the admission that "Now you are getting
confused in the head [. .1. Keep your head clear and know how to suffer like a man. Or
a fish, he thought" (92). The subject shows its limits in this text with suffering, the
pressure of which causes the subject's identity to collapse. Or to nearly collapse.
Santiago musters enough of himself to speak aloud, "in a voice he could hardly hear":
"'Clear up, head,'" and despite repeatedly feeling "himself going" as he tries to finish the
marlin, despite his "mushy" hands, his constructions and fictions and his will enable the
kill (92-93). The blurriness, though, that characterizes this moment indicates the
inexpressible and so links the moment of death with sentimentality. Both indicate limits
of language and subjectivity.
The conclusion to The Old Man and the Sea bodies forth these limits a final time.
Hemingway encourages us to notice that the tourists, who have asked the waiter about the
marlin's skeleton, fail to understand because of linguistic, cultural, and experiential
differences. They think the waiter has told them the marlin's skeleton is that of a shark.
Their misinterpretation dramatizes how the whole story has been at risk all along. it may
fail to come across even in the telling, even with the physical and textual evidence at
hand. Meanwhile, the character who embodies wisdom, experience, and instruction is
asleep "on his face," presumably at the edge of death (127).
From awareness of these limits comes Santiago's ethical claim: "'I shouldn't have
gone out so far, fish,' he said. 'Neither for you nor for me. rm sorry, fish"' (110). This
ethics derives from local, embodied experience that does not disavow death, either for the
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fish or for Santiago. The "ethics" here reside not in a proscripted behavior or an
application of truth so much as in an openness to the Other. Santiago's physical attention,
his suffering and his bodily awareness, leads him to change his ethical stance, as well as
his knowledge claims in the text. This is why it is crucial to notice how language
functions in a thick, embodied way that can register difference on the human sensibility
and so lead to ethical changes.
Several critics have begun to help us see what was at issue historically in
Santiago's fishing practice, which he takes to be more ethical than the younger men's
methods. Santiago did not have to use the more intimate and primitive methods of
fishing. Ethics reside in the possibility of differences, and here those differences come
down to technologies, techniques, and cultures. Hemingway makes us aware of the other
fishermen who use elaborate tools, "those who used buoys as floats for their lines and had
motorboats, bought when the shark livers had brought much money [. .1" (29-30). Susan
F. Beegel argues that Santiago's approach to technology allows him "to uphold an
ecological ethic diametrically opposed to Ahab's 'iron way' ("Santiago and the Eternal
Feminine" 143). She points out that the younger fishermen, with all their gear, "are the
ancestors of today's long-liners" (143). These boats, with much larger catches than small-
scale, traditional fishing practices like Santiago's, have not only produced the decline in
marine populations, they have radically changed the culture of fishing among humans."'
The Old Man and the Sea marks that decline but also resists it with the counter lineage of
Santiago and Manolin. In that counter lineage, it becomes clear that cultural and
17 In "The Cuban Context of The Old Man and the Sea," Bickford Sylvester also points
to the sea-change in fishing practices occurring in the 40s and 50s (e.g. 257).
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technological questions may be more important ethically and ecologically than the
sometimes reductive question about whether humans should ever kill animals.
The young men's understanding the sea as enemy, furthermore, recalls the military
history associated with their wealth. Beegel informs us that "their motorboats were the
fruits of war" insofar as the profitability of shark livers depended upon the German
submarine blockade in the North Atlantic during World War II. Pharmaceuticals
manufacturers, who required cod liver oil normally delivered from the Grand Banks, had
to rely on shark liver oil from the factory at Cojimar until 1958, "when vitamin A was
synthesized" (144). While it may not be the case that Santiago could have adopted all
these tools, because he is presented as poor, the example of these fishermen indicates that
a choice was available more generally. Certainly a choice was available at the level of
attitude. In other words, there are various ways of living by fishing.
The younger men's failure to acknowledge the sea and its life as more than an
enemy relates to a larger worldview that takes difference as a sign of conflict, which is
the mentality of war, dependent on a logic of purity. In Santiago's embodied
responsiveness to his wider community, Hemingway presents an alternative to such
thinking. The differences of the world are allowed to play on the sensing body without
reducing the world's alterity. This ethical openness is essential to Santiago's late
revelation that he should have let the fish be. That idea grows out of an ethical, embodied
practice that registers pleasure and the cramps of trauma. Our first ethical task may
simply be to recognize these cramps in the body of reason and then to let that body come
back to health of its own accord.
CHAPTER III
THE "HOMESICKNESS" OF LATER HEMINGWAY
They had found the trail of the old bull finally and when it turned
off onto a smaller elephant road Juma had looked at David's father and
grinned showing his filed teeth and his father had nodded his head. They
looked as though they had a dirty secret, just as they had looked when he
had found them that night at the shamba.
It was not very long before they came on the secret. It was off to
the right in the forest and the tracks of the old bull led to it. It was a skull
as high as David's chest and white from the sun and rains. There was a
deep depression in the forehead and ridges ran from between the bare
white eye sockets and flared out in empty broken holes where the tusks had
been chopped away. (Ernest Hemingway, The Garden of Eden 180)
The previous chapter presented the cramping body as a figure for the shock of
ethical alterity that has come home to the subject. This chapter pursues the same reading
strategy more generally in Hemingway's late work, extending the argument that
Hemingway's oeuvre constantly works to bring ostensibly external conflicts back to the
subject. "Homesickness," in this sense, represents the body's recognition of ethical
culpability, like the synecdoche of a cramping hand. Suffering, as a kind of sickness in
the subject, signifies the exposure of the subject to the world and to the Other and is
partly constitutive of the subject. The converse of this homesickness, equally important
to acknowledge, is Hemingway's desire to thoroughly inhabit a place and a culture, to
have a real marriage to a home (to borrow the marriage metaphor he uses, which I discuss
below). This second meaning of homesickness also gains more dimension in this chapter.
These apparently opposite sensibilities--suffering and desire--of course produce one
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another, and as each intensifies, it strengthens the other. This relationship is apparent in
the very ambivalence of the experiencing body, of sensory perception itself, exposed to
pleasure or pain along the same neural network. Acknowledging the complex
interrelationships between subject and world, in other words, produces both an estranging
sense of responsibility and a feeling of desire for more careful, intimate inhabitation.
The subjectivity such relationships produce in Hemingway texts is therefore
paradoxical. The inward or temporally backward movement toward roots, toward
"home," persistently reveals sickness: the secret history of vicious, animal appetite, with
its filed teeth and ivory hunger, the distrust of one's heritage so often apparently necessary
in Hemingway's work partly because of his father's suicide. But this very distrust disables
an innocent acceptance of the present cultural life. Ethical subjectivity can therefore
seem impossible because of the absence of a trustworthy ethical code. I argue that
Hemingway's solution to this dilemma depends on writing as exposure. Again, a
doubleness attends this notion. First, writing exposes the darker sides of desire, as I have
suggested. Hemingway, somewhat infamously, does not disavow appetite.' That
exposure, as in the epigraph, eventually leads to abjection and to momento mori in The
Garden of Eden, in which David and Catherine's relationship ends and David's
manuscripts are made into waste by fire. Second, this exposure of the limits of the
subject encourages in Hemingway a different inhabitation of writing. He uses a
stylistically thick, embodied prose that appeals to the physiological home of the subject--
the senses--without allowing the writer-subject to rest in this style, in this writing, in the
1 For example, Molly Westling calls Hemingway a "game hog" in The Green Breast of
the New World, citing Glen Love's essay on Hemingway discussed in the previous
chapter (99).
69
senses. Writing sharpens sensitivity, which both locates the subject more firmly in the
senses and, in precisely that locating, exposes the subject to the world via the senses, and
necessitates a critique of writing itself. In this way Hemingway exposes the ethical
impulse at the heart of writing, at the heart of what Levinas calls "saying." He reveals, as
we will see most clearly in The Garden of Eden, writing as an ethical passion, a
disciplined pathos that reveals and points beyond itself.
That uncanny doubleness can be seen as an ethical sensibility. It is the presence of
the subject to itself, a self-consciousness that enables the ethical awareness beyond one's
"animal" wants. The animality of this doubleness, however, is also part of what
Hemingway helps us see. His tendency to animalize himself and the human in general
has its counterpart in recognizing "human" behaviors in the animal. Indeed, his work
evokes several, heterogeneous recognition scenes. As we will see below, for instance, the
uncanny recognition between the elephant friends in The Garden of Eden pairs with
Hemingway's narrator's recognition of the elephant. Further, it is not just that human and
nonhumans recognize each other, but that the scenes of recognition, with their marks and
traces of language, resemble each other: The elephant writing recalls and helps to produce
its double that is The Garden of Eden, Hemingway's animal text.
The estrangement of the self from its home restores the more literal meaning of
Freud's term unheirnlich. Normally translated as "uncanny," the German word translates
more accurately as "unhomely" (Freud 193, note 1). Freud explains that the uncanny is
"related to what is frightening--to what arouses dread and honor" (193). But the
particular brand of horror that he defines as uncanny is that "which leads back to what is
known of old and long familiar" (195). The doubleness of ethical awareness I discuss in
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this chapter, seeing the very self again, accords with this definition of the uncanny, and
also helps us better understand why Levinas theorizes ethical subjectivity as a kind of
frightful trauma; a sense of the self develops from the traumatic invasion of the Other.
Homesickness is visible at several levels in much of Hemingway's work, perhaps
most readily so at the level of plot. It is often pointed out that Jake in The Sun Also 
Rises, who loves Brett in spite of himself, who is socially engaged with close friendships,
is nonetheless profoundly cut out of the social world by the war. hi this way, the whole
book signifies trauma brought home to the subject at the level of the body. I mentioned
in the previous chapter that Lieutenant Henry's earnest participation in the war effort
leads him necessarily to a separate peace. Violence and the threat of violence cut him out
of the social world too. f or Whom the Bell Tolls takes as one of its purposes, to borrow
Robert Jordan's words, telling "What we did. Not what the others did to us" (134). This
task is carried out perhaps most clearly in Pilar's account of killing the fascists in their
village. But it is also apparent in Jordan accepting his role in the conflict. He considers,
"You're a bridge-blower now. Not a thinker. Man, I'm hungry, he thought" (17).
Carrying out his duty, with some but not many delusions about its significance, returns
Jordan to the body and hunger in that passage, and leads ultimately to his becoming
"completely integrated" in the mountains at the end of the narrative, "his heart beating
against the pine needle floor of the forest" (471). Indeed, in For Whom the Bell Tolls 
more broadly, the move into the material or bodily balances against the difficulty of
acknowledging the individual's place in the war; thinking about hunger saves Jordan from
debilitating thoughts of what his position in this conflict means.
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The night before the attack and the bridge-blowing, this economy within the
subject--an exchange between sheer physicality and generalized significance--registers in
Jordan's internal dialogue. As is common in Hemingway's novels especially,' Jordan at
this moment is quietly panicking. He is self-conscious that this is happening, that he has
"been concentrating so hard on something" that his "brain gets to racing like a flywheel
with the weight gone" (340). He encourages himself to "Remember something concrete
and practical. Remember Grandfather's saber, bright and well oiled in its dented scabbard
[. . .]. Remember Grandfather's Smith and Wesson" (336). But this memory returns him
inevitably to the trauma associated with the Civil War in which his grandfather fought
with this sword and gun, and to his father's suicide with the same pistol. The limits and
the materiality of the bodied life show both in the memories themselves and in the desire
to remember something physical, which is described as a sanity-saving practice. Jordan's
metaphor--"like a flywheel with the weight gone"--presents this accurately. "Weight"
evokes sheer matter, and the need for this weight, like thinking about hunger, allows him
to play the role he feels is required of him by his world. Recognizing the materiality of
the subject enables ethical action.
In this case, the recognition also shows the limits of subjective agency, since, as
with Santiago, Jordan is so clearly self-conscious that he is really tricking himself to some
extent, that the whole set of circumstances seem somewhat absurd. This self-
consciousness can therefore be read as a social critique. Other social worlds are possible,
perhaps ones more like Santiago's in which human lineage in a rich world remains
2 I discuss other examples of this below, but see also the moment of crisis in the night as
Jake confronts his impossible love for Brett in The Sun Also Rises (149-53).
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possible, even if challenged, and in which a person has a chance for a full life-cycle. A
full life-cycle, in the conceptions of the subject I am discussing, would be important for
more than the individual, of course, since this extended inhabitation of "home" is taken to
strengthen ethical responsibility to culture and place. The subtle differences between the
way Jordan and Santiago inhabit their homes are profoundly important to reading
Hemingway's oeuvre carefully, but such differences tend to disappear under the vague
critical charges of "sentimentality" or, in Philip Young's case, with the wound theory,
discussed in the previous chapter. The question for Hemingway was not whether the
subject would be wounded, but for what purpose. Santiago is wounded while
participating socially and ecologically in a world that sustains a possibility of meaning
and value, so that injuries signify an intense, intersubjective sensitivity that approaches
love, physically and otherwise.
Characters like Lieutenant Henry also acknowledge intersubjectivity, but do so
grudgingly because of the particular circumstances of their relationships. After his escape
from near execution, Henry, "Lying on the floor of the flat-car," replays the events. He
considers that his new knee
had been very satisfactory. Valentini had done a fine job. I had done half
the retreat on foot and swum part of the Tagliamento with his knee. It was
his knee all right. The other knee was mine. Doctors did things to you and
then it was not your body any more. The head was mine, and the inside of
the belly. It was very hungry in there. I could feel it turn over on itself.
The head was mine, but not to use, not to think with, only to remember and
not too much remember. {231)
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This injury points back to a conflict that Henry is, at the moment of this passage,
deserting. The decision to do so was spurred by his rejecting the arbitrary "justice of men
dealing in death without being in any danger of it," and the terms of that rejection register
in the phrase "Doctors did things to you," and more clearly in the idea that he should "not
too much remember" (225). The reality of the body's alterity from the subject, the
heterogeneity of the subject, is revealed and augmented in this case, then, by a war trauma
that signifies arbitrary violence.
However, that alterity also appears in the hunger that Henry tries to own for
himself and to mark as distinct from his repaired knee. "The head" and "the inside of the
belly" are his, he claims, but the phrasing, "hungry in there" and "I could feel it turn over
on itself," points to appetite as a force that has its own kind of agency within the
heterogeneous subject, like a cramp. The phrases, in other words, suggest that hunger is
not entirely his, just as the dread of too much memory points to his limited ownership of
his thought. Henry wants to own stomach and mind because, even though they also do
things to him, they participate in a more fundamental economy of the subject that is not as
corrupted by injustice. The revelation here, via style, of desire driving the subject rather
than simple knowledge indicates the need for an ethics of bodily inhabitation.
Henry's relationship with Catherine is likewise outside, or mostly outside, of such
corruption, and the text turns to her immediately following the passage quoted above.
Henry allows that he "could remember Catherine," but not too much or he "would get
crazy" with missing her (231). The right measure of memory weighs against the spinning
flywheel of his thoughts. But they nonetheless commence to spinning in this critical
moment of the book, which resembles the passage cited above from For Whom the Bell 
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Tolls. Henry considers that he "did not love the floor of a flat-car nor guns with canvas
jackets" but that he
loved some one else whom now you knew was not even to be pretended
there; you seeing now very clearly and coldly--not so coldly as clearly and
emptily. You saw emptily, lying on your stomach, having been present
when one army moved back and another came forward. You had lost your
cars and your men as a floorwalker loses the stock of his department in a
fire. There was, however, no insurance. You were out of it now. You had
no more obligation. (232)
This vision's clarity derives from awareness of the individual's place in modern war.
Henry recognizes himself as a mere body in the conflict, a pawn in a larger scheme who
had "been present." This passive construction, which is followed by an abstract account
of the movement of armies that does not delineate allegiance, marks the reduction to
simple body, as does the zeugmatic simile that likens losing men and cars to losing
"stock." Henry's awareness of his bodily status, moreover, seems sharpened by his
physical position, lying on his stomach, still at risk of death.
Trauma has brought the self/body alterity--a kind of homesickness--into view
here, and has driven a narrative that reclaims the self by way of internal monologue. The
self-as-body is acknowledged and then reinscribed in a different context: "Anger was
washed away in the river along with any obligation" (232). Indeed, the description of that
river swim in the previous chapter has already presented Henry's awareness of himself as
mere physicality in a world separate from the war: "I was lucky to have a heavy timber to
hold on to, and I lay in the icy water with my chin on the wood, holding as easily as I
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could with both hands. I was afraid of cramps and I hoped we would move toward the
shore. We went down the river in a long curve" (226). Henry aptly puts himself on the
level of the timber he is floating with, and its company--this status of company is signaled
by the repeated pronoun "we"--stands in contrast to the human, military companions he
has just left. One is thus tempted to read the "we" here as ironic reinforcement of the
sense that the human situation could not be endured. His only friend is a piece of
driftwood.
However, more is happening in this moment. The saving company of "objects"
here functions like the company of language, which, as 1 suggested in the previous
chapter, can also be seen as an object. We should, that is, read this "we" seriously as well
as ironically. Hemingway has recognized the war's lesson that the human can be mere
body and is always partly body, but refuses the unjust application of this principle in war.
The river flows beyond these human flaws, just as hunger and sexual desire partake of an
older economy of the human. But immersion in the river, the surrender to hunger and
desire, these also admit the alterity and physicality of the human. This acceptance of the
body's physicality anticipates the equivalence between Santiago and the marlin.
Biographically, this acceptance also implores us to remember Hemingway's own
treatment of the trees at the Finca in Cuba. Norberto Fuentes reports that Hemingway
ordered his gardener'not to prune the plants on the estate, not even the grass, under the
theory that "plants and trees should grow without restraint" (53; see also 51). Hemingway
also forbade children to throw stones at the trees on the Finca and, according to stories,
had a rather vehement dispute about the ceiba tree at the house entrance. Apparently, one
of the tree's roots was lifting the house's floor tiles. Hemingway did not want the root cut
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or removed, but Mary Hemingway convinced the gardener to cut out the root when
Hemingway was away. The story has it that Hemingway appeared just after the root had
been cut and chased the gardener off with a shotgun, firing rounds into the air (Fuentes
52-53).
This ceiba story exemplifies the homesickness of Hemingway's later life. This
dispute perversely shows Hemingway's desire that home be a place for healing and for
reinventing a conception of health, in a broad way that includes the place. Yet, the
violent expression of this desire is characteristic of Hemingway at times and of his
troubled era, when one violent act seemingly had to be answered by another. We can
read in this violence the crisis of the subject, discussed at greater length in the previous
chapter and in Suzanne Clark's Cold Warriors. Hemingway was quite aware that the
times pervade people's subjectivity, as he reveals in one of his letters: "I think how we are
is how the world has been" (698). To give the world--in this example in the form of a
tree--permission to flourish in its own way is ultimately to help all flourish.
Thomas Hudson, in Islands in the Stream, reminds us again that such ethical
regard or ethical acknowledgment, however, balances against an awareness of mortality
and appetite. In that novel's opening, Hemingway uses driftwood as a figure for loss and
mortality which are the book's key themes. Hudson "had a big pile of driftwood" that
was whitened by the sun and sand-scoured by the wind and he would
become fond of different pieces so that he would hate to burn them. But
there was always more driftwood along the beach after the big storms and
he found it was fun to burn even the pieces he was fond of. He knew the
sea would sculpt more [. . . ]. [H]e could see the line of the flame when it
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left the wood and it made him both sad and happy. All wood that burned
affected him in this way. But burning driftwood did something to him that
he could not define. He thought that it was probably wrong to burn it
when he was so fond of it; but he felt no guilt about it. (11)
The key sentence for my argument, "He knew the sea would sculpt more," reveals
Hudson's recognition of the larger ecology that produces the driftwood. It locates both
wood and its burner in a world that, as Clark suggests in discussing this passage, "bums
like driftwood, the more affecting as we are fond of what burns" (Cold Warriors 95).
Hudson's familiarity with these longer-term processes is typical of Hemingway's later
work, in which sustained and knowledgeable dwelling in a place helped to produce an
ethics of inhabitation. But it is no easy ethics, since the simple practice of burning
driftwood for Hudson figures individual mortality (the limits of the subject), which the
remainder of the book reveals, as Hudson will lose his family and ultimately his own life.
The likeness between driftwood and human is made explicit late in Islands in the 
Stream, as Hudson contemplates the face of his ostensible enemy, the young German they
find who is already in the throes of death: "[The German's] were old eyes now but they
were in a young man's face gone old as driftwood and nearly as gray" (350). This
attention to the German's face, and Hudson's crew's gentle treatment of the man, again
circumscribe the events of war in a larger reality of loss and mortality. Hudson and crew
do what they suppose they must, just as Santiago, Robert Jordan, and most of
Hemingway's protagonists do, but they, and especially Hudson, sustain an ethical regard
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for the Other derived from the recognition signified by the driftwood passage that opens
the text. The weathered and well-traveled pieces of driftwood, like the story's humans,
are thus justly mourned.
This sentimental attitude toward washed-up wood, then, far from revealing a
writer "gone soft" (to cite again Weeks's characterization of later Hemingway), 3 shows
Hemingway's applied awareness of difficult realities in the most ordinary of situations.
This awareness often appears more dramatically in some of Hemingway's earliest work.
Green Hills of Africa centers on Hemingway's own surrender to animality and appetite,
which is made manifest at several points in the text. His desire to kill the sable bull, for
example, leads Hemingway to shoot "at the whole animal instead of the right place and I
was ashamed; but the outfit now were drunk excited. I would have walked but you could
not hold them, they were like a pack of dogs as we ran" (259). Hemingway both
acknowledges his animal excitement here and scapegoats it onto the others--"they were"--
reinforcing the doubleness that this moment of ethical hunting already contains.
Hemingway's identification with animals is even more explicit at this earlier
moment in Green Hills of Africa. He pities lions being molested by camel flies, which
reminds him of horses being attacked by these same flies. He explains,
That day of watching the camel flies working under the horse's tail, having
had them myself, gave me more horror than anything I could remember
except one time in a hospital with my right arm broken off short between
the elbow and the shoulder, the back of the hand having hung down against
my back, the points of the bone having cut up the flesh of the biceps until
3 See Chapter II for more on Weeks and sentimentality.
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it finally rotted, swelled, burst, and sloughed off in pus. Alone with the
pain in the night in the fifth week of not sleeping I thought suddenly how a
bull elk must feel if you break a shoulder and he gets away and in that
night I lay and felt it all, the whole thing as it would happen from the
shock of the bullet to the end of the business and, being a little out of my
head, thought perhaps what I was going through was a punishment for all
hunters. Then, getting well, decided if it was a punishment I had paid it
and at least I knew what I was doing. I did nothing that had not been done
to me. I had been shot and I had been crippled and gotten away. (147-48)
The trauma of injury, in an element of Hemingway's work familiar to us now, reveals the
body to the subject. What changes over the trajectory of the oeuvre is Hemingway's
response to the recognition of his own animality. The ethical shock presented here in the
form of guilt does not deter Hemingway from hunting, as the ending of the above
paragraph shows: "Since I still loved to hunt I resolved that I would only shoot as long as
I could kill cleanly and as soon as I lost that ability I would stop" (148).
But as we saw above, later in his life, still, he claims, in possession of the skills to
shoot accurately, Hemingway increasingly lost interest in the kill. This accompanies
what I considered above to be increased consciousness of nature's dimensions beyond kill
or be-killed, concisely presented in Santiago's dream of the lions. Just as Hudson in
Islands in the Stream takes no pleasure in the young German's mortal pains, Hudson's
acknowledgment of human animality sometimes takes the form of love in that book,
perhaps most clearly in the often-discussed love affair with Boise the cat. This affair is
described in the same (therefore oddly double) terms as the younger Hemingway's
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appetite for the sable bull; it is a kind of uncontrollable passion: "The way he and Boise
felt now, he thought, neither one wanted to outlive the other. I don't know how many
people and animals have been in love before, he thought. It probably is a very comic
situation. But 1 don't find it comic at all" (208).
Hemingway's repeated mention of the potentially comic appearance of this affair
does not deter Roderick Nordell, in his generally favorable review of Islands in the
Stream, from calling this "an unbelievable bout of sentimentality with a pet tomcat"
(Stephens 443). Such a position, of course, simplifies this question of the animal that
persists throughout Hemingway's work and that, I have been claiming, takes new form in
the later texts. The recognition of animality that led to violence earlier in Hemingway's
life here leads to a love that muddles the categories of human and animal. Hemingway
writes, for instance, that "Sometimes, the servants said, he [Boise] would not eat for
several days after the man was gone but his hunger always drove him to it" (208). Then,
in the same paragraph: "He [Boise] always ate very quickly and then wanted to leave the
cat room as soon as he had finished. There was no cat that he cared for in any way"
(208). The next paragraph begins, "For a long time now the man thought that Boise had
regarded himself as a human being" (209). The more generalized approach to the
human/animal distinction is signaled by the broad terms used: "the man," "human being."
Hudson's reference to himself in the third person can also be understood as adopting
Boise's perspective, and it marks Hudson's recognition of the heterogeneity of the self that
is determined situation by situation. Further, Hudson recognizes in Boise behaviors
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typical of Hemingway human characters--a surrender to appetite, a skeptical attitude
toward its own kind--and we are encouraged to see these likenesses as key to Hudson's
love for Boise.'
Indeed, these likeness are crucial to reading the pages that follow the above
passages, as the history of the cats presented there slowly modulates from thoughts about
Princessa the cat into a consideration of Hudson's human love affair with an "Italian
princess" on a ship. The subtle, hybrid, transgressive work of the words
"Princessa"/"princess" here enables the transition. In the recollected story of the princess,
their intensifying relationship is held in check by the reality that she is married and her
husband sails on the same ship as they do. The comically serious effect of these
circumstances must thus be read alongside the serious comedy of the love affair with the
cat, so that Hudson can reveal and mock his own passionate appetite as he does Boise's.
Human/animal relationships thereby stand for (or stand alongside) social alterity more
generally. Love becomes an unfulfillable passion, an impossible union, the sentimentality
and humor of which marks the limits of the knowing subject and of the union.
Sentimentality, pathos, operates as erns does for Levinas: It is "neither a struggle, nor a
fusion, nor a knowledge" (Ethics and Infinity 68). 5 Because it embodies the limits of pure
knowing in a language that communicates, though, sentimentality also, importantly,
sustains the possibility of the movement toward love, with cats or people. Calling a
sentimental language more than reasonable, in other words, recognizes the limits of
reasoning without surrendering the possibility of exchange and communication.
4 it is important to recognize that, as Fuentes reports, Boise was a real cat that
Hemingway did spoil (79).
5 See Chapter I, 8-9 for more on this idea.
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To read such relationships under consideration of ethics may seem strange, since
we are presented with two tales of uncontrollable animal passion, both verging on taboos.
My point is not to condone either adultery or bestiality, of course, but rather to point out
how Hudson's observations of Boise and of other cats enable him to recognize more about
human behavior. This effort reaches a tragicomic apogee in Hudson's animalization of
the aristocratic classes:
Princessa was such a delicate and aristocratic cat, smoke gray, with golden
eyes and beautiful manners, and such a great dignity that her periods of
being in heat were like an introduction to, and explanation and finally
exposition of, all the scandals of royal houses. Since he had seen Princessa
in heat, not the first tragic time, but after she was grown and beautiful, and
so suddenly changed from all her dignity and poise into wantonness,
Thomas Hudson knew that he did not want to die without having made
love to a princess as lovely as Princessa. (217)
This political claim or satire aligns with so much of Hemingway's work and interests,
from his participation in the hunt to his interest in bullfighting and fishing. He mocks and
acknowledges the alternation between grace and appetite, in Princessa and in himself.
Actual, embodied contact with animals enables the recognition scenes that ensure over
the course of Hemingway's work, which lead him toward the view of subjectivity
embodied in The Old Man and the Sea_
But even the earlier texts, that have seemed to the criticism driven by a machismo,
show signs of what Hemingway realizes more fully later. Jake finds in the bullfight a
drama that acknowledges violence, but a successful bullfight is not mere opposition.
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Indeed, as Hemingway shows more explicitly in Death in the Afternoon, without the
bullfighter's careful application of craft and his deliberate risk of life, a bullfighter is a
mere "assassin."' In this way, the bullfighter must level himself with the bull; he must
approach the animal, both literally and in a more figurative sense. This distinction
between an assassin and a craftsman is crucial to Hemingway's accounts of bullfighting
and writing. Furthermore, the fact that the bullfight is an old cultural tradition is a key
part of its appeal.
It is only the other side of this thinking that leads Hemingway to lose interest in
the kill later. His refusal to find the kill itself valuable in bullfighting unless it is
accompanied by risk and skill points to the value of the ritual and the culture surrounding
the bullfight. Likewise, comparing his two safaris makes the development of
Hemingway's esteem for craft and culture abundantly clear. The first safari, as described
in Green Hills of Africa, finds much of its narrative drive in the competition to kill the
best trophies (e.g. 86). In True at First Light,' Hemingway disowns that goal: "The time
of shooting beasts for trophies was long past with me. I still loved to shoot and kill
cleanly. But I was shooting for the meat we needed to eat and to back up Miss Mary and
6 The word "assassination" and its cognates are used in Death in the Afternoon (e.g.
246). Hemingway also talks extensively about the false "tricks" bullfighters use at times
(Death in the Afternoon 51, 163, 232-69, passim; The Sun Also Rises 171).
7 I recognize the textual problems with Scribner's published version of this book. As
Cary Wolfe points out in "Fathers, Lovers, and Friend Killers: Rearticulating Gender and
Race via Species in Hemingway," this text is "a diffuse and belabored piece of work
culled from the vast body of late Hemingway manuscripts" (224). Another text drawn
from the late African manuscripts, reportedly titled Under Kilimanjaro, is expected to be
published soon. My claims here are true of the text I have seen.
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against beasts that had been outlawed for cause [. .]" (98). Instead, killing is integrated
into a life practice and is obedient to local cultural codes, laws, and causes.
In one sense, then, True at First Light extends and complicates the project of
Green Hills of Africa, as Hemingway presents it in the Foreword to that earlier text: "The
writer has attempted to write an absolutely true book to see whether the shape of a
country and the pattern of a month's action can, if truly presented, compete with a work of
the imagination." The greater focus on killing and the more evident trust in truth in
Green Hills of Africa go together; they are replaced with more cautious interest in
observation itself in True at First Light.' This change appears in the epigraph selected for
the later book: "In Africa a thing is true at first light at first light and a lie by noon and
you have no more respect for it than for the lovely, perfect weed-fringed lake you see
across the sun-baked salt plain. You have walked across that plain in the morning and
you know that no such lake is there" (5). Time is explicitly brought to bear on perception
in this passage, which points to the importance of culture as a register of long-term,
collective observation in a place. Hemingway makes this idea more explicit later in the
text:
I thought how lucky we were this time in Africa to be living long enough
in one place so that we knew the individual animals and knew the snake
holes and the snakes that lived in them. When I had first been in Africa we
were always in a hurry to move from one place to another to hunt beasts
for trophies. If you saw a cobra it was an accident as it would be to find a
8 Interest in observation is signaled by the words "shape" and "pattern" in the Preface to
Green Hills of Africa, but True at First Light, takes this interest more seriously.
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rattler on the road in Wyoming. Now we knew many places where cobras
lived. (97)
The month's perceptions mentioned in the Foreword to Green Hills of Africa seem more
to organize and structure the text, much as does the text's professed parallel to
imaginative works, or fiction. But time and perception in True at First Light put fiction
and observation into question, and motivate the ethical shift from learning by killing to
learning by watching and inhabiting. Temporality interrupts organization rather than
enables it. The notion of bringing heads home to hang on the wall is replaced by the
desire to join the local African culture in True at First Light, though this latter, as we saw
above, also entailed killing.
Hemingway's obviously problematic desire to "go native" is perhaps most
apparent in his plotted marriage to Debba, who is a Kamba woman. Their sustained
courting is presented as obedient to Kamba customs (e.g. 36), which therefore makes
Hemingway an at least partial participant in that culture. But ultimately Hemingway's
outsider status and his marriage with Mary force him to expose the fantasy element of the
Debba affair. By the end of the book, after Hemingway has taken to patrolling at night
barefoot with a spear as the locals would, and when the Debba events have also gone on
for some time, Mary's return from Nairobi leads him to "put the other Africa away
somewhere." In its place, he and Mary "made our own Africa again. It was another
Africa from where I had been and at first, I felt the red spilling up my chest and then I
accepted it and did not think at all and felt only what I felt and Mary felt lovely in bed"
(293). Loss and ethical acknowledgment, figured here as an internal bleeding, parallel
Santiago's hand cramp. The inhabitation of a heterogeneous body figures the inhabitation
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of culture, driven by desire but contained by alterity. The bawdy pun on "felt,"
furthermore, makes the ostensibly sincere feeling of loss for the "other Africa" look
absurd. Humor destabilizes and ironizes Hemingway's desire.
Hemingway's desire for Africa plays against what he recognizes as ethical duty as
well:
[. . .] I had been a fool not to have stayed on in Africa [years before] and
instead had gone back to America where I had killed my homesickness for
Africa in different ways. Then before I could get back came the Spanish
war and I became involved in what was happening to the world and I had
stayed with that for better and for worse until I had finally come back. It
had not been easy to get back nor to break the chains of responsibility that
are built up, seemingly, as lightly as spiderwebs but that hold like steel
cables. (161)
Marriage to his world, "for better and for worse," prevents his remaining in Africa, much
as his marriage to Mary and his sense of responsibility prevent the complete border
crossing that marrying Debba would have entailed. Despite this admission of
responsibility, however, Hemingway's African fantasies clearly and disturbingly evoke
imperialist and colonialist histories. Unfortunately, criticism tends to stop at the
recognition of this imperialist pattern without acknowledging the useful cultural critiques
embedded in such fantasies (see my discussion of Toni Morrison below, for instance).
Hemingway's desire for Africa is a longing for a fuller inhabitation of the senses, for
waking up happy every morning (19), for an honest participation in the ancient rite of the
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hunt (e.g. 156), and these desires create his "homesickness" that bears a more complex
relationship to imperialism than might first appear, as the rest of this chapter will show.
In a parallel fashion, the desire for truth that is evoked by True at First Light's title
and epigraph, characteristic of so-called nonfiction genres like memoir or nature writing,
is contained by a similar recognition about the complexity of knowledge. It is only via
long-term inhabitation and culture that one can really approach the truth Hemingway
always sought in his writing. His self-mocking, yet also sincere homesickness for Africa
registers both his awareness of the complexity of truth and his outsider status to African
cultures. Hemingway in Africa, then, resembles Santiago in body, in language, and at
sea. The thick language practice of  he Old Man and the Sea, rich with style, registers in
fiction what True at First Light presents in memoir. Both texts present a heterogeneous
subject, out of phase with itself, but still oriented by ethical impulses. Both texts also
reveal Hemingway as a wary and suspicious lover of the word.
A strangely comic parody in tru e 	of an F. Scott Fitzgerald phrase
demonstrates this point with its meditation on the word "soul." In the middle of the night
after Mary has killed "her" lion, Hemingway has awakened to worries, to ethical shocks,
first about Mary's disappointment in requiring shooting assistance and then about the lion,
how it felt in life and what he supposes it felt in death. The time--three o'clock in the
morning--and the disappointments of this hunt put Hemingway in mind of the Fitzgerald
phrase: "'In a real dark night of the soul it is always three o'clock in the morning"' (172).
But the abstract desperation of this phrase is immediately mocked with a worldly
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pragmatism: "For many months three o'clock in the morning had been two hours, or an
hour and a half, before you would get up and get dressed and put your boots on to hunt
Miss Mary's lion" (171).
Nonetheless, he continues to mull the phrase: "And I thought sitting up awake in
the African night that I knew nothing about the soul at all. People were always talking of
it and writing of it but who knew about it?" (172). The situation of his thinking--African
night--plays against the abstract word "soul" and reminds us that True at First Light is
designed in large measure to interrogate what Hemingway sees as the false pieties of
Western culture. He goes on to say that "I knew I would have a very difficult time trying
to explain it to Ngui and Mthuka and the others even if I knew anything about it,"
reinforcing his implicit claim that the word is at least vague and perhaps nonsensical
(172). The very next sentence, without a paragraph break, offers an alternative mode of
understanding:
Before I woke I had been dreaming and in the dream I had a horse's body
but a man's head and shoulders and I had wondered why no one had known
this before. It was a very logical dream and it dealt with the precise
moment at which the change came about in the body so that they were
human bodies. It seemed a very sound and good dream and I wondered
what the others would think of it when I told it to them. I was awake now
and the cider was cool and fresh but I could still feel the muscles I had in
the dream when my body had been a horse's body. (172)
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Thoughts of the soul become an animal dream that would make sense to the African
locals and to his hunting companions. Abstraction modulates into physical sensibility,
feeling "the muscles."
However, in the sentence that follows the above passage, Hemingway's narrative
voice recognizes that "This was not helping me with the soul." He therefore tries to
imagine the soul "in the terms that I believed." He decides it would likely be "a spring of
clear fresh water that never diminished in the drought and never froze in the winter"
(172). Again, the concreteness of this metaphor is key to the whole discussion and to
Hemingway's work generally, and it points toward his conclusion about the soul. He
decides he "could not believe" in an everlasting soul. Rather, if he and his companions
had been killed, "we would all just have been dead, deader than the lion perhaps, and no
one was worrying about his soul" (173). Hemingway's conclusions about the soul aside,
it is crucial that he insistently considers it in terms of an animal Other. The lion's
imagined experience informs Hemingway's own beliefs, much as the marlin's death
foreshadows and expresses Santiago's death. The whole meditation in . Truk at First Light,
however, is animated by a wry humor that is reinforced by the chapter's ending:
Hemingway and his friend share a beer first thing in the morning. Depending on how we
read this, it either redoubles the critique of thoughts about the soul (replacing them with
an Epicureanism) or ironizes the narrator's perspective, or, somewhat disjunctively and
most interestingly, both.
In other words, as I suggested above, what happens at the level of the word in The
0.11Ma and t e Sea is attempted in terms of life practice in Trais .
However, it must also be recognized that much of the energy of The Old Man and the Sea 
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derives from Hemingway's even greater familiarity with Cuban culture and environment,
so this distinction between a fictional world and a nonfictional one is false in the histories
of these texts. In the later books, though, the influence of the actual on the textual is
permitted to become more visible, to be explicitly at issue. Some of the work of the
incomplete True at First Light text, for example, is at the level of genre, which is signaled
by its selected title and epigraph. What exactly is true? Hemingway's interrogation of the
fiction/nonfiction divide is also important to A Moveable Feast. The Preface states, "this
book may be regarded as fiction." Gerry Brenner reports that the legitimacy of this
Preface as presented in fact is in doubt, but Brenner explains that Hemingway stated
"more assertively" that "This book is fiction" (298). 1 show below how the interaction
between word and world is explored directly in The Garden of Ego. The approach to the
Other--fish, culture, language, lover--produces a version of the self but also exposes the
porosity and fluidity of the self. Relationships with animals are important catalysts for
this recognition. Confronting the marlin or the lion requires an ethical admission of the
Other's alterity. Recognizing this, especially with regard to True at First Light, offers a
different view of the ostensibly masculinist practice of action in Hemingway's life and
work. The sincere act, like the true sentence, shows itself as an important and enabling
fiction. The desire for integrity of act and word can be seen to derive from an awareness,
which becomes increasingly self-conscious through the oeuvre, of the intersubjective,
hybrid, circumstantial production of identity. The insistence on honesty and sincerity
implies the difficulty of both.
Indeed, recognizing the element of desire in the move to integrity helps us
understand how Hemingway's humor fits into his ethical sincerity. Humor is quite
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apparent in True at First Light. But it is also important in earlier works like The Sun ALL)
RIS&a. 9 In these texts, as in the passage discussed above, humor deflates claims to
knowledge or seriousness much as sentimental impulses do. These moves mark the
limits of the knowing subject. But the very marking itself also indicates a sincerity
beyond knowledge. We can see this if we change the interpretive framework to ethics
(here, under Levinas's theorization). Writing, saying, signifies an ethics. Self-effacing
humor in Hemingway is not purely destructive, then. It signifies recognition of
circumstances bigger than--and productive of--the self. It partly points toward
community. The ethical call for an honesty more honest than discursive truth, that
produces jokes as well as lyricism at the limit of the subject, is what can make cultures
healthy. This ethical call contains within it the humor and playfulness of textual
practices.
Playful and serious textual practices, and the differences between them, are
precisely at issue in The  Garden of Eden?' This is most readily apparent in Catherine's
representational play, first with her own body, then with David's and Manta's bodies, and
finally with David's stories. Several critics have recognized how this bodied textual play
parallels and interrogates David's production of written texts, Kathy Willingham, in
9 James Hinkle, for one, unearths some of this often buried humor in his essay "What's
Funny in The Sun Also Rises."
10 As with I e Light,  I am forced at this time to work with the problematic
published version of this text. Burwell argues that there is "an enormous gap between
Hemingway's intention for the book that can be recovered from the novel and the
meaning readers can create without knowledge of the manuscripts" (99). While I
recognize the need to consult the manuscripts, I also believe that careful reading can
reveal more about The Garden of Eden than Burwell admits. Further, reading the
published text importantly recognizes the importance that publication has on the meaning
of a text.
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"Hemingway's The Garden of Eden: Writing with the Body," for instance, aligns
Catherine's bodied art with French feminism's conceptions of Ncriture feminine 
especially those of Helene Cixous. Willingham helps us begin to see that more is at issue
in Catherine's bodily play than the jealousy (of David's writing) often cited in the
criticism.
For Willingham, Hemingway's "treatment of Catherine reveals several surprising
insights into the creative struggles of the female artist" (294). She claims that "Catherine
compensates for her insecurities about expressing herself with language by asserting her
creativity and ingenuity physically," and that this uneasy relationship to the symbolic is
paralleled in the novel by Catherine's resistance to conventional western notions of
economics (299). While, in David's "male economy [. . .] money is a commodity to be
possessed and a signifier of power and sexual control," for Catherine, economics come
back to a gift exchange (304). Willingham traces her ideas of economy as gift exchange
back through George Bataille and Claude Levi-Strauss to Mauss's The Gift, also pointing
out Cixous and Catherine Clement's contestation of "the idea of woman's passivity which
forms the matrix of Levi-Strauss's interpretation of exchange relations" (304).
Willingham aligns Catherine's actions with such challenges to male economics and the
value system they depend on, explaining how Catherine clearly refuses a passive role
economically and artistically in the novel.
Willingham's argument usefully identifies many of the issues interrogated in The
Garden of Eden, but her focus on Catherine obscures the extent to which David
recognizes and accepts the claims Catherine makes about art, the body, economics, and
the symbolic. In this sense, Willingham's reading is akin to much of the criticism of this
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book. Burwell, in her discussion of the manuscript from which the book was culled,
likewise reduces the complexity of some of these issues to sexual experimentation that
ends in a war of the sexes: She writes that "Eden is Hemingway's attempt to render
aesthetic growth through sexual metamorphosis" (108). Burwell is of course right to
recognize the body/text tension in The Garden of Eden, but her view that "When
Catherine burns the stories, the androgynous vision is over," that "it is only the masculine
mode of David's creative imagination which survives in the rewritten stories" is difficult
to align with the fact that The Garden of Eden presents these body/text tensions as
tendons in a narrative that recounts and re-presents them (112). And this is to say
nothing of the elegiac feeling that pervades the book.
Burwell's sense that masculine art prevails over feminine embodiment follows
from several of the critics whose work she cites favorably. Frank Scafella argues (in
1987) that, as Catherine undergoes her "crisis of identity" (26), David realizes "with a
certainty deeper than reason that disaster lies ahead for them" (27). From this important
observation about the dynamics of identity in the book, Scafella moves toward a
conclusion that trusts David's frequent refrain that "the only thing left entire in David
after the ravages of his sensual life with Catherine is his 'ability to write"' (27).
Accordingly, Scafella has begun his article with the suggestion that David's garden in the
novel "is story" (20): The text (the "said" in Levinas's terms) has sufficiently replaced the
dangerous, ravening, living body in this account; the ideal is rescued and preserved from
the visages of the body. Fascinatingly, this abjection of the body plays out in the course
94
of Scafella's article as he ends two paragraphs by repeating, with variations, the elegiac
line from early in the novel: "his heart said goodbye Catherine goodbye my lovely girl
goodbye and good luck and goodbye" (18).
Like most of this book's critics, Scafella trusts to the novel's surface explanation
of events--that Catherine is going crazy (e.g. Scafella 21)--without considering how that
opinion is interrogated by later events in the book. This reduction of complexity is akin
to the likewise common tendency, mentioned above, to read these events simply as a
conflict. Scafella characterizes the plot's events as "Catherine's gamble for David's soul"
(22). There are signs of a deeper reading in Scafella's essay, such as when he recognizes
David's commitment to 'stay with' Catherine in the story and in actuality," even though
doing so "means feeling the changes that she wills 'so that it hurt him all through'
(Scafella 26; The GardeDof Eden 20). This moment gestures toward what I will discuss
below as the ethical impulse of The Garden of Eden, an impulse that centers on a shared
acknowledgment of suffering and of vulnerability. The ostensibly external sickness is
brought home to the subject. That ethical reading, rooted in shared pathos, subtends the
conflict reading, in other words. Scafella's interpretation, on the other hand, does not
follow his awareness of David's commitment out beyond the said of the text and so does
not recognize the complexity of what Catherine introduces.
A similarly sensitive reading that nonetheless reifies the text, and especially the
brief text, as the site of meaning and immortality appears in James Nagel's essay, "The
Hunting Story in The Garden of Eden." Nagel recognizes David's awareness of how
impossible it is to use language to bring the past back to life (e.g. Nagel 331, 334). This
type of uneasy relationship between the speaking subject and language is implicit in
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Nagel's acknowledgment that David's painfully dissolving marriage helps him understand
and write about his earlier traumas presented in the hunting story (332). The difficult
stories become approachable at the limits of the self, in pain, which Hemingway makes
explicit later in the novel, describing young David being pressed into responding to the
hunt: "Tiredness brought the beginning of understanding" (182). Further, Nagel is aware
that both the hunting narrative and the love plot of The Garden of Eden are
interdependent and "conclude in agony and emptiness, with irreparable loss and searing
emotion" (336).
But the lessons of this experience are obscured by Nagel's insistence that "it is
only in his writing that he [David] truly lives" (337). Writing here is the distillation of
experience to its essential oils, so it is not surprising that Nagel seems to favor the
African story contained in the novel to the larger novel itself. This preference is clearest
on Nagel's concluding page: "The Garden of Eden is certainly a flawed novel. As a
heavily edited text it belongs in the Hemingway canon in only a qualified sense, but it is,
nevertheless, a valuable document that contains some of Hemingway's most intriguing
observations about the creative process along with one of the finest stories he ever wrote"
(337).
I recognize with Nagel the flawed editing of the book. But we need to consider
that David's reassurances about writing as a refuge, much like those of Santiago discussed
above, are self-consciously hollow, and increasingly so as the narrative proceeds and his
reassurances multiply. David reassures too much. Recognizing this enables us to begin
to see how the word and language are positioned in relation to the bodied life in this text,
and therefore changes the terms of evaluation Nagel applies when he talks about the
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"creative process." Indeed, we might say "lived culture" here more generally in place of
"bodied life," in order to connect the thinking happening in this text with the claims I
make above about True at First Light's desire for genuine cultural and geographical
inhabitation beyond the trophy hunting of Green Hills of Africa.
Reducing the complexity of the doubled plot to an aesthetically polished short
story abjects the much more explicitly bodily elements of the longer story. Indeed, this
move abjects Catherine and Marita altogether, as well as David's adult experiences of his
body. Further, this reduction misreads both the short story and the novel. When viewed
in its broader context, the much more didactic hunting story cannot mean what it seems
to, and Hemingway repeatedly warns us away from making such a mistake. One of these
cautions appears relatively early in the book, when David has just begun writing again:
" He wrote it exactly and the sinister part only showed as the light feathering of a smooth
swell on a calm day marking the reef beneath" (42)." Nagel, we saw above, recognizes
this interdependency between stories, but still privileges the more legible, brief story.
Catherine is uncomfortable writing or producing aesthetic objects, as much as she
likes them, as Willingham points out. I want to emphasize that David feels much the
same. David's stance encourages us to recall Hemingway's familiar iceberg theory of
prose, which acknowledges that leaving things unspoken can sometimes communicate
more powerfully than what is actually said. Indeed, the very act of literary speech, of
committing words to paper, is at issue in this story. David knows from the beginning that
the honeymoon cannot last, that he would have to drive himself into "enforced loneliness"
11 "[N]ever telling" (202) is also David's response to the events of the hunting story,
after he has "betrayed" the elephant (174).
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of writing soon enough, and he finds this "regrettable" (14). Labor and the written word
are set against happy marital life, then, in the framing of the story. We soon also learn
how anxiety-stricken David has been about the hunting story. He does not even keep the
memory of "how long he had intended to write it" clearly in his head. He is forced to
correct himself: "The story had not come to him in the past few days. His memory had
been inaccurate in that. it was the necessity to write it that had come to him" (93).
This anxiety about producing texts is revealed in a complex scene that occurs just
after David has begun writing again. Catherine has left him alone in the room to work
and, having worked, David finds Catherine's writing left for him: "He opened the note
which said, David, didn't want to disturb you am at the cafe love Catherine. He put on
the old trench coat, found a boina in the pocket and walked out of the hotel into the rain"
(38). The passage alludes, of course, to the concluding line of A Faxewell to Arwa:
"After a while I went out and left the hospital and walked back to the hotel in the rain"
(332). There it marks by mood and understatement the gulf of Henry's loss, In The
Garden of Eden, the sentence and its marking of loss comes early in the narrative and
attaches to writing. Catherine's underpunctuated, unpretentiously direct statement of their
separation is not set in quotation marks in the novel, so that it could almost be David or
Hemingway speaking. This shared speech thus stands exactly at the moment when voice
and bodied life begin to separate. Her note reinforces how the act of writing on both
David's and Catherine's parts replaces their lived union. Writing marks the end of the
period in which "Everything was free" (31). The question the remainder of the novel
pursues is what this loss and separation mean.
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Catherine and David are both aware of how endings loom over their honeymoon
union, then, from the very start. Catherine's art enacts this awareness as a form of critique
in various ways through the remainder of the text. She pushes her inhabitation of the
body and her sensibility about materiality to its limit, into abjection. Her first dramatic
hair cut, "cropped as short as a boy's," we are told, "was cut with no compromises" (14-
15). Catherine's unrest in her female body and feminine gender leads her to this writerly
revision presented as a concise statement, shorn of its excesses. Bodily material is
literally cut away and made abject, leaving only her innovative message. Catherine says,
"'Stupid people will think it is strange. But we must be proud. I love to be proud."'
David, in support of her art, agrees: "'We'll start being proud now'" (16).
A similar separation between the meaning and its waste matter is implied in the
disagreement about David's press clippings. Catherine asks, "'Do you think I married you
because you are a writer?'" marking a division between the husband she values and his
public persona. Her desire to abject that persona hovers behind their fight. David
explains his resentment of her clippings critique: "'It was you thinking about them when
you were drinking. Bringing them up because you were drinking."' Catherine answers:
"'It sounds like regurgitating,' she said. 'Awful. Actually my tongue just slipped making
a joke' (40). Catherine is resisting the intervention of the social world into their
marriage and shared selfhood, and marking the limits of their intimate identity by
regarding even the words they exchange about the clippings as vomit or jokes or drunk
talk, all forms of trauma to the proper and willful body. The fight, its abject terms and its
implications, furthermore, tests the limits of their humanity, pointing toward the elephant
story's complication of writing and of the human/animal divide. When David tells her to
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"'Eat lunch by yourself,"' Catherine answers, "'We'll eat lunch together and behave like
human beings' (41). They then exchange apologies, and Catherine closes the scene by
repeating that "'It was really a joke,'" leaving the significance of these marital tests
unstated and hanging over the chapter, despite the attempted disavowal.
David comes to the same recognition about the press clippings as Catherine had,
shortly after this fight. He thinks, having just read them over again, that "They had been
understanding and perceptive reviews but to him they had meant nothing. He read the
letter from the publisher with the same detachment" (59). He continues in his internal
monologue, repeating and mulling others of the things he has read, until his own
judgment and cultural parody intervenes, again, resembling Catherine_ Here is the turn:
It was an unusual summer in New York, cold and wet. Oh Christ, David
thought, the hell with how it was in New York and the hell with that thin-
lipped bastard Coolidge fishing for trout in a high stiff collar in a fish
hatchery in the Black Hills we stole from the Sioux and the Cheyenne and
bathtub-ginned-up writers wondering if their baby does the Charleston.
And the hell with the promise he had validated. What promise to whom?
To The Dial, to The Bookman, to The New Republic? No, he had shown
it. Let me show you my promise that I'm going to validate it. What shit.
(59-60)
David's rejection of the false pieties of public culture is closely parallel to
Catherine's and leads him to the same abjecting move, transforming its texts, words, and
world into "shit." "Promise," which weighs against the deceitful history of American
conquest, is transformed by way of pun into a personal, ethical denotation. That is, the
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standard of genuine, personal commitment like that of marriage is used to expose the
false language of American culture. At the same time, this word play accentuates the
explicit critique of the publishing world that seeks a writer whose value can be
"validated," as though there were some single standard by which to judge. Surface
meaning in the single word is paired with superficial evaluations of writing, and both are
made by mockery and play into waste. Furthermore, this is all written on David's face,
much as Catherine writes on her body, which the Colonel reveals with his question when
he approaches and interrupts David's thoughts: "'What are you looking so indignant
about?'" (60),
As textual play in the novel becomes more embodied, the approach to the limits of
abjection becomes more general, moving from haircuts and press clippings to cuts more
central to the marriage. Thus, just after Catherine has brought Marita to participate in
their explorations, Catherine and David talk in bed and acknowledge this greater
seriousness. Catherine says, "'I never should have let you in for any of it. Not for any
part of it."' David agrees, "'I wish we'd never seen her."' Catherine: 'It might have been
something worse. Maybe to go through with it and get rid of it that way is best"' (105).
What is abjected here, or gotten "rid of," is the desire and curiosity that leads each of
them out of their initially blissful union. That Marita herself is threatened with being
scapegoated or abjected under the title of this dehumanizing pronoun "it" becomes clear
when David responds to Catherine's "get rid of it" line: "'You could send her away'
(105). But they then both agree they want her to stay. When Catherine ends the chapter
by saying, "'Well we won't be solemn. I can already tell it's death if you're solemn,' all
three are threatened by the pall of mortality because of their dalliance with desire. The
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refusal to scapegoat anyone, central to the ethical work of this text, becomes explicit in
the next chapter. Again it is Catherine (responding to Marita's statement to David that
she is "happy the way you said to be") who writes (by speaking) the general justification
for that happiness: "'We've shared all the guilt' (111). As in the hair salon scene
discussed below, this sharing is apparent in their responsibility at the level of answering
each other in language.
Catherine's characteristically quick comprehension of these events' significance
shows its darker side in the next chapter. Marita explains to David that Catherine "feels
terribly," so David makes Catherine a series of drinks. After making the first one,David
toasts: "'Here's to us."' Catherine pours it out on the bar, making the cure into waste, and
says, "'There isn't any us, [. .1. Not anymore."' When David hands her another drink,
she says, "'It's all shit"' (117). What began as a dismissal of clippings and the external
world they represent comes home here to the essence of David and Catherine's
relationship.
Abjection permeates Catherine and David more completely as events proceed,
registering in more physical terminology. Catherine explains that, after feeling happy,
she suddenly felt old, "'older than my mother's old clothes and I won't outlive your dog.
Not even in a story"' (163). Instead of a productive maternity, Catherine claims a doubly
(or even triply) dead status. She is the dead bodily covering of her already dead mother,
the body outside of the body that is itself already dead. Further, she has less longevity
than an already dead dog in a story, and Catherine has criticized that story itself as
"bestial" (157).
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David's acknowledgment of their failing relationship is more understated but no
less complete. As Catherine insults his stories, he recognizes more fully all the
implications of her words, so that even "the lovely cold wine on the bright clear day in the
pleasant, sunny room in the clean comfortable hotel" cannot "lift up his dead cold heart"
(210). This death at the center of the feeling subject fittingly balances against Catherine's
figuration of loss in terms of external physicality. Each of these expressions is consistent
with the character's mode of artistic work. Catherine's attention to surfaces and bodies
leads her to represent loss in terms of wasted exteriority, just as David's desire to
communicate some core, vital message in writing suits his impression of loss as a dead
heart.
Their desire has driven David and Catherine to the limit of things, to abjection,
much as the elephant is driven to death and to its own expressions of loss in the hunting
story. Indeed, it is crucial to the complex plotting of The Gar4en of Eden that Catherine
and David's reach toward the limits of the subject, to death, drives David's writing the
elephant story toward its strangely familiar momento mon presented in the epigraph of
this chapter: an elephant skull with gaping holes where its ivory tusks once were. The
elephant that David had led his father and Juma to, and that all three pursue, has fled back
to the scene of a previous trauma, where Juma killed his "askari," his "friend" (askari is
the plural of the Swahili word for "soldier," but Hemingway adds "friend" in the text after
suggesting "askari"). Juma remembers the place, which provokes his grin and David's
father's nodding head. Their shared knowledge, "the secret," goes without saying in these
gestural exchanges. This body language parallels the elephant's tracks and traces, which
signify his memory of the place. These are described in the passage quoted in my
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epigraph and in what follows it:
It was not very long before they came on the secret. It was off to
the right in the forest and the tracks of the old bull led to it. It was a skull
high as David's chest and white from the sun and the rains. There was a
deep depression in the forehead and ridges ran from between the bare
white eye sockets and flared out in empty broken holes where the tusks had
been chopped away. Juma pointed out where the great elephant they were
trailing had stood while he looked down at the skull and where his trunk
had moved it a little way from the place it had rested on the ground and
where the points of his tusks had touched the ground beside it. He showed
David the single hole in the big depression in the white bone of the
forehead and then the four holes close together in the bone around the ear
hole. He grinned at David and his father and took a .303 solid from his
pocket and fitted the nose into the hole in the bone of the forehead. (180)
The elephant has led the human trio, via tracks, to this recognition scene. At the
center of the scene is the empty skull, shorn of its ivory appendages, so that the elephant
has "written" a narrative line that leads to the same place that David's story does. As Cary
Wolfe points out in "Fathers, Lovers, and Friend Killers," David identifies with the
elephant, against his father and Juma (e.g. 249), so that his recognition of his heritage is
tantamount to a rejection of it: sickness at home. That rejection is delivered to his father
in perhaps the most taboo of curses: "'Fuck elephant hunting"' (181). Burwell reads this
piece of diction as connecting the "orgiastic scene," where David had found his father and
Juma cavorting with married women, to ivory hunting (122). This reading seems right.
104
We should add, however, that both these indulgences pervert the activities of
reproduction--sexual and cultural—by extending them beyond necessity. Hence David's
critique: "My father doesn't need to kill elephants to live." And "Juma," he thinks, "will
drink his share of the ivory or just buy himself another god damned wife" (181). Indeed,
if the killing was not enough, Juma re-enacts the earlier killing by fitting one of his
bullets into the skull. This re-enactment foreshadows the actual re-enactment of the
killing that is about to happen.
These indulgences overextend (or physically overreact to) desire, and they
produce suffering in the elephant, in David, and in the indigenous culture. From here we
can better see that David's curse, at the center of this story of paternity, describes paternity
to itself with its own overstated version of what paternity is. "Fuck" mocks and abjects
sexuality and reproduction just as David understands his father to be mocking them. We
know David has stepped out of his former bounds when his father asks, "'What's that?"' in
response to David's curse, then simply returns the curse: "'Be careful you don't fuck it up"
(182). David immediately notes that his father recognizes David's position: "He's not
stupid. He knows all about it now and he will never trust me again. That's good. I don't
want him to because I'll never ever tell him or anybody anything again never anything
again. Never ever never" (182). These mutual recognition scenes turn around the word
itself, and David's sympathy with the elephant leads to his decision never to reveal
anything again. He puts that decision to himself, in the passage just quoted, in a language
that testifies to language's insufficiency with its repetition and overstatement. These
failures in language are exactly parallel, furthermore, to the empty elephant skull, pointed
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out by the living elephant. Both track and drive toward some final recognition scene that
is ultimately only death, holes in a skull, a swearing off of communicable language in
silence.
Knowledge of the impending death of the elephant, with all its significance in
terms of David's understanding of his father, reveals the close proximity of death to
desire. But David explains that he learned to distinguish them during this ordeal, and this
lesson is what determines David's eventual rejection of his father. Ethics lives in the
difference between necessity and desire: "David thought then in the night that the hollow
way he felt as he remembered him [the elephant] was from waking hungry. But it was
not and he found that out in the next three days" (166). David feelings closely parallel the
elephant's expressions of loss; both are figured as holes or absences.
The youthful David's use of forceful language followed quickly by his rejection of
language altogether presents in miniature what ultimately becomes Catherine's dramatic
critique of David's writing. She begins, we have seen, with the clippings and the public
persona, but then dismisses more and more of his work, ultimately burning all the stories
except their honeymoon narrative. David's writing, leading back toward death and
emptiness in the elephant story, couples with Catherine's writing the death of writing with
fire. Significantly for the position of the word in this book, moreover, Catherine, the
avowed non-writer, actually does write the letter she leaves for David that explains her
actions.
The significance of this letter is underscored when David reads it through twice,
thinking that "He had never read any other letters from Catherine because from the time
they had met [. .] they had seen each other every day [. .] (237). Catherine returns the
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issue of reproduction to the narrative with her letter's metaphor comparing burning the
stories to killing a child in a car. But even such figurative language fails, as Catherine
concludes the comparison by saying: "I did it and I knew I did it and I can't undo it. It's
too awful to understand. But it happened" (237). Language and understanding cannot
account for the events of the world. The next sentence, opening the next paragraph,
redoubles the claim to incommunicability: "I'll cut this short." Echoing the many cuts of
this narrative, these words point to what David believes explains all of the events.
Catherine is 'Hurried,' he tells Marita (230). Her desire to completely understand desire
and subjectivity leads her to rush to the end of things, in effect, to cut things short.
Catherine's letter concludes with yet another twist on her theory of language: "I
won't end as I'd like to because it would sound too preposterous to believe but I will say it
anyway since I was always rude and presumptuous and preposterous too lately as we both
know. I love you and I always will and I am sorry. What a useless word" (237). The
situation requires that she write even the preposterous-sounding vow of love, and even
the useless apology. But she knows these words cannot convey her feeling. So what is
conveyed in the simultaneous statement of her feeling and the critique of that statement is
a pathos beyond what can be said. Her letter, precisely like David's short story, and then
precisely like the larger narrative in which both are contained, regard language this way,
making constant use of this trope occupatio, in which a speaker claims an inability to
convey her or his thoughts, but then tries to do so anyway.
Now we can connect the above discussion of abjection with this novel's treatment
of language. Death is a traumatic signifier for the Real's resistance to ontology. But,
despite David's youthful decision never to tell anyone anything again, the move to convey
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and to understand, when they are coupled with an ethical acknowledgment of
understanding's failure, is shown throughout this novel to signify love. The fierce
critiques of language can only happen in language, or in another kind of language (like
body language). The fact of speaking, despite awareness of its insufficiency, renews
language, but the speaker must suffer with that awareness. The same is true of social
critiques and social actions as critiques. Social and linguistic renewal depend upon a kind
of patience, then, that resists but also endures wrong.
This tension between renewal and endings is put in terms of experience itself early
in the book, where it is connected to art. In a key moment, Catherine worries about
preserving her satisfying experience of driving through the countryside: "'There's nothing
except through yourself,' she said. 'And I don't want to die and it be gone'"(53). David
assures her that she has the memory of that country, but Catherine forces him to
acknowledge that death ends memory. Then she presents the upshot of their talk: "'When
you start to live outside yourself,' Catherine said, 'it's all dangerous' (54). Experience
demonstrates the limits of the subject; it endangers the coherent self.
This discussion transforms the paragraph that follows it, which apparently narrates
an ordinary scene: "The salad came and then there was its greenness on the dark table and
the sun on the plaza beyond the arcade" (54). However, normal, sensory perception here
becomes charged with sharpness because its fleeting nature has been established,
justifying the strange richness that often attends Hemingway's understated language and
plain descriptions of the life of the senses. Perception and so the human subject have
been put at risk by mortality, so that the turn to physical experiences--seeing the salad and
thinking about eating it--both steadies Catherine and David and reveals their shakiness.
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Further, Catherine's clarification of mortality indicates the importance of standard
temporality and embodiment, signaled by this same phrase discussed in the previous
chapter with regard to the marlin's appetite in he Old Man and the Sea: "and then there
was." The concern with hurrying, made explicit by the end of The Garden of Eden, is
present even in its beginning, and requires a return to the bodied self and to a bodied
language practice for psychic survival.
Such practices are, of course, life, while hurrying toward understandings and
endings is connected to death, as we saw above. In the elephant story, David's use of
language to reveal or "betray" the elephant leads to the elephant's death, just as his
insistence on writing as a solitary activity leads to the death of his relationship with
Catherine and her equally potent artistic evocation of death in burning the manuscripts
(181). Yet, Catherine ultimately wrote her letter. David insists on continuing to write.
Hemingway wrote this novel in spite of his and its agonizing about writing itself.
Furthermore, actual killing is not dismissed entirely in the novel, not even in what David
calls his "very young boy's story" of the elephant hunt (201). As the threesome pursue the
elephant, David kills "two spur fowl" with a slingshot without guilt (172). Cary Wolfe
reads this moment as an example of the "novel's humanism" because David fails "to
establish any ethical linkage between the multiplicity of animal others he encounters in
the novel, such as the 'two spur fowl' David kills [. . (251). Wolfe then continues:
"This systematic parsing of the animal other into quite different and discrete ontological
and ethical categories would in turn evince the obsessive hierarchization and
classification of the other so central to the Enlightenment project" (251-52).
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Wolfe is relying here on a reductive account of ethics that forgets ethics'
necessarily circumstantial quality. He is worried that recognizing some animals as
worthy of ethical consideration while ignoring others simply restores a humanist or
anthropomorphist understanding of animals. In this sense, his critique resembles Glen
Love's critique of The Old Man and the Sea, discussed in the previous chapter (Love
argues that Santiago only values animals insofar as they serve his interests and value
systems). But we see in the terms of David's condemnation of his father and Juma's hunt
his implicit expiation for his own killing of the spur fowls: necessity. The party was low
on food, and having enough energy simply to cover the miles was very much at issue for
David, whereas his father and Juma patently did not need the wealth from more ivory
(e.g. 170). Acknowledging this need of appetite, rather than disavowing animality or
reducing it to Enlightenment categories, brings animality home to the human subject.
The ethical task is to both recognize this animality and sustain a possibility of ethical
action, which is what makes an ethics circumstantial.
The supposition operating in Wolfe's argument seems to be that if one animal, like
an elephant, deserves ethical treatment, then so should all others, including spur fowl.
Otherwise, we return to Enlightenment categorization. Such categorization, though
rightly critiqued by Wolfe and by many others, cannot be so easily dismissed in its
entirety, however. At the root of categorization is a recognition of human interest or
desire or need driving and therefore limiting knowledge. Indeed, it is on these grounds of
narrowly human interest that ecological thinkers especially have tended to critique
enlightenment categorization. In its place, this argument goes, we need an ecocentrism,
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to use the term adopted by Lawrence Buell,' that encourages us to make ethical
judgments based on a set of interests broader than a narrow humanism. This much seems
correct, and indeed these claims fit with the rhetorical turn that has happened in
philosophy over the past century that situates knowledge . 13 But the difficult question
remains, How are we to understand such an ethical system? Derrida's work on animality
that Wolfe relies on in his argument actually puts the very possibility of ethics at risk.'
So a simple application of the idea of ethics, as is happening in Wolfe, will not do.
Indeed, Wolfe's notion of ethics that would ask for the same conduct toward different
animals in different circumstances partakes of the very Oedipal economy of the subject
that his essay seeks to overturn because it reduces the multiplicity and complexity of
animality into a tacit notion that ethics means never harming anything. It restores to the
word (in this case, the word "ethics") an apparently singular meaning, producing a unified
signifier out of multiplicity. When Wolfe quotes the key phrase from Derrida that animal
life is actually "a heterogeneous multiplicity of the living" and "a multiplicity of
organizations of relations between the living and the dead," we should be reminded that
ethical decisions must account for this multiplicity in complex, situated ways (Wolfe
249). This is why, as I take it, Derrida explains that "The moral question is thus not, nor
has it ever been: should one eat or not eat, eat this and not that, the living or the
nonliving, man or animal, but since one must eat in any case and since it is and tastes
12 See The _Environmental Imaginatiort 1, and note 1, for more on this term.
13 Stanley Fish argues for this rhetorical turn in "Rhetoric." See especially 209-16. See
also James Crosswhite, Th,u,s,ol ofLut 3 and passim.
14 See my first chapter for more on this point.
111
good to eat, and since there's no other definition of the good (du bien), how for goodness
sake should one eat well (bien manger)" ("Eating Well" 115; original emphases).
Ethical conduct toward animals, let me clarify, surely must account for the
individual animals, each one we face, but it must also account for the larger organization
of relationships the individual depends upon. This means that sometimes individual
death can be accepted and even required. In terms of this story, for instance, at certain
times and in certain regions, killing animals could be ethically permissible, even when
our ethical system requires valuing animals' lives, if taking an animal's life to sustain
one's own is gentler to the whole system of life than other options, In effect, this is
admitting human animality and appetite.
What we might call the rhetoricity or circumstantiality of ethics I am putting forth
here at first seems to undermine ethics. However, it is only ethics as a universal set of
rules that is called to question. When we admit that ethical systems depend partly on
"eating well," on the material satisfaction of needs, we refuse what Derrida discusses as
the sacrifice of animality in the construction of the human.' Rather, we bring animality
back to the human; we bring the multiplicity of the living and non-living, which is
Derrida's complicating gloss of animality, home to the human subject. There is an ethical
requirement to do this, to resist scapegoating human animality onto "the animal."
But admitting the animal in the human cannot be be used to condone all
behaviors. Rather, this effort leads to situated conclusions about what is ethical. We may
indeed end up condemning killing any animals in most any circumstances, but this
decision, or really these decisions, must be made with as much awareness of the
15 See "Eating Well" 115, for example.
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multiplicity of organizations of the living as possible, rather than by recourse to a single
ethical rule about not harming individuals. Ethics, then, resides in this acknowledgment
of the complex vulnerability of all living systems, which requires us to make new ethical
decisions for each new situation.
What is ethical in Derrida's exposure of the scapegoating logic operating in the
construction of the human is this very exposure. This is so for two reasons: First, it is a
more precise account of both humans and animals, and working toward such precision or
honesty is an ethical obligation. Second, the exposure restores responsibility to the
individual agent. To further describe this second point: We have seen above that
Derrida's complication of the human/animal distinction is not intended to indicate
human/animal sameness. When he exposes the permeability of the distinction, however,
Derrida restores some measure of desire to ontologies that are frequently understood as
purely objective. This move, rather than destroying or "deconstructing" such ontological
systems, enables us to deploy distinctions in ways tailored to particular situations.
Otherwise, the dreadful acts committed in atrocities like the Holocaust could only point
toward an ontology of a world "red in tooth and claw," bound to be continually and
equally horrible.
This account of heterogeneous, material subjectivity, driven by animal desires, is
key to The Garden of Eden not just because of the hunting story. It also gives us a new
way to understand the bodily play that Catherine and David and eventually Marita
undertake. Wolfe reports that this play, especially the obsessive tanning, is most often
read as part of the return to Africa plot of The Garden of Eden, as a kind of going native
(getting dark). He recalls Toni Morrison's critique of this element of the novel. She
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argues that Hemingway understands Africa as a "blank, empty space" for conquest
(Wolfe 253; Morrison 88-89). Wolfe rightly complicates this reading by showing how
David does not think of Africa as empty, and further, that David sides against such
conquests. For Wolfe, by recognizing the discourse of species operating in the novel
(David's allegiance with the elephant, against his father and Juma), we become better able
to read the book's critique of colonization and racism (e.g. Wolfe 254). This attention to
species discourse is necessary in Wolfe's view because he reads Catherine and David's
tanning together and their shared hair styling as tending to reduce difference, as
disavowing the multiplicity or heterogeneity of the subject because their differences tend
to be covered over by an ostensible similarity (250). For him, this is true even of their
trading sexual roles. They look and act more and more alike.
But Wolfe's reading ignores the complex ethical relationship that enables the
tanning and body play to go forward. While David and Catherine (and eventually Marita)
are presented as looking alike, the narrative clearly reveals their different responses to
that apparent likeness. It is crucial to recognize this because in so doing we note how
narrativity itself undermines the apparent mimeticism of the word or image (Wolfe uses
the term "mimetic" on 248-49). In this sense, the temporal duration and movement of
narrative reveals this theme of The Garden of Eden--the impossibility of unity. This is
perhaps the key lesson from the biblical story.
We can more clearly see how much artifice and temporality are at issue when
Catherine first develops her plan for play with their hair. The plan is her response to and
critique of David beginning to write again. Catherine explains that she has "'made a lot of
plans.' She goes on: "I can tell it but it would be better to show it. We could do it
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tomorrow. Will you go in with me?" (76). Showing rather than telling, of course, is
Hemingway's (and many other artists') standard for good art, but Catherine radicalizes the
phrase by treating it dramatically; she expects worthwhile artistic actions to be acted out,
to be lived. She has gotten together with a "very good coiffure": "'I went to see him this
morning while you were working and I explained and he studied it and understood and
thought it would be fine. I told him I hadn't decided but that if I did I'd try to get you to
have yours cut the same way" (77). Already we see Catherine's conception of art as a
shared activity, produced in dialogue and collaboration. She further explains that the
coiffure "'wants to lighten it [their hair] but we were afraid you might not like it.'" David
answers: "The sun and the salt water lighten it" (77). The question here, which becomes
clearer as the book proceeds, is the how the body should inhabit time. David prefers to
let nature take its course with his hair; Catherine wants to intervene in the natural course
to produce artifice. But, crucially, her intervention is exactly parallel to David's
interruption of the happy time of their honeymoon with his return to writing. Both
reductions are akin to reducing the wonderfully strange, living elephant to its ivory tusks
and a heap of dead, gray matter.
Burwell, working to show that Catherine's hair work is a critique of David and of
their relationship, argues that the published text denies Catherine ownership of that
artistry "as the coiffure becomes the sculptor, deferring to David's judgment and
comparing his metier with David's" (114). However, the dynamics of this exchange, in
my view, are more complex. The narrative voice opens the scene by establishing that "It
was very friendly and offhand at the coiffure's but very professional" (79). Then
Monsieur Jean says to David, "'I will cut it as she asks. Do you agree, Monsieur?'
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David's reply: "'I don't belong to the syndicate, . leave it to you two" (79). David's
use of "syndicate" here indicates his awareness of the parallel between this activity and
writing, so that the implications of the exchange carry over into The Garden of Eden's
theory of writing. When Monsieur Jean, who has been "working like a sculptor, absorbed
and serious," pauses for a moment to allow Catherine to see the progress, the following
exchange occurs:
"Do you want it cut that way above the ears?" she asked the
coiffure.
"As you like. I can make it more dógagë if you wish. But it will be
beautiful as is if we are going to make it truly fair."
"I want it fair," Catherine said.
He smiled. "Madame and I have spoken of it. But I said it must be
Monsieur's decision."
"Monsieur gave his decision," Catherine said. (80)
This exchange shows art as collaboration rather than, as Burwell argues, Catherine's
surrender of control, not only in the existence of dialogue itself, but in Jean's admission
that ""Madame and I have spoken of it."' Jean's questioning of David's will here is
presented as a polite but also playful indication that David is being respected and that
David recognizes how not only Catherine's hair but his own hair is in the hands of these
collaborating artists. David's refusal to advise indicates his admission of their expertise
and his acceptance of the shared will of marriage and artistic creation and even, we might
say, of cultural life. Their speaking for David--physically via hair and literally--is further
indicated by Catherine answering for David in the final lines quoted above.
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Catherine's art and David's art involve both parties in its production and in its
consequences, with attendant concerns about will and control present but not easily
tipped in favor of one or the other. If art is the subject making and confirming itself, in
this book the subject is always intersubjective. In other words, art does not exactly
confirm the subject. This point is crucial to the ethical component of the book's events
and to the hair styling scene. This recognition also fits within the broader constellation of
Hemingway's life practices in which he recognized mistreatment of the world and of his
home as a mistreatment of himself.
David's acknowledgment of his intersubjectivity is his ethical stance. It requires
him to undergo Catherine's changes and experiments, even though they make him
nervous. He puts it to himself this way: "We've been married three months and two
weeks and I hope I make her happy always but in this I do not think anybody can take
care of anybody. It's enough to stay in it" (57; see also 56). This understanding, and the
many other moments like it presented in the novel, reveal the differing significance of
what are ostensibly the same signs written on the character's bodies. When he does "stay
in it" and has his hair cut like Catherine, he returns home for a (mis)recognition scene.
He looks in the mirror and asks himself, "'How do you feel?'" (84). His answer: "'You
like it' (84). His ethical commitment leads David to a new version of himself.
Furthermore, admitting "liking it" to himself leads David to accept his own desire and to
swear off scapegoating: "Now go through with the rest of it whatever it is and don't ever
say anyone tempted you or that anyone bitched you'" (84). Finally, in the next paragraph
we see that restoring agency to himself restores David's sense of being home in himself:
"'You like it. Remember that. Keep that straight. You know exactly how you look now
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and how you are"' (85). These repeated assurances, of course, communicate how much
David actually feels uneasy, as does the inclusion of this entire scene in the narrative.
The third-person intervention that concludes the vignette announces this clearly: "Of
course he did not know exactly how he was. But he made an effort aided by what he had
seen in the mirror" (85).
These scenes convey this book's tension about the materiality of the subject, about
sex and gender, desire, appetite, and change. Above we saw Wolfe's claim that the
tendency to discuss these physical changes in terms of racial discourse ignores the
discourse of species operating in the novel (225 and passim). My contention, most
particularly with Derrida's complications of the animal in mind (the animal is a
heterogeneous mixture of the living and nonliving), is that even species discourse is too
narrow to adequately address this novel's concerns. Its recognition and misrecognition
scenes involve more than the play between people, more than the play between animals
and people. They reveal the subject's alterity from itself in material ways. Conceptions
of such alterity, I have been arguing, can itself benefit from an application of the
Levinasian ethical system.
The consequences of such an application are, in one way, purely common sense.
People must take care of themselves, eat well, and so on. This caring behavior is a way
of recognizing the division between body and subject. But when applied to ethical
theory, this acknowledgment has the potential to bridge common divides that have upset
the possibility of ethics. Ethics can appear, then, not as a conflict between the self and
the world, but as a recognition of alterity within the subject, between the subject and the
world, and so on. The melodramatic sense of conflict between the needs and desires of
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the subject on the one hand, and the world on the other, can be described and lived in
more ethical and more reasonable ways.' The type of corporeal explorations that
Catherine and David undergo, in other words, need not be understood or practiced so
desperately. Indeed, I read their desperation not as a sign of moral failure, which is the
type of ethical reading that Wayne Booth seems to be advocating in AnEthics of Fiction,
but as a signal of the need to refine our conceptions and practices of ethics. This is the
body, in other words, informing ethics.
Following this thinking, we can at least complicate and perhaps move beyond, for
instance, Levinas's characterization of an ethical sensibility as traumatic, though it is
trauma that characterizes Catherine and David's explorations. Trauma is a first stage in
admitting the limitations of the subject, and can lead us toward an ethics, as the trajectory
of these chapters on Hemingway has tried to show. Indeed, recognizing trauma as trauma
already implies the ethics that can emerge because of trauma's acknowledgment of alterity
and suffering in the subject. For Levinas, as we saw in Chapter such acknowledgment
signifies ethics because it signifies a responsiveness to Others that cannot be denied.
Patience and this altered sense of how to inhabit the heterogeneous self has been
at issue all along in the novel. We have seen this above with regard to the limits of the
bodied self. It is also announced by David's perpetual concern with ending his stories.
Having just finished a story for the first time "since they were married," he considers,
"Finishing is what you have to do [. .1. If you don't finish, nothing is worth a damn"
16 1 would characterize much of the criticism of The Old Man and the Sea in precisely
this way--as melodramatic. See Chapter II.
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(108)." Likewise, when he realizes he is ready to write the difficult African story, David
thinks that "He knew how the story ended now" (93). Knowing the ending means
understanding the story because the ending confers meaning and because form is
indicated by conclusions.
It is of course significant here that Hemingway himself was not quite sure how to
end this book, and that he was experiencing ending anxiety in general late in his life.
Burwell explains that this book that "Hemingway could not complete" has two extant
endings in manuscript, neither of which Tom Jenks selected in editing for the published
version (105). In one, Catherine returns from a Swiss asylum. Burwell further explains,
"Catherine notes that David can no longer take the intense sun in which they once spent
hours deepening their tans, and that he would like to protect her from it, implying that
their transformative adventures failed. They agree that if her madness returns, and she
asks David to commit suicide with her, he will do it" (105). In the other ending, David
rewrites his stories and Marita talks about how "she will handle David like a trainer
handles a big race horse." Burwell further explains that, in this ending, "David does not
sustain the confident voice he possesses in the ending Tom Jenks chose for the novel"
(105).
Wolfe importantly reminds us, however, that Jenks's ostensibly confident ending
only points back to the unsettled African narrative in a way that undermines that
confidence (243). So all these endings reinforce the anxiety about ending itself because
none of them conclude things neatly or comfortably. For me, then, this book's anxiety
about endings and limits of many sorts signifies its ethical impulse, in all the ways I have
17 See 112 also for more on this relationship between endings and good writing.
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been suggesting that point back to suffering and bodied experience. Suffering marks the
hole or negativity in the subject where she or he undergoes ethical responsiveness.
Hemingway makes the relevance of suffering explicit at two moments in the published
text when he mocks the idea of "comfort" (149, 224). But in both instances, he mocks
and makes use of comfort, much as the whole book mocks and makes use of writing and
its imposition of order.
Catherine's "madness," her tendency to push human experience to its limits and to
rush time, then, really aligns with, criticizes, and exposes the pushing to the end that is
fiction. Imposing endings on stories is exactly what Catherine does, literally. Her
dramatic action and her letter lead David to admit that "he still could be, and was, moved
by her" (237). This is a perfectly understated Hemingway vaguery that evokes all the
pathos of the whole novel, that shows such pathos to sustain language production and,
indeed, subordinates the importance of language production, since he is moved despite
her destruction of the stories. As we saw above, the production of art and relationships is
shown to revolve around control, ultimately a political issue, and it is pathos that enables
each of them to surrender their drive toward control. Such a surrender is dramatized most
clearly in Hemingway's proposed suicide ending to the novel.
Even in the published ending, adding complexity and greater tactility to his father
does not mean changing the essential experience. Instead, the problems presented by that
story and that experience are only made more vivid, in the same way that David's
undergoing Catherine's changes, despite his awareness that they could not lead to good,
only made the problems clearer and clearer. Against such forced clarification are David's
suggestions about a greater physical patience, but David is only moved to make such
121
claims because Catherine recognizes and criticizes David's desire to write, to reduce their
shared experience to a simpler and clearer form. Catherine's critique is embodied and
rhetorical in that she makes use of their physical selves and circumstances to demonstrate
her views on writing. This whole discussion about what Jenks's ending signifies, then,
can be understood to turn on what writing signifies. Writing signifies suffering and
desire. It is the body producing something beyond itself, and in its representative work,
producing ideals from a physical being. All along, though, this second self is paralleled
by Catherine's second selves, and both together amount to an exposure of the limitations
of desire and its products. Both David and Catherine write themselves out of happiness.
The return to writing presented in Jenks's ending does show David backing off
from other possible responses, such as the ones suggested by Hemingway's alternative
endings. But when we recognize how thorough the critique of writing is in this book,
how David recognizes the validity of Catherine's embodied claims, that ending does not.
imply the neat restoration of paternal trust that some readers find.
Perhaps more importantly, as we approach the end of the book and the ostensible
triumph of the written word according to several critics, David is instead forced to
recognize its failure, at least in the conventional sense of re-presentation. When he first
begins the hunting tale, David states the fundamental writing challenge to be making the
text as though it could "be lived through and made to come alive" (108). Thus later, in
the midst of writing that story, he thinks how he
tried to make the elephant come alive again as he and Kibo had seen him
in the night when the moon had risen. Maybe I can, David thought, maybe
I can. But as he locked up the day's work and went out of the room and
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shut the door he told himself, No, you can't do it. The elephant was old
and if it had not been your father it would have been someone else. There
is nothing you can do except try to write it the way that it was. So you
must write each day better than you possibly can and use the sorrow that
you have now to make you know how the early sorrow came. And you
must always remember the things you believed because if you know them
they will be there in the writing and you won't betray them. The writing is
the only progress you make. (166)
This final sentence seems to suggest the triumph of the word only if we ignore the
preceding sentences (which move would be roughly the equivalent of reducing The
Garden of Eden to a messy text with a really good short story in it). The preceding
sentences make clear that David cannot "possibly" write as well as he must. Rather than
words sufficing, then, Hemingway here claims that words can only begin to convey the
loss when we acknowledge the gap between what they desire and what they do. Without
the gap, without this sense of language's insufficiency, writing is only a "betrayal." This
conception of writing is entirely akin to Levinas's insistence that the said be constantly
renewed by saying again. For Levinas, the ethics at the heart of language reside here, in
this renewal which signifies a regard for the Other that goes beyond what can be said for
or about that Other. It is something like a pathos, or a sentimentality, or an ethics, or
something Otherwise.
Furthermore, David recognizes the loss of the elephant to be a fundamental part of
the reality of that time and place, with the values and behaviors that prevail there and
then. And even if the elephant were not desired for its ivory, mortality and vulnerability
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are presented as incontestable realities that must be recognized. It is not accidental, then,
that the insight that he "can't" bring the elephant back to life comes to David just after he
has locked away and thereby tried to secure his work. This attempt, like young David's
desire that the elephant not die, is contravened by the larger narrative in which even these
stories end in ashes, only to be rewritten, to be renewed in another saying. David's
awareness of this looming ending even for his words is presented here by Hemingway as
it first began to dawn in David, as David must have experienced it, going through the
foolhardy motions of locking up his treasured words. But because this is part of what is
"sinister" in this story and so is left more submerged, many readers have sailed right over
it.
Does this mean Hemingway has surrendered the possibility of ethics to some kind
of fatalistic ontology about death, a kind of existentialism? It does not. In the pathos of
the presentation is the possibility of another understanding. The story does not
communicate that stories can restore life. But it communicates the suffering of love and
desire in the lived world, and especially how that suffering can be intensified by rushing
toward endings and by reducing the lived world to what in the end of this story is only the
waste matter of written language. In the long passage quoted above, this suffering is
conveyed not only by David's unease with his failure, but also by the agonized account of
honest speech or writing. Understanding presents itself to David as an ongoing process of
becoming that cannot end in reification, and this sense of his passivity in the face of
understanding underscores the strange evasiveness of serious knowing. Understanding is
a sensitized exposure to the world, an unhoming of the self that must nevertheless
acknowledge the need for a home and a sense of home. Furthermore, such understanding
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and language in the broader world are inhabited not just by humans, but by animals too,
as the elephant story shows. The elephant in this chapter's epigraph, returning to the
home of companionship is, like the bull seeking a querencia in the ring, on the way to its
own unhoming, despite its homing instinct. The elephant's awareness of such an ending's
significance is indicated by the marks and tracks it left, pointing toward the skull of its
friend, its double.
CHAPTER IV
THE ABJECT MOVEMENT OF THE BEATS
I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by
madness, starving hysterical naked, [. .]
(Allen Ginsberg, Howl 1.1-2)
Well, I thought, this is the end—I finally made the step and by God I paid
her back for what she done to me—it had to come and this is it—ploop.
(Jack Kerouac, The Subterraneans 101)
In bearshit find it in August,
Neat pile on the fragrant trail, in late
August, perhaps by a Larch tree
Bear has been eating the berries.
(Gary Snyder, "A Berry Feast" 1.6-9)
David Perkins, in his account of the 1950s counterculture, explains the frustration
felt by many in the milieu that became popularly known as the Beat generation. It was
more than disaffection with war and the atom bomb.
[It] was also related to pervasive features of the social and economic
order, such as bureaucratic impersonality, huge populations, material glut
and waste, the feeling of being manipulated by advertising and publicity,
alienation from work, rootlessness, existential aimlessness [. . .]. To many
poets it seemed that Western civilization and its cultural ideals were
spiritually bankrupt. (541)
To a large degree, of course, these feelings had been shared by previous groups
disaffected with America and Western culture, such as the "Lost Generation" of
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expatriates who found themselves in Paris in the 1920s. Among the 1950s set, the
intense feeling of alienation, the sense of a wasted culture, produced an equally strong
desire for an alternative community. Gary Snyder, a prominent member of this 1950s
group, opens his essay "North Beach" by explaining, "In the spiritual and political
loneliness of America of the fifties you'd hitch a thousand miles to meet a friend.
Whatever lives needs a habitat, a culture of warmth and moisture to grow. West Coast of
those days, San Francisco was the only city; and of San Francisco, our home port was
North Beach" (A Place in Space 3)'. One of the defining moments of this community
was the 1955 Six Gallery poetry reading. Indeed, Michael Davidson reports that, for
"most commentators, the San Francisco Renaissance 'began' on October 13," the night of
this event (3).
This community was united by its desire to articulate and create, partly via
writing, a more satisfactory way of living. The importance of the Six Gallery event as a
community literary function registers the relationship between literature and this desire
for social change. However, the counterculture was no utopia. The most frequently
mentioned problem is the absence, or at least the apparent absence, of women among the
well-known countercultural figures. In one sense, we can understand this as part of the
larger cultural configuration that, in Suzanne Clark's analysis in Cold Warriors, severely
contained the province of the literary. More especially, as Clark points out, "The Cold
War silenced women writers on several levels, together with others excluded from the
struggle over white male identity" (1). As critics and writers have recognized this
1 "North Beach" was originally published in the 1977 text The Old Ways. I quote from
the version Snyder reprinted in A Place in Space because he has made some minor but
important wording changes there, even in the passage quoted (see The Old Ways 45).
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silencing, we have begun to see more of the literary work that women and others actually
did produce during the period. The 1996 anthology Women of the Beat Generation is one
example of what Anne Waldman, in her Foreword to the book, calls "a kind of
resurrection" (xi). Obviously such work is vital.
This chapter, in treating three of the best-known, white, male figures from the
counterculture--Allen Ginsberg, Jack Kerouac, and Gary Snyder--partly reproduces the
exclusions of others. But as my argument should help us see, these authors' work bears
an uneasy relationship with the canon and even canonicity. Thus, to the extent that these
writers have been adopted into an exclusive system of canonization, they can be
understood to show the dissonances of such a system. Indeed, these texts, especially
Ginsberg's and Kerouac's, make the breach of silence by the speech act itself, in whatever
form, significant. Noticing this further indicates how pervasively literary silencing
happened in this period. In other words, I believe a key part of the larger project of
reconstructing the literary since World War II involves reevaluating how the literary
functioned even among those who were recognized somewhat more broadly.
I argue that the texts under consideration here bring abjected elements of 1950s
American culture into the literary. In doing so, they suggest new directions and
possibilities for the countercultural community. These texts thus contest cultural
possibilities by contesting the boundaries of the literary_ They do so, we will see, at the
level of genre and at the level of the word. &:)v.A particularly came to represent a whole
complex of cultural events and tendencies, so I read the poem attending more to these
external circumstances than to its content, precisely the reverse of New Critical methods_
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While I read Kerouac's roman a clef The Subterraneans in a more textual fashion, clearly
its status as more "real" than a conventional "novel" bridges the literary/worldly
distinction.
I also claim that these texts' interrogations of abjection and the literary bear an
ethical component that involves acknowledgment of the bodied subject. These
acknowledgments are uneasy, perhaps especially in Kerouac's and Ginsberg's cases,
though to a certain extent in Snyder's case too. Fascination with and dread of the abject is
important to the larger argument of this dissertation that seeks moments when the
physical and physiological reveal themselves as ethical. Indeed, in these concerns, these
writers resemble David and Catherine in Hemingway's The Garden of Eden, discussed in
the previous chapter.
I present a version of ethical criticism distinct from Wayne Booth's account in The
Company We Keep. His usefully rhetorical model there, which presents the book as a
kind of friend that influences the reader, finds Kerouac's On the Road bad and dangerous
company (228, 279). Though this seems generally true at a plot-level reading of On the
Road and The Subterraneans, it reveals much about 1950s culture and literature to
perceive an ethical impulse behind what seem to be "unethical" texts. Finding abjection,
at the limits of language, to be at issue for these writers helps us understand some of the
Cold War exclusions that, to use Kristeva's terms, abject from the social and literary body
that which "cannot be assimilated" (Powers of Horror I). To put this in Levinasian terms,
the constricted set of cultural possibilities require an ethical criticism that attends to the
"saying" of the literary as well as the "saids,"where this latter seems more Booth's focus.
In this chapter, attending to the "saying" partly involves reading the cultural context
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surrounding the "saids" of the texts themselves. Analyzing the cultural circumstances
surrounding texts is also a way of recognizing the material embodiment of the literary
because doing so recalls the worldly attributes that nourished the texts. Culture is to text
here as body is to thought.
Five male poets read and presented themselves at Six Gallery. The most famous
was Allen Ginsberg's performance of Howl, the first of what would become his many
recitations of that poem. David Perkins reminds us of the cultural significance this poem
has taken: "It is often said that Howl influenced American poetry more than any poem
since The Waste Land" (551). Though Perkins goes on to qualify this claim somewhat,
indicating other work that could be credited with doing the same influential work as
Howl, the generally accepted importance of this poem reveals something about the
generally countercultural place of poetry in twentieth-century America.
Those in attendance registered and also helped to create Howl's significance. Jack
Kerouac, who refused to read despite Ginsberg's encouragement,' bought wine for the
crowd and also started the crowd chanting as Ginsberg read. In The Dharma Bums,
Kerouac describes the scene as quite ebullient "by eleven o'clock when Alvah Goldbook
[Ginsberg] was reading his, wailing his poem 'Wail' drunk with arms outspread
everybody was yelling 'Go! Go! Go!' (like a jam session) and old Rheinhold Cacoethes
[Kenneth Rexroth, MC of the reading] the father of the Frisco poetry scene was wiping
his tears in gladness" (14; qtd. also in Davidson 3). As Schumacher suggests, the success
of Ginsberg's reading depended not only on the poem, but also on the community in San
2 Ginsberg organized the reading. Michael Schumacher describes Ginsberg's
arrangements (210-16). See also Snyder, A Place in Space (7-18).
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Francisco that was prepared to hear it (211). Rexroth makes a similar point in his early
essay (1957) on this group: "San Francisco seems to have liberated Ginsberg" (161).
Rexroth's teary response in the Kerouac passage also testifies that the feelings conveyed
by the poem and by the atmosphere of the reading were not restricted to Ginsberg's
generation. Indeed, Rexroth would become more and more critical of Ginsberg and other
Beat writers later on (Schumacher 262) and so was no automatic partisan. His happiness
on the night of the reading indicates what a breakthrough it was felt to be. Kerouac's own
excitement, wine purchasing, and then recounting of the night just quoted in a book that
itself became popular also have much to do with the importance that was eventually
invested in the poem itself Many .complex cultural events and desires are condensed into
the celebration of Howl as a major poem.
At the level of the poem, of course, Ginsberg relied also on community influences.
Ginsberg was always ready to admit that Kerouac's notions of spontaneous composition
influenced him considerably, as Schumacher repeatedly makes clear throughout his
biography of Ginsberg. In fact, Howl marked a break from Ginsberg's habitual,
"deliberate" practice of writing poems longhand in a notebook (Schumacher 200). It was
mostly written directly on a typewriter without conscious planning. This method derived
from Kerouac's usual approach to writing. Ginsberg sent Kerouac an early copy of the
poem, and when Kerouac was pleased, a gratified Ginsberg wrote to Kerouac about the
latter's methods of composition: "How far advanced you are on this. I don't know what
I'm doing with poetry. I need years of isolation and constant everyday writing to attain
your volume & freedom & knowledge of the form" (qtd. in Schumacher 204).
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Certainly Ginsberg's performance itself must be credited too. Michael McClure,
who also read that night, corroborates Kerouac's account. He explains that Ginsberg
"began in a small and intensely lucid voice. At some point Jack Kerouac began shouting
'GO' in cadence as Allen read it" (13). Schumacher further indicates that "Allen had been
drinking wine throughout the evening and, by his own later admission, he was intoxicated
by the time [. . .] he began his reading." After his quiet beginning, Schumacher reports
that Ginsberg "gained confidence and began to sway rhythmically with the music of his
poetry, responding to the enthusiasm of the audience {. . .1" (215). McClure further
characterizes the impression the reading made: "In all of our memories no one had been
so outspoken in poetry before--and we were ready for it, for a point of no return. None of
us wanted to go back to the gray, chill, militaristic silence, to the intellectual void--to the
land without poetry--to the spiritual drabness "(13). By this account, the possibility of
poetic speech, of any sort, was at issue in this historical moment. Ginsberg broke the
"militaristic silence." The act of speaking, especially in a lively cultural gathering, was as
significant as the poem itself.
The importance of the sheer presence of words is reinscribed in McClure's text.
The above description is followed by about two pages filled with the first twenty or so
lines of Ginsberg's poem. Then McClure continues with his general explanation:
Ginsberg read on to the end of the poem, which left us standing in wonder,
or cheering and wondering, but knowing at the deepest level that a barrier
had been broken, that a human voice and body had been hurled against the
harsh wall of America and its supporting armies and navies and academies
and institutions and ownership systems and power-support bases. (15)
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McClure reduces the linguistic act to physical intervention, to a "voice" and a "body
hurled against" a wall. McClure's repetition, in the space of a few pages, of the critique
of American culture and particularly American militarism further indicates the perceived
status of the speech act at this moment. That is, what McClure finds to say about
Ginsberg's reading is that it broke a silence, and McClure's own repetition reenacts this
sense of speaking not so much to convey ideas as to resist other forces and to break a
silence. This sense of language use also seems implicit in the long, paratactic string of
targets for McClure's critique, linked by ands. These targets accumulate as though
language were substance being piled together.
It is obvious from the poem's agonized cultural reception that it did break taboos:
When Lawrence Ferlinghetti and Shig Murao published Howl, they had to undergo trial
for publishing obscene material. The judge ultimately found that the book was not
obscene, partly because, in Schumacher's quotation of him, "'If the material is disgusting,
revolting, or filthy, to use just a few adjectives, the antithesis of pleasurable sexual
desires is born, and it cannot be obscene' (264).
Such strong reactions provoked counterreactions. Despite the judge's less-than-
complimentary view of the poem, shared by several of those who testified, the publicity
from the trial "certainly bolstered its sales figures," Schumacher reports (254). The
definition of literature was on trial legally and publicly, and the vehemence of the
positions excited interest. In another version of this point, Michael Davidson's Preface to
The San Francisco Renaissance opens rather wryly with his explanation that his book
owes a great deal to all those well-intentioned English teachers who never
said a word about the literary movement going on in San Francisco during
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the late 1950s and early 1960s. Their silence meant that, as a student,
growing up across the bay in Oakland, I had to learn about these events on
my own through a kind of "vernacular pedagogy." (ix)
Davidson's terms again are simply silence or speech. The effects of this polarized literary
climate are enduring enough to earn mention in his 1989 work of literary criticism.
Turning to Ginsberg's poem itself, we can see that it widely publicized a taboo and
abject constellation of ideas. In Perkins's A History of Modern Poetry, what he finds
"most original and instructive for other poets" is Howl's exploitation of "the intimate,
painful, sensational, and shocking" (551). This becomes, indeed, Perkin's distillation of
Ginsberg's oeuvre, since he treats ow as Ginsberg's only poem really worth discussing
(for his project, a general history of modern poetry). I suggest that a central reason
Ginsberg explores the "shocking" is to make an ethical claim of solidarity with these
taboo elements of the human. This ethical work is what has given the poem more cultural
resonance than it would have if it were merely shocking.
The long first section, however, begins with a slight evasion of the solidarity
claim. Instead, it establishes the speaker as a witness: "I saw the best minds of my
generation destroyed by madness, starving hysterical, naked [. (1.1).3 This move
externalizes the horror the poem describes to some extent. The long catalogue of misery
and madness that follows, however, makes this distancing somewhat easy to forget.
Structurally, moreover, the poem moves from that initial, externalizing gesture to the
third section, where the autobiographical speaker declares, "Carl Solomon! I'm with you
in Rockland / where you're madder than I am" (3. I). "I'm with you" is repeated to open
3 I cite section number, then line number.
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each line throughout the third section, making the declaration of solidarity clear. "I'm
with you" refers both to the literal level--Ginsberg was in the Psychiatric Institute with
Solomon--and to the more figurative level of solidarity that I am discussing. The final,
playfully serious "Footnote to Howl," which seems to allude to and mock The Waste
Land's footnotes, completes this movement by claiming "Everything is holy!" (43). It
names several of the people whose biographical experiences had been detailed above,
including Ginsberg himself, and also unites the taboo language prevalent in the first two
sections with claims to holiness: "The world is holy! The soul is holy! The skin is holy!
The nose is holy! The tongue and cock and hand and asshole holy!" (4.2). The footnote
seeks to redeem the suffering described in the poem itself by connecting the profane and
the sacred. Its apparent, mocking allusion to the classic work of high modernism pursues
this end intertextually by refusing the spiritual drought of Eliot's poem.
We can recognize, then, the somewhat ambivalent way that the poem makes
Ginsberg's identity claim (even without the biographical knowledge that many of the
experiences described in the first parts of the poem were Ginsberg's own). Much as
Ginsberg himself had tried to fit in to the cultural norms of the 1950s before he became a
key figure in the counterculture, the poem confesses to drug use, homosexuality,
obscenity, and more, seemingly on the part of others_ It is really only by the end that
Ginsberg announces his partisanship among those others, and even then with a measure
of persisting anxiety.
In this way, the poem itself also resembles its cultural reception. The poem was
first criticized and nearly silenced in terms of publication, then became a generally
recognized, even if less generally praised, work of the century. By bringing a taboo
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language and subject matter into the visible, and even into literary anthologies, the poem
and its reception history helped make possible many of the cultural experiments that
would ensue in the next decades. To do so, it relied on a form and method that had
already gained acceptance in Whitman's practice of it--the long, biblical line and the
catalogue. But unlike Whitman's tendency to use catalogues as a celebration of
democratic inclusion, Ginsberg's long lines pile up language as marks of suffering, like
cultural symptoms in need of curing. Howl thus haunts Whitman and mockingly answers
to Eliot.
Kerouac's silence at the Six Gallery in terms of his own literary speech can be
connected to his rather howl-like participatory role in the elevation of Ginsberg's poem to
fame. Both are suspicious of nuanced communication. Like a howl, silence is also a
form of transgression. His silence should also be read alongside the literary speech he did
make public in The Subterraneans, which shares many of Ginsberg's confessional
elements and shares Ginsberg's treatment of the abject in ethical terms. This
experimental novel confesses to anxieties of identity akin to those Ginsberg presents.
Jonathan Paul Eburne points out that the novel challenges the strictly limited cultural
possibilities of 1950s America, but does so by "identifying with the 'otherness' of the
American cultural margins" (55). Eburne explains that this move leads Kerouac to
involve himself in "the same process of normativity and containment" he purports to
move beyond by coopting the Other into his own identity project (55).
I partially concede Ebunie's point, finding that Kerouac is able to present the
problems of his inherited sense of the subject without presenting solutions. However, in
my view, the apparent "normativity and containment" of the novel are mocked by the
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text's confessional element, at the levels both of form and content. Also, humor
functions here much as it does in Hemingway's late work. In effect, the approach to the
Other in The Subterraneans explodes the subjectivity of Kerouac's stand-in Leo, much as
Julia Kristeva argues Celine writes himself out of his own subjectivity.' The turn to the
body that surfaces in this book's approach to the Other becomes for Kerouac, ipso facto, a
destruction of ethical regard and potential. Relying on Levinas's account of embodied
ethics, though, I argue for signs of an ethical subjectivity in what Kerouac perceives to be
hopelessness.
I also claim that Kerouac's treatment of place points to the anxieties of identity
operating in the text. The desire to escape a constrictive subjectivity registers
geographically. The novel's setting in San Francisco displaces New York, where the
events described actually happened. This change reproduces in a different form the
American narrative of westward movement and reveals concerns about the importance of
place to the subject's identity.
While I resist Kerouac's interpretation of the bodily, I also suggest that his writing
Leo into abjection hollows out the literary, upsets aesthetic standards and other methods
of judgment, and thereby makes a place for cultural renewal.' This hollowing can be seen
in the publication history of texts like Howl or The Subterraneans, where actual legal and
economic struggles occurred over what could or could not be published.' Indeed, the
4 See Powers of Horror.
5 In this interpretation of the effects of presenting abjection textually, I echo Kristeva's
conclusion to Powers of Horror. See 210.
6 Kerouac's nonstandard punctuation was subject to dispute in this book's publication.
When Donald Allen, editor at Grove Press, removed the frequent dashes, ellipsis, and the
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greater inclusivity of the canon, or even more radically, the partial elimination of the
canon that resulted in some degree from works like Kerouac's and Ginsberg's, made space
for work like Silko's Almanac of the Dead, discussed in Chapter VI.
It is certainly neither new nor surprising to find an escapism in Kerouac's work, of
course. On the Road makes the mythic, westward American journey a picaresque of
crossing and recrossing the country for increasingly empty reasons. The Subterraneans
internalizes this logic in at least three senses: The frenetic need to travel moves from
overt theme in On the ., oad to the displacement of setting in The Subterreaneans; the
latter depends on a more experimental style; and The Subterraneans is structured as a
confession of guilt about Leo's failures in his relationship with Mardou. These last two
attributes--its literary experimentation and its confessional work—can be understood in
some sense as oppositional in the novel. Kerouac's narrator makes it quite clear that his
writing ambitions conflict with his relationship to Mardou. He is frequently leaving
Mardou to go home to write, discussing literature with literary friends, and blowing off
steam after long days of writing, all in ways that afflict Mardou. Insofar as the book is a
confession of how he failed in the relationship, furthermore, it is a confession of guilt and
remorse about these failures. It therefore follows that the achievement of the novel, its
style and content, conflicts with a guilty awareness of its costs. These tensions are
presented simply in the book's final two lines, broken into separate paragraphs: "And I go
home having lost her love. / And write this book" (111). The book replaces her love,
insufficiently we suppose. The two cannot persist together.
like, converting Kerouac's punctuation into a more conventional form, Kerouac prevented
publication of the book until his punctuation was restored (Schumacher 251).
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Because the book makes public Kerouac's private transgressions of cultural
taboos, it functions culturally as a confession. This recognition further complicates its
complex generic character; as a roman a clef, it has already muddied the world/text
boundary. This work at the level of the world/text distinction also makes The
Subterranean closely parallel to Hemingway's The Garden of Eden. In Kerouac's case,
we can read his reliance on the fictional distancing of his experiences in order to confess
them as an acknowledgment of the heterogeneous, ethical subject. Leo, the uncanny
version of Kerouac, embodies in text the doubleness of ethical sensibility.
Most of the texts considered in this dissertation register their rhetorical work and
their work on the subject at the level of form. A hybrid subjectivity is presented by way
of hybrid forms. In Kerouac's novel, this hybridity induced a kind of panic and a sense of
conflict between the proper and the improper. At the heart of Leo's anxiety about love is
his mistrust of his own motives, most particularly at the level of the body. Leo worries
that he is driven primarily by his own sexual drives, for one, and more especially, he
expresses "doubts" about his interest in Mardou, which also focus on her bodily status.
He wonders if he pursues her merely because of her mixed racial identity (African-
American and Cherokee). This concern appears on the second page of the book and
recurs throughout.
Leo's anxiety about and interest in Mardou's status as a mixed-blood outsider to
white, male culture persist together and inform each other. His worries follow all the
stereotypical, racist lines: Is she sexually more potent? Does she have wandering feet? Is
she naturally messy? Is she really crazy? Is her body somehow irregular? The doubts
center on her status as a representative of the abject in a Kristevan sense. By this I of
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course do not mean that Mardou was in fact abject, but that in the 1950s, violently limited
conception of normative subjectivity, she was exceptional. In Powers of Honor, Julia
Kristeva defines the abject as that which is outside of "the possible, the tolerable, the
thinkable." It is that which "cannot be assimilated" to hegemonic discourses, that which
therefore, in its alterity, "beseeches, worries, and fascinates desire" (1). Thus, predictably
according to Kristeva, Leo's questions about Mardou are answered by investigations that
verge on pleasure and horror, that "fascinate desire."
Kerouac's treatment of this experience tends toward a reduction of Mardou to
what seem to Leo to be essential bodily differences in terms of race and gender: the
genitals. For example, at a key moment in Leo's paranoia, when Mardou insists they
"confess everything," Leo explains of Mardou's genitals, "I thought I saw some kind of
black thing I've never seen before, hanging, like it scared me" (45, original emphasis).
Leo admits that "it must have stabbed her heart to hear" (45). But nonetheless, when they
return to the house later, "we both of us childlike examined said body and looked closely
[. and I was really and truly assured to actually see and make the study with her" (46).
Mardou's perceived outsider status drives this sexual, pseudo-scientific inquiry, and
Kerouac reports the incident with this strange mixture of romantic, scientific, and legal
discourses that recapitulates her distance from him: Looking at her body is a "study," just
as her body is distanced and objectified with the jarring term "said body" (though perhaps
Kerouac meant this usage to be playfully humorous as well). Then, the expression of
assurance is full of modifiers that revolve around ideas of truth: "really," "truly,"
"actually." All of this testifies to the distance Leo feels from Mardou's body, his concern
about what she really is, a distance Leo himself acknowledges as paranoid.
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The logic at work behind these paranoias becomes clearer just down the page
from this "study," when Kerouac justifies the doubt and the writing of the novel as
designed "to show how abstract the life in the city of the Talking Class to which we all
belong [is], the Talking Class trying to rationalize itself I suppose out of a really base
almost lecherous lustful materialism" (46). This sentence conveys Kerouac 's own guilt
about his position of privilege, but it also reveals his sense that rationality and lustful
materialism" must be at odds. Another way to put this is that Leo perceives a conflict
between physical desire, pleasure, and moral behavior.
This conflict is exaggerated, or more precisely, misunderstood, in The
Subterraneans. For one thing, the text itself, associated with work, rationality,
confession, reproduces and intensifies the pleasure of the love affair, much in the way
that Foucault shows that the confession and the strictures surrounding sexuality produce
sexual discourse in the first volume of The History of Sexuality. Thus the act of
describing the affair, the writing, at times becomes explicitly pleasurable in sexual terms,
as when Kerouac writes, "--all those good things, good times we had, others I am now in
the heat of my frenzy forgetting but I must tell all, [. . 1" (73). This phrasing is set off
with the dashes that recur throughout the text, meant to mark spontaneity and sincerity,
two attributes which can be understood to combine pleasure and morality. And this
quotation moves directly from intense pleasure--a heat of frenzy--to an ethical
command--"I must tell all." In this phrasing, the need to tell, at the root of confession,
grows out of bodily experience. In other words, the experience of this pleasure provokes
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a keener moral sense. Indeed, if we put this situation into the terms of Levinas's ethical
subjectivity, we could argue that this encounter with the Other produces the morality at
work in the text.
Such a claim may seem to justify Leo's behavior that is at times quite lousy, even
by the narrator's own admission. Obviously this is not my point. The ethics at work in
The Subterraneans are half formulated and confused. But it is precisely for such
situations that Levinas wrote his ethical philosophy. Levinas's hope was to clarify some
of the confusion at the heart of subjectivity in order to reveal the ethics at work there. In
the revelation of a fuller ethical understanding that Levinas offers, the subject is always
for-the-other, so much so that the subject is not itself. The ethical command is indeed at
the root of whatever the subject might want, and understanding this can enable a subject
not only to behave more ethically but, I add, to inhabit her or his own desires more
carefully. This final step extends beyond Levinas's own view of his ethics.
For Levinas, this ethics appears in sensibility or embodiment itself. Even though,
as I argue above, Levinas's own positions about the physical and the material have some
inconsistencies, this view of sensibility provides a way to complicate Kerouac's simple
and conventional division of the rational from the physical. Unlike Kerouac, Levinas
argues that sensation produces the subject, yet that "sensation {, . I is not reducible to the
clarity or the idea derived out of it" (Otherwise Than Being 63). Sensation is
"vulnerability, enjoyment and suffering, whose status is not reducible to the fact of being
put before a spectator subject" (63). This more-than-specular vulnerability is an openness
to the Other, and an Other cannot be totalized into an entity_ Rather, "sensibility is being
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affected by a non-phenomenon" (75). This "being effected" is physical experience, is the
core of the subject, and the subject is always an ethical subject for Levinas.
I am suggesting that a dim awareness of this exists in Kerouac's work, appearing
partly in the fact of the work itself. Even though this book is understood as antagonistic
to his human relationships, especially his relationship with Mardou, I suggested above
that the very character of this book, its texture and emotion, relies on that relationship.
More than this, though, the trip underground, this going subterranean, is fundamentally a
confrontation with an Other, as Kerouac admits explicitly and implicitly. Frequently in
the history of western cultures in particular, confrontations with an Other produce
anxieties, and anxieties lead to exertions of power and force. This is a well-rehearsed
point. But Levinas's work offers a new way to understand the confrontation of
difference, which, far from being exceptional and exotic, is the root of human experience
itself. Levinas brings home the often melodramatic voyage of discovery, the trip
subterranean, however we want to call it. In a sense, then, Levinasian ethics are to
conquest narratives as  he Subterraneans is to On the Road: The Subterraneans takes
responsibility for the often harmful encounters with Others, the desire for which is the
theme of On the Road.
We have already begun to see, in the odd "study" scene quoted above, how the
Other is frequently reduced to a body in The Subterraneans. Materiality or embodiment
in such encounters becomes manifest in large part because differences provoke
awareness. This interest in the Other has been called a racist, "romantic primitivism" by
Jon Panish, and for understandable reasons. The whole account of the affair alternates
between an apparently sincere affection and the doubt that centers on the differences
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between Leo and Mardou. An important example of this occurs toward the end of the
text, when Leo gushes forth phrases of regard for Mardou, expressed in terms of the body,
as he condemns himself for failing to live up to his regard: "--the warm lovemouth of the
woman, the womb, being the place for men who love, not . . .this immature, drunkard and
egomaniacal . . . this .. knowing as I do from past experience and interior sense, you've
got to fall down on your knees and beg the woman's permission [. .1" (76). He
continues in this fashion for several more phrases, only to interrupt with "--yes
psychoanalysis, I hear (fearing secretly the few times I had come into contact with the
rough stubble-like quality of the pubic, which was Negroid and therefore not enough to
make any difference, [. .j)" (76). From here the account becomes excessively
complimentary, only to shift back, still in such explicitly bodily terms, to stereotypical
fears about Mardou's overpowering sexuality. Kerouac proceeds this way, vacillating
between desire and horror, until Leo is described as reaching the limit, death, at the end of
the paragraph: "till she threw me over a dead hulk that now I am--psychoanalyst, I'm
serious" (76).
These final three words indicate the satirical side to this whole melodramatic
alternation between love and fear. The next paragraph confirms this playful element by
beginning, after an extra space that separates it from the previous paragraph, with the
mocking sentence, "It's too much." This satire is in keeping with Leo's insistent chiding
of psychoanalysis throughout The Subterraneans. Instead of a psychoanalytic
understanding, this passage and this book place the blame on Leo himself. This sense of
ethical responsibility at the level of the subject is the same reason, I think, that Levinas
had reservations about psychoanalysis. To be clear, though: I do not mean
144
psychoanalysis lacks value; I only mean to point out this belief Kerouac and Levinas
seem to share that puts the ethical responsibility of the subject at the fore. However,
ultimately, an ethical sensibility is not in conflict with psychoanalytic understandings.
Rather, a believable view of ethics must accommodate psychoanalysis. I would suggest
Kerouac's view--and Levinas ts to some extent--disavows the heterogeneity of the subject,
which drives Kerouac to crisis in the plot of this book and undermines his ability to act
ethically in general. Furthermore, as I mentioned in the previous chapter discussing the
porosity of the human/animal boundary, part of ethics requires admitting complexity
when that is warranted, which psychoanalysis does, even if that makes the enactment of
ethics more difficult.
The movement toward Leo's own responsibility is paralleled by the shift of bodily
attention from Mardou to Leo in the phrase "dead hulk that now I am." Just as this book
can be read to expose the racist logic of scapegoating, only to return the blame to Leo, the
end of this section brings back to its narrator the attention to the body that characterizes
the long, paranoid, mocking section that precedes it. Indeed, the anxiety about Mardou's
body produces a greater awareness in Leo of his own body throughout the novel. As their
relationship becomes increasingly enervated, Leo's physical sensibility heightens. We are
aware of this tendency from very early in the book, when Leo discusses "the pain which
impels me to write this even while I don't want to, the pain which won't be eased by the
writing of this but heightened, but which will be redeemed, and if only it were a dignified
pain and could be placed somewhere other than in this black gutter of shame and loss and
noisemaking folly in the night and poor sweat on my brow" (18). This account is
classically abject. It presents substances like sweat that are neither quite internal nor
145
external to the body as substitutes for language. This move restores representationality to
language by indicating language's failures. That is, Kerouac reminds us here of the gap in
representation between the Real and language. Sweat functions as physical proof of
feeling and suffering, beyond words. Furthermore, sweat stands for shame and its
association with the instincts and nighttime, all part of the constellation of abjection.
This turn toward an embodied language as a kind of proof of Leo's feelings is
reiterated each time the expression of pain grows severe. Mardou's telling Leo, "I have
this balloon now--I don't need you any more," in reference to an ordinary balloon she had
happened across in the hall, makes him "heavy as lead" (64). Absurdity is conjured in the
comical contrast between heavy lead and a random, buoyant balloon, but that absurdity
itself also signifies sorrow, since we normally hope relationships redeem the absurd in
living. The logic of abjection, moreover, repeatedly pushes toward what Kristeva
reminds us is its limit--the human corpse, the body as mere waste. Becoming "lead" is
one example. An even more concrete example occurs at the level of the word, when Leo
has fully narrated the relationship's end: "Well, I thought, this is the end--I finally made
the step and by God I paid her back for what she done to me--it had to come and this is
it--ploop" (101). Communicative language here translates across the dash into mere
substance, excretion, corpse. The dash, indeed, has already begun to do this work by
flouting grammatical convention.
We might understand this push to abjection and death as part of the
physiological/ethical divide that Kerouac seems to assume. However, these lines
themselves also bear a critique of the whole logic that makes embodiment sheer
abjection. The idea of revenge in the lines is mocked, both by the switch in linguistic
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register that indicates self-parody--"for what she done to me"--and by the larger context
of the story that replaces vengeance with sadness and pain. Kerouac was able to
articulate the problems with his view of alterity, the body, the Other. He exposes the
empty consequences of scapegoating by restoring sadness to blaming. But he could not
with full awareness see how a notion of embodied language and an embodied subject
could, to use his language quoted above, redeem his experiences.
Locating the subject in the body produces tremendous anxiety, humor, and other
disruptive emotions in this text, marking the limits of the subject. Embodiment reminds
us of the locality of subjectivity in general; the subject inhabits a particularized body in
dialogue with particular cultures, places, and so on. So, localizing the subject has a
geographical component. In Leo's violent and strange departures, his frantic bodily
mobility, therefore, we see his agonized reactions to this growing awareness of the
subject's limits. In particular, Leo identifies his leap out of the taxi Leo and Mardou
shared as the craziest and most disturbing of his actions. This action quietly violates Leo
and Mardou's relationship and also enacts agonistic relationships with time and the body.
Instead of making a place in the subject for embodied desire, Leo is forced to admit desire
in these extreme ways that upset the time and order of his relationships and of his own
subjectivity. This same type of displacement from the bodily and the local appears in the
text's displacement of setting.
Indeed, a guilty awareness of geographical sin intrudes into the text itself through
Mardou as well, since her father was Cherokee. Contemplating this genealogy, Kerouac,
via Leo, "with a great amount of effort," realizes Indians "were the inhabitors of this land
and under these huge skies they were the worriers and keeners and protectors of wives in
147
whole nations gathered around tents--" (20). Kerouac, in this text and in his life, was not
able to resolve these feelings of guilt in large measure because of the physical/ethical
divide he took to be fundamental.
This parallel between identity and geography continues in present theoretical
solutions to these problems—hybridity, critical regionalism, bioregionalism'—all of
which rely on a complex notion of locality or particularity. Such particularity, without
giving itself over to an essentialism, nevertheless demonstrates a greater responsibility to
the unique circumstances of each enactment of identity in each place. It helps to make
possible an embodied subject that is not necessarily immoral or unethical. Gary Snyder
has become an important spokesperson for these conceptions of ethics in the years since
the Six Gallery reading, but already in the poem he presented there, "A Berry Feast," we
can see his thought moving in that direction.
More generally, while Kerouac's and Ginsberg's work present defiance of cultural
taboo partly by explorations of the abject, Snyder's treatment of alterity and the abject in
"A Berry Feast" tends toward the anthropological. Another way to put this is that all
three animalize language, but Snyder finds affirmation and potential renewal in that
animalization while Kerouac and Ginsberg find mostly misery, anxiety, and sorrow.'
Thus, while the word or the sign in Kerouac and Ginsberg reveals itself partly as a
7 The case for hybridity can be found in Kristeva's Powers of Horror, in Edward Said's
Culture and elsewhere in contemporary critical theory. Kenneth
Frampton makes a case for critical regionalism. Snyder is a key figure in bioregionalism.
8 I am admittedly simplifying Kerouac and Ginsberg's work to make this point. Clearly
both practice a lyricism that is joyful at times, and as I argue above, Ginsberg's "Footnote
to Howl" finds affirmation in Ginsberg's avowed marginal status. Nonetheless, Snyder's
affirms animality much more specifically and precisely, while the animal in Kerouac and
Ginsberg tends to operate less deliberately, as a kind of unconscious.
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symptom of pain, a response to suffering, like a howl, for Snyder the animalized word is
more like a track to be followed. Snyder thereby restores a measure of agency and
purpose to the subject, much as I argue Hemingway's The Old Man and the Sea does.
From this perspective, it seems appropriate that Snyder read last at the Six Gallery, as his
work seems to answer to Howl in a grounded and pragmatic way. Snyder's presentation
of himself to the audience apparently registered such differences. Schumacher explains,
Reading in a voice that Kerouac later described as "deep and resonant and
somehow brave, like the voice of oldtime American heroes and orators,"
Snyder effectively summarized the spirit of the evening, the feeling that
the human race was losing sight of its own basic consciousness and
spirituality [. . J. Unlike Robinson Jeffers, whose poetry could be
characterized as pessimistic in its outlook, Snyder delivered a hopeful yet
urgent message [. . (216)
The audience would have been positioned as trackers by Snyder's first lines:
Fur the color of mud, the smooth loper
Crapulous old man, a drifter,
Praises! of Coyote the Nasty, the fat
Puppy that abused himself, the ugly gambler,
Bringer of goodies. (1.1-5)
The evocation of mixed substance ("mud"), together with the suggestion of motion in the
first line, combine with the varied list of descriptions of coyote to render a figure that is
evasive. The reader or auditor must try to keep up.
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Tracking is also important ontologically, as it resists the idea that the animal
Other, or any "object" really, can be easily or completely understood. In this way, it is
part of Snyder's literary ethics. This element of Snyder's work bears resemblance to
Derrida's work on the animal discussed above, especially in Chapter In some of
Snyder's more didactic poems, discussed below, he makes similar claims about the animal
and about "objective" reality more directly. We should notice that he was presenting such
ideas more subtly earlier in his work because his growing didacticism reveals Snyder's
changing ideas about the function of the literary ,. He becomes less interested in subtlety
on the page and more interested in the actualization of ideas in the world. The notion of a
difficult poetry, inherited from the modernists who influenced him, had to be interrogated
and revised on these grounds.'
The second stanza continues tracking, but shifts the object of pursuit: "In bearshit
find it in August, / Neat pile on the fragrant trail, in late August, [. I (1. 6-8), These
signs indicate that "Bear has been eating the berries" (1.9), but they also point beyond this
natural fact to the cultural work of the poem:
Blackbear
eating berries, married
To a woman whose breasts bleed
From nursing the half-human cubs.
9 It is beyond the range of this chapter to show this trajectory in Snyder's work, but in the
relatively recent poem "Word Basket Woman," published in the "No Nature" section of
_ o Nature (the "new poems" section of the book), he writes, "Robinson Jeffers, his tall
cold view / quite true in a way, but why did he say it / as though he alone / stood above
our delusions, he also / feared death, insignificance, / and was not quite up to the inhuman
beauty / of parsnips or diapers, the deathless / nobility at the core of all ordinary things"
(lines 9-16).
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Somewhere of course there are people
collecting and junking, gibbering all day, [. . .] (1.11-16)
The bears' adherence to the laws of the seasons--eating berries when they are ripe in
August--begins to show here as a model for the human who might mix with bear, as
signified also by Snyder's reference to the traditional story of bear/human hybridity.l°
That model for living, that source of values, contrasts with the reality presented by the
offset acknowledgment of what other people are doing "somewhere": collecting junk and
"gibbering." The casual presentation of the critique indicates that articulating another
possible way to live, in a more pointed fashion than Ginsberg or Kerouac do, is at least as
important as the critique.
The remainder of the poem repeats and accentuates the methods and substance of
this cultural critique. In one world we find that "The Chainsaw falls for boards of pine, /
Suburban bedrooms, block on block" (1.24-25), so that "Each morning when commuters
wake" (118), they find themselves in "a box to catch the biped in" (1.30). The
alliterative diction that makes tract housing a trap for "bipeds" animalizes the human.
Human animality is a plain fact in Snyder's work. The question for him is how the
individual (and culture) understands and inhabits that animality. The suburban world is
contrasted with the more natural world, presented again with reference to berries in the
next stanza :
and shadow swings around the tree
Shifting on the berrybush
10 Snyder presents a fuller account of these stories in Practice of the Wild 155-74.
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from leaf to leaf across each day
The shadow swings around the tree. {1.31-34)
As with the animal signs discussed above, in these lines Snyder presents the reader with
only the objects themselves, as time swings around them, calling attention to the alterity
of these "objects." In the case of the berrybush and the animal signs, alterity functions
both as ethical acknowledgment of difference, then, and as cultural critique. We are
encouraged by juxtaposition to register the differences between worlds, differences
implicit also in the banality and sense of entrapment conveyed by the suburban culture as
compared to the more harmonious picture of the berry bush in its proper place, living in
what Snyder sees as its proper way. A better culture, he is suggesting, would live more in
accord with these larger patterns and temporalities of nature.
Another element of Snyder's suggested cultural solution involves hearing animal
voices more clearly. In the first section, we see two primary methods for doing this in
poetry:
"Where I shoot my arrows
"There is the sunflower's shade
--song of the rattlesnake
coiled in the boulder's groin
"K'ak, k'ak, k'ak!
sang Coyote. Mating with
humankind-- (1.17-23)
In the first instance, Snyder translates the rattlesnake song into English, thereby more
directly rendering animal signs. This move makes those signs legible and therefore useful
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for cultural revisions. But the purely sonic transcription of the Coyote's call reminds us
also to read transliterations skeptically, in keeping with the sense throughout the poem
that the animal can be followed but not fully known. Thus, in these moments Snyder
both brings the animal Other into human discourse, rendering animals as potential
teachers, and registers the alterity of animals by way of estranged language. Indeed, for
Snyder, Coyote is an archetypal figure of the inscrutable animal.
The duality in Snyder's treatment of the animal contests a common reading that he
is excessively optimistic about poetry's ability to represent the world. In Greening the 
Lyre, for instance, David Gilcrest takes Snyder as an example of a tendency an individual
can have to be "eminently sanguine about his or her ability to ascertain the ontological
conditions of nature" (31). This moment in Gilcrest's analysis treats one of Snyder's more
optimistic poems, "For All," in which Snyder works to articulate a positive direction for
culture. But this poem, and Gilcrest's analysis of Snyder more generally, treats only a
limited part of Snyder's larger work. Important to the ethical component of that work is
Snyder's acknowledgment of the inscrutable animality of the human and of human
language."
Snyder's approach differs considerably from Kerouac's uncomfortably fascinated
approach to the Other because Kerouac's recognitions of difference lead him to crisis.
This difference, in fact, returns us to Judith Butler's response to Levinas, centering on the
nature of ethics, discussed in the opening of this dissertation. If ethical acknowledgment
can only lead to crisis, a kind of apocalypticism seems to result. The concrete version of
I I There are many additional examples to cite, beyond those explicitly discussed in this
chapter. Some key instances appear in The Practice of the Wild 15-18, and passim.
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this in Kerouac's The Subterraneans is the end of his relationship with Mardou. Butler's
call for acknowledgment of the subject's needs, including good air and peace, is an
acknowledgment of the embodiment of the subject, the subject's thickness. In Snyder's
work, awareness of these needs translates not only into the trackable animality of his
writing, but also, at times, into the pragmatism of his poetry. Such pragmatism
recognizes the utility of language as a tool that human animals use, hopefully, to better.
inhabit the world. In this way, Snyder's use of poetry resembles Santiago's use of
language in Hemingway's The Old Man and the Sea (see Chapter II).
However, there are other ethical concerns with Snyder's "A Berry Feast."
McClure reports "Snyder's gloss" that it derives from "'a first-fruits celebration that
consumes a week of mid-August on the Warm Springs Indian Reservation in Oregon.
Coyote is the name of the Trickster-Hero of the mythology of that region"' (McClure 20-
21). This fact reminds us of considerations of cultural appropriation that can be as
harmful to the cultures being borrowed from as Kerouac's behavior was to Mardou.
Indeed, Snyder's Pulitzer Prize in 1975 for Turtle Island prompted Leslie Silko's response,
"An Old-Time Indian Attack Conducted in Two Parts." In this essay, Silko first generally
criticizes "white poets and writers who romanticize their 'power' as writers to inhabit
souls and consciousness far beyond the realms of their own knowledge or experience"
(78). Then, more specifically, she criticizes Snyder as "occupying stolen property" in his
inhabitation, careful and deliberate or not, of North America (83). She also criticizes his
use of native peoples' mythologies.
Silko's critique resonates with many other critics' work on this issue of
appropriation. Shari Huhndorf, in Going Native, demonstrates how ostensibly
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sympathetic depictions of native peoples can reinforce European-American hegemony,
especially when such depictions reinforce stereotypes of native peoples while presenting
the regeneration of white culture at the expense of natives. The opening example in her
book is Kevin Costner's 1991 Academy Award-winning film Dances with Wolves, which
depicts a disgruntled Civil War veteran whose contact with a band of Sioux reaffirms his
vitality and teaches him the nobility of the Indians. Huhndorf shows that, despite this
positive depiction of the Sioux, the film mostly focuses on the nobility of the white
character while presenting the ultimate decline of traditional Sioux life. Snyder, as a
white, European-American, can be understood similarly in his reception of attention and
accolade because he uses Native ideas and even native identity in order to propose better
ways of living on "Turtle Island," his adopted name for North America.
There are no simple resolutions to this ethical problem, as we also saw in
Hemingway's case. But a few important responses to it in Snyder's work should be
pointed out before we proceed. For one, Snyder has acknowledged the sources of poems
like "A Berry Feast" and of terminology like "Turtle Island." This obviously necessary
step does not answer to the more pointed concern Huhndorf mentions, however.
Huhndorf demonstrates the need for more direct political awareness and even political
commitment.
Snyder's work shows signs of this. in his 1977 collection of essays The Old
Ways, for instance, Snyder seeks to rearticulate contemporary human cultures with older,
and in Snyder's view more essentially human practices (see "Re-inhabitation" especially).
Importantly, Snyder holds that task alongside a keen awareness of "The Politics of
Ethnopoetics," the title of one of the essays. That essay directly treats the problem
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Huhndorf enunciates by recognizing that people who study other cultures are also
responsible to those cultures. Snyder tells his audience of ethnopoetics scholars that "we
should ally ourselves to peoples' struggles everywhere" (23). 
12 
In a 1977 interview with
Paul Geneson, Snyder broadens and underscores the necessity of political commitment in
terms of how democracy might be practiced:
We all see what democracy means, too. It means that the Navajo should
get their own nation, that Rosebud and Pine Ridge maybe should be
separate nation, that the Indians of Puget Sound have fishing rights, that
trees and rocks should be able to vote in Congress, that whales should be
able to vote--that's democracy. (The Real Work 74)
Snyder makes clear his concern for the political situation of nonwhites and does real
advocacy work in addressing an audience of people who work on these issues. His claim
about rocks voting may sound flippant or quixotic, but as the interview proceeds, Snyder
argues for its practicality by referring to Christopher Stone's 1972 book _ hould Trees 
Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects. Stone presents a legal
argument for the idea Snyder advocates.
Snyder's political point derives partly from his awareness of the possibility that
"anthropology is always imperialism" (The Old Ways 22). At issue in this question of
imperialism are the politics of knowledge more generally. What are the worldly effects 'of
cultural epistemologies? Snyder explores this question in the remainder of "The Politics
of Ethnopoetics," measuring cultures' knowledges against the lived experiences, so far as
12 Snyder's essay was originally delivered at an Ethnopoetics conference in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, in 1975 (see The Old Ways 43).
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we know them, of members of those cultures. A key moment in that discussion for our
purposes here is Snyder's report of Levi-Strauss's view that "writing systems have served
largely throughout history to enslave men rather than to serve any useful religious,
spiritual or esthetic purpose, since the original use of writing was to write down lists of
slaves and to keep an account of what you had in your warehouse, and only much later
became used in these other ways" (34).' For Snyder, it is not enough to celebrate the
achievements of writing technologies or disciplines like ethnopoetics. We must measure
these forms of understanding against the effects on all people and all life more generally.
Knowledge cannot be divorced from questions of its use, and these questions (obviously)
entail ethical concerns. Snyder's approach, then, repositions language in the physical
world. His oeuvre insistently considers ecological effects of cultural activities.
The pragmatic animality of Snyder's poetry thus signifies an ethical awareness of
the function of language and knowledge in the world. Some of his poems work in
apparently simple fashion to reveal this insight, like epigrammatic teaching tools. The
final lines of his 1970 book of poetry Regarding_Wave, for instance, position poetry in
relation to work and culture:
When creeks are full
The poems flow
When creeks are down
13 This question of the material function of language, key to much contemporary critical
discourse, generally involves questions of ethics too. Kristeva's account of abjection
encourages us to attend to the worldly effects of the development of the subject as it
attains language. In The Spell of the Sensuous, David Abram argues that the technology
of written language has separated humans from the physical world. He makes an
(ethical) argument for a return to an embodied awareness.
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We heap stones. (page 84, lines 18-21)
Poems can be written when the broader worldly conditions permit. The context of these
lines makes this point clearer; the poem they conclude is entitled "CIVILIZATION" and
is a critique of how "civilized" people behave. It is broken into three related parts. It
begins with the direct claim, "Those are the people who do complicated things," who
"grab us by the thousands land put us to work" (1-3). Civilization is criticized from
without, then, for the labor practices that support it. Snyder continues,
World's going to hell, with all these
villages and trails.
Wild duck flocks aren't
what they used to be.
Aurochs grow rare. (4-8)
Here the measure of civilization's "success" is its effects on animals.
The middle section of the poem uses animals again as a measure, but in a different
way. We are presented with a more concrete situation:
A small cricket
on the typescript page of
"Kyoto born in spring song"
grooms himself
in time with The Well-Tempered Clavier,
I quit typing and watch him through a glass.
How well articulated! How neat!
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Nobody understands the ANIMAL KINGDOM. (10-17)
A worldly event interrupts textual activity and complicates what textuality itself is by
making animal activity a version of intertextuality. This cricket lands on the manuscript
of another poem, also published in Regarding Wave. "Kyoto born in spring song"
positions human rebirth in the larger rebirth of spring, which includes "melons,"
"bamboo," mice, and other living beings (page 18). "Kyoto born in spring song" thus
restores to human activities the world that enables them, and it reminds readers more
generally of the vitality of the nonhuman. The cricket reiterates the point of the poem on
which it has landed in a direct, compelling, embodied way for the speaker, as we see in
the enthusiastic observations conveyed with exclamation points. This tableau
demonstrates how texts respond to the world as well as to each other because this event
has inspired a new and, I am arguing, pragmatically oriented poem, which further
underscores this worldly conception of the word. Moreover, to some extent the "poem"
of this middle portion is the cricket itself, a point emphasized by the isolation of the line
"A small cricket."
The last line of section two anticipates the epigrammatic four lines of the third
section discussed above. The poem's final four lines suggest individual action--"heap
stones"--based on this poem's observations, much as the declaration of ignorance about
animals suggests a policy for humanity more generally (a policy that the poem has begun
to enact by attending closely to a cricket). In that sense, Snyder elects a pragmatic goal
for his poem rather than a purely aesthetic one, but in a way that is concerned with the
roots of aesthesis--embodied, worldly experience. This pragmatism is reinforced by the
title of the larger section that houses this poem, "Target Practice," which presents poetry
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as a kind of training for the real task of living. Even so, the poem's final lines are more
subtle than they may seem. "When creeks are full / The poems flow" removes agency
from the poet by eliding the poet as subject. Instead, "poems" are said to flow, seemingly
of their own volition, in parallel with the healthy creek. This move naturalizes poetry in
addition to showing the ecological intersubjectivity of the "human." That type of
subjective practice, that enables a fuller intersubjectivity with the nonhuman world,
contrasts with the ethical work of piling stones, in which the awareness of ecological
illness requires also the self-awareness of the ethical subject, the ethical uncanny perhaps,
signaled by the use of the pronoun "we."
Many critics have taken Snyder's inquiry into and effacement of hubristic or
controlling human will to be one of his key achievements as a poet. A prominent
example appears in Lawrence Buell's Environmental Imagination, where he argues that
Snyder made "an inspired choice" when he elected "to follow traditional Chinese poetics
by effacing the 'I"' in a section of Myths and Texts (166). 14 Buell shows how Snyder's
speaker "has allowed his body to become permeable to the point that [. .  inside and
outside can no longer be distinguished" (167). For Buell, however, a key failure of this
poem is Snyder's introduction of "a piece of exotic pedantry": the phrase "congestion of
14 An important early version of this reading of Snyder's work that highlights Snyder's
occlusion of the "I" appears in Charles Altieri's Enlargiig the Temple (see 133-38 for
example). Patrick Murphy points to other examples in his Introduction to his collection
of critical essays on Snyder (6-15). Helen Vendler likewise reads Snyder this way in
Soul Says. Finally, Julia Martin has recently renewed this point in "Seeing a Corner of
the Sky in Gary Snyder's Mountains and Rivers without End" (e.g. 61, 62, and passim).
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karma," which generalizes the point the rest of the poem renders concretely. This
moment reveals for Buell "the heroic difficulty of achieving a thoroughgoing redefinition
of the self in environmental terms" (167).
Buell is not wrong in this assessment of the difficulty of environmental selfhood,
but Snyder's use of this term "karma" can be understood differently, as well: It reveals the
limits of poetic literary practice as a method of shifting worldly behavior.' One way to
see this is to recognize that "karma" is a very familiar term for students of Buddhism and
Hinduism. This usage, then, like a citation, recognizes the cultural debt Snyder's specific
practices have to Buddhism and the East more generally. It thus resists the
aesthetic/worldly duality that might be seen in Buell's apparent desire for a more purely
poetic discourse.' Furthermore, the use of a conventional religious term with
considerable cultural history gives the specific practices presented in the poem a general
language. It restores a traditional category for concrete experience. It thereby can be
seen to familiarize (or enculturate) the strange (or the wild), despite Buell's suggestion of
the opposite in calling this usage "exotic pedantry."
Snyder's use of a conventional religious term also indicates one of the ways
language functions more generally, much as I argue in Chapters II and HI that
Hemingway's self-conscious language use does. Conventional language or terminology,
15 Terry Gifford makes a similar claim in his essay, "Gary Snyder and the Post-Pastoral."
He answers to Jonathan Bate's critique of some Snyder work as "embarrassingly
unpoetic" (Gifford 84) by pointing to Snyder's effort to push "at the whole range of what
poetry can do on the page" (85).
16 Elsewhere in Buell's Environmental Imagination, he recognizes how genre imposes
limitations on the environmental imagining a writer might do (see 4-5, 57, 84, and
passim for examples). Thus, his critique of Snyder can be read to embody some of the
tensions an ethical criticism produces.
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often taken as the bane of aesthetic discourse, is pragmatic because of its very familiarity.
Conventional language is to original language, then, as language in general is to new
experience. Language generally imposes some measure of order on what can seem
disorderly. In the destabilization of the subject that contemporary theoretical and
ecological circumstances seem to require, the use of language, or of conventional
language, can thus be interpreted to signify that very destabilization because it indicates
the desire for some measure of order. Like Hemingway's Santiago talking to himself to
keep his focus, Snyder's turn to conventional or pragmatic language is a synecdoche for
the function of language among humans in our moment.
For Snyder, then, a pure poesis is replaced by use of a mixed form that does
practical, "religious," and aesthetic work.' His move toward epigram in
"CIVILIZATION" and the move toward didacticism in some of his poetry also signal this
commitment. Indeed, one of his more broadly recognized books, The Practice of the
Wild," can be characterized as a kind of etiquette manual for human life (the first chapter
indicates this orientation with its title: "The Etiquette of Freedom"). This book mixes
story, essay, and dense, poetic writing in order to present ways a culture and a person
17 "Work" has been a key word throughout Snyder's career, marking his commitment to
practical, worldly efforts. The title of his collected interviews and talks, The Real Work
(1980), points to the importance of this orientation and inquiry. That eponymous phrase
derives from the title to a poem in Turtle Island (1974).
18 One measure of this recognition is The Practice of the Wild's place among the top
fifteen recommended books on ecocriticism in a list compiled from a poll of 150
members of the Association for the Study of Literature and Environment (ASLE). SeeIhglggcdii ie lcLaQu (393, 397).
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might practice or embody the wild. It is practice that proves the value of the book, rather
than its success according the standards of some generic or purely literary measure.
This focus on practical, situated, local subjectivity is crucial more generally to the
mixing of categories this chapter has been treating: 9 A localized perspective shifts the
way a thinker approaches questions. Such perspective tends toward the
phenomenological philosophically, reorienting ontology by inductive rather than
deductive thinking.' These elements of Snyder's work as they bear on language and
animality are condensed in the poem "Claws Cause" from his most recent book Danger
on Peaks, quoted here in full:
"Graph" is the claw-curve, carve--
grammar a weaving
paw track, lizard-slither, tumble of
a single boulder down. Glacier scrapes across the bedrock,
wave-lines on the beach.
19 This word "mixing" is preferable for this discussion of Snyder to other, roughly
synonymous terms that might be used: "deconstruction," "disruption," "traumatization."
Snyder's work acknowledges ideas akin to those recognized by poststructuralism, but I
am arguing that his work goes beyond the trauma of those intellectual insights (radically
new ideas often reach human cultures as a trauma at first). Snyder's work to make these
traumatic insights more ordinary enables an ethical practice that acknowledges
embodiment.
20 Many of the ecocritical books concerned with local, ethical action, have been
influenced by phenomenology. Some treat it directly. See Abram, Brown and Toadvine,
Louise Westling's "Virginia Woolf and the Flesh of the World," among others.
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Saying, "this was me"
scat sign of time and mood and place
language is breath, claw, or tongue
"tongue" with all its flickers
might be a word for
hot love, and fate.
A single kiss a tiny cause [cause]
--such grand effects [texts].
The title, "Claws / Cause," employs the slash that indicates the ambivalence central to
embodied physicality and also central to the poem: An apparent consequence of natural
evolution—claws--is revealed also as a cause of nature as it is. The rhyme heightens
ambivalence by drawing on the sense of hearing to reinforce the poem's intellectual point.
This work with sound is further accented in the first line with the string of words, "claw-
curve, carve," which evokes the curving graphs familiar to newspaper and sociology text
readers at the same time that it evokes the violence of marking and carving. Language
and the violence of predation thus are signified together by this string.
The poem does not resolve this ambivalence into policy or judgment, however;
instead, it holds these ambivalent realities together with appropriately synecdochic
images like claws and tongue. The poem embodies these realities. The somewhat wild
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"flickers" of the tongue in its natural behaviors of speech, eating, and sexuality are shown
both to indicate "hot love" and the delivery of "fate," perhaps by way of sentencing, of
edict. "Tongue" must also of course be read back into the animality of the poem's claws
motif, so that "tongue" signifies taste and animal appetite more generally. The poem's
analysis of causes and fate, beginnings and endings, lends significance to the geological
events alluded to--rockfall, glacial gouging. These events and the marks they leave can
both cause significant results, as in fatal rockslides, and can signify global events, as with
glacial retreat due to global warming.
Snyder understands those marks, to return to the distinction between Snyder and
his friends Ginsberg and Kerouac, as a kind of waste matter, but he does not seem
especially troubled by the admission. Writing, "Saying, 'this was me,"' indicates an
identity enacted in each "time and mood and place." That writing, a "scat sign," is left
behind even as it may amount to a "tiny cause [claws]" with such "grand effects [text]."
These final, rhyming words reenact the whole ambivalence of the poem via sound and
meaning. "Grand effects" can diminish into mere "text," waste matter that nonetheless
can be cause to future significant events. The editorial brackets used to sustain the
ambivalent posture of the poem dramatize the heterogeneous identity of the writing
subject, lover and killer, and remind us why "character" is crucial to ethics and its root
"ethos." The ambivalence of the self and of knowable reality can render ethical action
difficult to discern, yet an ethical awareness requires admission of ambivalence.
Snyder's poem thus returns us to the dialogue with which this dissertation begins:
How are we to understand the embodiment of language? Levinas's suspicion of images
discussed in his 1948 essay, which I argue becomes his more general wariness of "saids,"
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of static language, becomes his way of arguing for the necessity of ethics. Judith Butler's
return to the body's needs and the ambivalence that attends these needs answers to
Levinas with an approach akin to Derrida's work on the animal. This approach prevents
the surrender of embodied language. "Claws / Cause," one of Snyder's less didactic
poems, complicates notions of ethical action and implicitly makes a case for the
embodiment of understanding that is poetry. Poetry in such usages, we might indeed add,
can be read as a synecdoche for embodied, linguistic understanding because of its
connection between form and content. The generic conventions of showing rather than
telling, frequently understood as epitomized in poetry, are often appeals to localized or
particularized, inductive modes of knowing. Such attendance to bodied details
complicates but also improves and extends ethical action. The best we can expect of
ethics is that it grow out of as keen and accurate an understanding of as much of the
world as possible, always derived from local attention and applied in locally cognizant
ways.
Ginsberg, Kerouac, and Snyder all acknowledge the animality of language, and
take literary discourse toward the edge of abjection. However, 1 have suggested that
Ginsberg and Kerouac register more terror and dread in their work than Snyder.
Restoring these texts to their involvement in the communal presentation at the Six
Gallery, to the cultural milieu that nourished them, allows us to read these differences
more complexly. Their awareness of social loss and possibility helped make room for
writers like Terry Tempest Williams and Leslie Marmon Silko, who would follow some
of their cues as well as dispute many of their claims and literary practices. Remembering
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the community context allows us to read or at least acknowledge more of the cultural and
human embodiment of the literary texts, and to see them as a group of complimentary
voices, speaking toward new cultural and literary embodiments.
CHAPTER V
TERRY TEMPEST WILLIAMS BEARING LOSS
I have felt the pain that arises from recognition of beauty, pain we hold to
remember what we are connected to and the delicacy of our relations. It is
this tenderness born out of a connection to place that fuels my writing.
Writing becomes an act of compassion toward life, the life we so often
refuse to see because if we look too closely or feel too deeply, there may
be no end to our suffering. But words empower us, move us beyond our
suffering, and set us free.
(Terry Tempest Williams, An Unsp oken Hunger 57)
This chapter, like much of Terry Tempest Williams's work, is written at a loss. It
is written in place of it, and moves toward a collective response to it, but the loss is
nonetheless fundamental. Criticism points to aporia, and in it we conventionally speak
with assurance about those vacancies, often implying the possibility of a final resting.
But criticism does not ever rest. To be sure, the approach toward fuller understanding of
texts and contexts is productive. It can serve a social good. But a central claim of this
chapter is our need to acknowledge loss and opacity in texts and in our critical practices.
Certainly the criticism of Terry Tempest Williams's work has acknowledged the
importance of loss, frequently with reference to her best-known book, Refuge., a
mourning text. Virtually every essay in the 2003 collection Surveying the Literary
Landscapes est Williams mentions loss and mourning. John Tallmadge, in
an earlier essay "Beyond the Excursion," argues that Williams extends the work of Annie
Dillard's Pilgrim at Tinker Creek. Tallmadge understands Dillard to rework nature
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writing conventions. She emphasizes horror and pain in nature as much as beauty by
writing the violation of self/nature borders, as in the famous tomcat scene that opens the
book.' Williams, Tallmadge holds, writes a still more thorough suffering in Refuge. Her
painful experience, as many critics have noted along with Tallmadge, leads Williams to
an activism by the book's close.' I agree that the move to activism is an important
achievement of Williams's published work. This move also appears at the level of genre
and form, since she publishes essays on timely social issues in newspapers and magazines
that engage audiences daily on a more pragmatic level.
But the concept of textual activism should also be understood to complicate both
text and activism. Though an activism is indeed crucial to the meaning of her oeuvre,
how does that activism function? What does it mean to protest military actions with
marches and peaceful demonstrations, and with the pen? What does it mean to practice
an embodied subjectivity? Mary Newell, for one, gives an important answer to this last
question in finding Williams's erotics of place an antidote to her suffering. Sharon A.
Reynolds similarly claims that Williams's experiences of landscapes depend on "humility,
not dominance" and lead her "to find reciprocity, not transcendence" (47). Mai Saj
Schmidt attests that Williams's writing brings private suffering into the social and
discursive by writing it, making the personal political. These claims tend to emphasize
the transformation of suffering.
1 Suzanne Clark argues in Sentimental Modernism that Dillard's hybrid generic work
interrogates the status of the knowing author and knowing subject by recalling the
fictionality of even non-fictional genres. This is true, I add, of Williams's work too.
2 Other writers to make this claim include Maia Saj Schmidt, Karl Zuelke, and Tina
Richardson.
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This chapter emphasizes a patience in the face of suffering, a waiting, even an
inevitability of suffering as part of texts' ethical work.' Alexander J. Hunt prepares the
way for this by connecting Williams with Julia Kristeva's work in his dissertation. He
understands Refuge "as a reclaiming of the abject" (145). He reminds us that the
suffering and dying bodies in Refuge, both human and non-human, are testimony to what
military and economic policies ignore. This position outside official and legal sanction,
this abjection, gives special insight into those powerful systems of government and order
by offering a new perspective of them, as Kristeva's work has demonstrated. I am
reminding us, though, that the work of this testimony is not only insight. Williams,
writing in the throes of loss, relies on a thick language practice, a team I draw from
Jacques Derrida, as I discuss below and in Chapter This practice reveals the embodied
character of language and admits an otherness within itself. We have seen in
Hemingway, Kerouac, and Snyder how acknowledging the thickness of language also has
a strong ethical component. This chapter emphasizes that the practice of ethical
intersubjectivity exposes the self to greater pain in this age of ecological trauma. Further,
Williams's writing, like Derrida's, reminds us of the necessity of embodied sentimentality
for reasonable discourse.
Williams's approach to embodied understanding unsettles and innovates nature
writing as a genre. Key to this innovation are her methods of perception themselves. Her
notion of the erotics of experience, mentioned above, is rooted in Williams's practice of
interacting physically with her surroundings. She does not merely "see" the world in an
3 Lisa Diedrich's essay makes a related claim in emphasizing the ethics of witnessing in
Williams's Refuse.
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ocular fashion, though she is capable of sharp vision; she meets it bodily, generally
without surrendering her ethical concerns. In her writing, this practice tends to disrupt
ideas of a discrete, external object.
A moment in her essay "In the Country of Grasses," from An Unspoken Hunger,
dramatizes this bodily disruption of visual, objective perception. The essay describes
traveling on the African Serengeti with a Maasai companion, Samuel, hoping particularly
to see some rhinoceroses. Since rhinoceroses are endangered and not always easy to find,
Williams has doubts about their chances. However, with luck, Samuel points two out.
Describing the moment, Williams writes, "My vision blurs. Who would kill a
rhinoceros? It seems clear that the true aphrodisiac is not found in their horns but in
simply knowing they exist" (11).
The sympathetic tearing intercedes between her and the rhinoceroses, and marks
her seeing as particular, subjective, and blurry' It also belongs to a long tradition of
sentimental women's writing.' In this passage, a bodily fluid interrupts the visual
experience in a narrative that has concentrated on Williams herself being out of place on
the Serengeti and thus being unable to discern the animals that Samuel, who is much
more intimate with this region, can see. Thus, for Williams the approach to the
4 Donna Haraway argues for "situated knowledges" in Simians. Cyborgs, and Women:
The Reinvention of Nature, an essay Mary Newell applies to Terry Tempest Williams's
work. Haraway understands situated knowledges not only to be a more accurate theory of
understanding but to have an ethical component.
5 Suzanne Clark's Sentimental Modernism makes a sustained case against critical
dismissal of sentimentality and pathos in literature. Crucially, Clark reminds us that "no
discourse can escape appealing to the emotions of its audience" (6).
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rhinoceroses "is like crossing the threshold of a dream"; as they depart, the rhinoceroses
"have become outcroppings of stone" (11). The experience of vision itself is
circumscribed with obscurity.
In this context, the tear simultaneously works in divergent ways. It represents a
sublime awe of the rhinoceroses; it shows sympathy for their endangered status; and it
signifies perceptual blurriness right at the moment of perception. The blurriness indicates
the otherness of this place and these animals, yet that alterity fuels Williams's punning
turn on aphrodisiac. Their very strangeness, in other words, drives Williams's sympathy
for their plight. In this way, Williams practices an ethical regard for a heterogeneous
community. Under a conventional sign of sentimentality, she allows their radical
otherness to remain Other, much as I argue in Chapter II that the sentimentality of
Hemingway's The Old Man and the Sea actually signals the ocean's alterity.
One might interject here that her trip into the desert to see the rhinoceroses itself
disturbs their lives and so is unethical. There is substance to this objection. The problem
here is the problem anyone faces in a difficult situation, when action must be undertaken.
Is it more important to leave the rhinoceroses in their own presence, to respect their
otherness enough to avoid bothering them at all, or to learn more about them in order to
better protect them? The move to protection always carries some measure of intrusion
into the lives of others, whatever one's intentions. Whether one agrees with Williams's
decision to visit the rhinoceroses or not, I want to claim that this tear, with its blurring,
signifies Williams's acknowledgment of the limitations of her position and her sense of
the grave danger to the rhinoceroses. It signifies her imperfect but sincere desire to help
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them. It also physically intrudes between her and them, and makes present the thickness
of perception. Perhaps her experience, rendered thickly into a public text, can atone for
her interruption of their lives, perhaps not.
Though we might condemn Williams's intrusion on the rhinoceroses, it is
important to notice that, unlike animals in many other accounts, the rhinoceroses in this
narrative are not drugged or handled. The nature writing genre is here showing an ethical
advance.' This moment should also be read inside a women's literary tradition that
demonstrates resistance to objectification, as in texts like Sarah Orne Jewett's "A White
Heron," Mary Austin's The Land of Little Rain, and others. Lorraine Anderson's Sisters
of the Earth anthologizes many other examples.
Furthermore, Williams's resistance to objectifying the rhinoceroses or to reducing
them to commodity status is an interruption of abstract values imposed on the natural
world by economic schemes. Part of what enables this disruption is exactly Williams's
status as a middle-class tourist, it must be admitted_ Yet, such concern appears
throughout Williams's work, often in ways that offer another perspective on the
economics of her view of nature. An example is the account in Refuge of Lake Wasatch
plans. This was the proposition to dike off fresh-water flows into Salt Lake in order to
create a recreation area and to develop shoreline real estate. Williams was especially
worried about the effects this action would have on animal life associated with the lake.
She resists the plan in terms of its logic of commodification, saying sarcastically that,
6 John James Audubon killed birds in order to collect them. More contemporary
examples of nature writers writing about killed or drugged animals include Barry Lopez
in Arctic Dreams, though he is critical of the practice (see 105-06 especially), and, of
course, Hemingway in Green Hills of Africa (see my Chapter III for more).
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once diked, "the Great Salt Lake would be worth something." She then asks rhetorically
in demonstration against that abstract worth, "'How do you quantify the wildness of birds
. . . ?'" (265). To the extent that this plan is driven by profit motivations, then, her
critique conveys self-consciousness about bourgeois sensibilities, advocating instead for
classes of life whose interests are inadequately addressed.
Williams's stand against the dike recognizes the interdependence or heterogeneity
of living systems, in the terms Derrida presented. She resists the kind of purification
entailed by excessive conversion of nature into commodity. Doing this work in an
autobiography, furthermore, brings such concerns back to the subject in a way that can
interestingly be compared to theoretical work on subjectivity. Kristeva's account of the
subject's development in Powers of Horror, for another instance, returns us to a key word
from Williams's passage about the rhinoceros: "One must conclude, and phobic adults
confirm this, that within the symbolic law accruing to the function of the father,
something remains blurred in the Oedipal triangle constituting the subject" (35, my
emphasis). Kristeva's central claim in that text points to fear and anxiety as markers of
this blurring. Kristeva complicates the usual story of the Oedipal triangle, in which the
symbolic gives the subject the idea of objects, which helps to confirm the independence
of the subject and the subject's separation from her or his mother. Kristeva's work thus
upsets the subject/object dualism. The blurriness at the core of the subject, Kristeva says
above, enters into and remains in the symbolic. The symbolic retains traces then of the
subject's trauma and loss in attaining language, showing language to be always infused
with this blur of pain. Language itself thus remains partly a symptom of fear. Even when
language works effectively as representation, it acts partly to calm this fundamental dread
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in loss. The symbolic cannot be seen, therefore, as a purely rational faculty, and it
behaves in ways fundamentally similar to those which Levinas proposes, discussed
above. Language, in other words, remains partly physical, a point fundamental to
Kristeva's work, as we see in her semiotic/symbolic pairing.'
Kristeva's discussion of Hans in Powers of Horror, whose phobia Freud
discussed, demonstrates further how she understands language to act partly as a symptom
of trauma. She reads Hans's fear of being bitten by horses as a dramatization of the
tension between remaining safe with the mother's body, which she calls "incorporation"
(39), and movement away from the mother driven by the symbolic system that the father
conventionally represents. Originally-comforting incorporation thus assumes an
otherness and a dread, demonstrating indirectly how in these early stages of the subject
the mother is made into a non-object, the border-line entity that is feared, the abject.
Having demonstrated that Hans's experience is only an exaggerated version of the
common movement into language, Kristeva goes on to claim that "Hans has quite simply
written earlier than others, or rather he has been stage director within a scription that
encompassed his living space with all its extras, putting into flesh (a horse) those logical
constructs that set us up as beings of abjection and/or as symbolic beings" (42-3, original
emphasis). Williams's writing of her encounter with the rhinoceroses can be understood
to uncover these fundamental elements of language use. Like the inchoate subject,
Williams is a subject in a state of crisis, both as a person concerned with the possible
extinction of these rhinoceroses and more generally as someone whose experiences of
loss in her family and home place have led her to reconfigure her ideas of selfhood. Most
7 See The Kristeva Reader (89-136) for more on this.
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broadly, we might say, returning to another of Kristeva's claims made in an interview,
Williams is a postmodern subject living "in permanent crisis" (Clark and Hulley 160).
As a person aware of this condition, Williams interrogates core assumptions in our
systems of meaning and language. In her experience of the rhinoceroses, the thickness 
that intrudes is a thickness of her own experiencing body. It is thus a thickness in the
symbolic incorporation of those experiences. Another way to put this is that the
rhinoceroses' status as objects is unsettled.
This sense that language is a "putting into flesh" appears all through Williams's
work, as has been frequently noted in the criticism.' She often makes use of concrete
language, both in poetry and prose, that signifies by position on the page and by
juxtaposition. All these attributes appear in this passage from Refuge that describes an
experience at the Great Salt Lake:
Wind and waves. Wind and waves. The smell of brine is burning
in my lungs. I can taste it on my lips. I want more brine, more salt. Wet
hands. I lick my fingers, until I am sucking them dry. I close my eyes.
The smell and taste combined reminds me of making love in the Basin;
flesh slippery with sweat in the heat of the desert. Wind and waves. A
sigh and a surge.
8 In addition to Mary Newell's essay, cited above, see other essays in Surveying the
Literary Landscapes, including Bart H. Welling's and Melissa A. Goldthwaite's. Welling
claims that Williams's Leap "succeeds in the Helene Cixous-inspired enterprise of
'writing out of the body"' (134). Goldthwaite likewise argues that Williams's work
connects an embodied, feminist aesthetic practice to her religious beliefs.
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I pull away from the lake, pause, and rest easily in the sanctuary of
sage.
Ten miles east, General Conference is adjourned. (240)
Enclosing the first paragraph with repeated, rhythmic phrases encourages the reader to
hear the sound of the onomatopoeic words. The more embodied, less abstract language
thus earns the transition into Williams's suggestion of sexual union with the place. The
passage depicting that union reveals an indistinctly bound body: the external sea conjures
sweat that begins internally; sweat and salty air are not easily distinguished either.
Further, Williams contrasts her sexual experience of the lake with the events of
the General Conference, a Mormon gathering, by reminding us of their simultaneity, a
fact indicated also by their parallel placement on the page. Indeed, in this case, the
parallel amounts to a critique of the conference, which Williams clarifies a few lines later
by asking of Mormon theology, "Where is the Motherbody?" (240). She goes on to argue
that "the Holy Ghost is female, although she has remained hidden, deprived of a body
[. .1" (240). In Refuge, restoring that body means not only acknowledging her own
embodied experiences, it means accepting the intersubjectivity that includes the birds, the
lake, and the environment more broadly.
Williams's nature writing thus operates as a cultural critique, and interestingly
aligns with Kristeva's account of Hans's language practice. Kristeva calls Hans's
"writing" a "scription that encompassed his living space with all its extras." Hans's fear
of the horse is a way of making sense of his dread of nothing, his dread of that which is
outside representation, Kristeva explains (Powers of Horror 42-43). Nature writing, as
texts that bring the lives of nonhuman beings into language and the symbolic, complicates
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anthropocentric understandings of the nonhuman. As "scriptions," nature writings
recognize the extras of our cultural living spaces. But nature writing has the potentially
opposite effect of Hans's tendency to scapegoat his fears onto the horse, to make it
symbolic of his dread, which resembles the more general denigration of the "animal"
addressed throughout this dissertation. Writing the animal can render what is often
abjected visible, and can thereby factor animality into rational decisions (a literal example
of this is Williams's concern about the effects the Salt Lake dike plan would have on the
birds). Simultaneously, Williams's version of nature writing, which problematizes not
only the exterior world seen, but also the experiences of the seer, shows that the symbolic
functions partly as symptom, as a marker of loss and thickness. Williams brings her fears
home to her own subjective practice, refusing, for instance, the idea of using rhinoceros
horns as an aphrodisiac.
In making fundamental inquiries into the character of language, Williams turns to
other originary human experiences like birth for analogies. The notion of birth gone awry
is key throughout Refuge in particular. In the dream she describes in the Prologue, for
example, a doctor tells Williams, "'You have cancer in your blood and you have nine
months to heal yourself" (4). The idea of growing a thickness in this place of injury, of
perverse creation, is an apt figure for the book itself, appropriate to its introduction. This
particular figure will' be used repeatedly in the remainder of the book to describe the
cancerous growths in Williams's loved ones.
Another important example of this birth figure occurs near the end of the text,
when her paternal grandmother Mimi has been diagnosed with ovarian cancer. Narrating
a conversation with Mimi during which she had watched her grandmother stand,
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Williams explains, "I could not help but notice her distended belly, pregnant with tumor"
(263). Their discussion is highly relevant to Williams's observation. Williams has told
of being unnerved by the display of hollow eggs at the Museum of Natural History where
she works: "It dawns on me, eggs are not meant to be seen. This collection is a sacrilege,
the exposed medicine bundles of a tribe" (262). She has sought Mimi for counsel on the
matter, explaining to her grandmother that "'The hollow eggs translated into hollow
wombs. The Earth is not well and neither are we" (262-3). Mimi agrees, "'It's all
related' (263).
This rejection of the display returns us to the concern with objectification
discussed above, but set now in a wider context. Williams draws together her critique of
a worldview that produces wars (and hence the nuclear tests that Williams suspects to be
the cause of the cancers in Refugel with this very tendency to remove eggs from their
living world, to render them into objects to be viewed. This comparison is further
implied in Williams's labeling the collection a "stockpile" (262). Calling the bird eggs
"medicine bundles" also puts birds on a level with humans, a practice implicit and
explicit throughout the text. This appellation, furthermore, suggests a critique of another
primary function of such museums--housing human artifacts that are frequently sacred to
violently displaced cultures. In the course of conquest, such cultures were often
animalized and thereby dismissed from the realm of the human in order to justify their
displacement and murder. Such reductions of Others are an element in war psychology
more generally.'
9 Elaine Scarry's The Body in Pain demonstrates how the enemy is dehumanized in
warfare and torture; a central concern of Levinas' Otherwise Than Being is this disregard
for the other person, especially as dramatized in the Holocaust and the World Wars.
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These eggs thus become artifacts of loss in their very status as artifacts. As I have
suggested above, this view of the object and the text is typical of Refuge. We can,
therefore, again notice the resemblance between Williams's work and the concerns with
abject textuality that are especially strong in Hemingway and Kerouac. Williams presents
a slightly different critique of created objects in a significant passage often cited in the
criticism:
The cancer process is not unlike the creative process. Ideas emerge
slowly, quietly, invisibly at first. They are most often abnormal thoughts,
thoughts that disrupt the quotidian, the accustomed. They divide and
multiply, become invasive. With time, they congeal, consolidate, and
make themselves conscious. An idea surfaces and demands total attention.
I take it from my body and give it away. (44)
As Elizabeth Dodd indicates, this passage belongs to the "desire to embrace the cancer, to
embrace one's death as part of one's self, part of the whole of one's life" that is an
important to the work Refuge does (10). Such effort is necessary to soften Williams's
mother's suffering as well as her own, and is thus part of the text's sympathetic work.
However, Dodd wrongly assumes the conventional derogation of the sentimental here,
when she claims this passage contradicts the larger trajectory of Refuge. Dodd argues
that this passage implies a submission to cancer and thus perhaps to its causes. She
reminds us that Williams moves from this type of passive endurance toward resistance to
and action against the causes of her family's suffering, signaled perhaps most clearly in
the book's final chapter, "The Clan of One-Breasted Women." We can make this claim
without surrendering the importance of the text's sympathetic work.
180
Nonetheless, I certainly agree that one of the driving energies of the book is its
critique of this tendency to suffer in silence that Williams finds especially prevalent
among Mormon women. With this project in mind, the above passage can seem
especially disturbing because it naturalizes cancer in order to accept it, and even goes so
far as to include the creative process as part of this natural suffering. Thus, as Dodd
reminds us, "'Death' may be natural, but these specific cases of terminal cancer are
unnatural" (10). However, in the next section of Dodd's essay, she quotes Williams's
significant belief that "it is a point of disaster or deep pain that propels us from one era
into the next" (Dodd 10). This idea reminds us that the traumatic experience of cancer,
though its causes should certainly be resisted, also offers significant insights, a point that
might be made about traumatic experiences more generally. The ethical practices and
conclusions drawn from these experiences at the limits of pain are indeed the central
concern of my larger argument.
In Williams's case, those insights include but go beyond the lesson that political
action is necessary. This passage quoted above, for instance, highlights the theme of loss
in creation that runs throughout Refuge. Another fundamental statement of this idea
appears in Williams's interrogation, "What it is about the relationship of a mother that
can heal or hurt us?" (50). In this section, Williams answers that "Her womb is the first
landscape we inhabit" that is "perfectly safe," but that it is a place we must, of course,
leave_ She continues, "The umbilical cord is cut--not at our request. Separation is
immediate. A mother reclaims her body, for her own life. Not ours. Minutes old, our
first death is our own birth" (50). Suffering from the consequences of the logic of this
original separation in losing her mother again, with the terrible finality of death this time,
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Williams is persistently led to investigations of loss. Such loss invades her home, even at
the level of the word. For instance, she begins her account of a family gathering early in
her mother's ovarian cancer ordeal with the one-word sentence "Home" (28). What
follows is an unsettling of that word's meaning for her family in the face of illness.
Williams's heterogeneous sense of home and self, involving the birds and
landscapes of Utah, is also disturbed. The invasion is actualized and symbolized with
strange, dramatic, coincidental rise of Salt Lake and the flooding of Bear River Refuge.
Williams's knowledge and experience of her home place, her skill as a naturalist, her
practice of intersubjectivity of the sort Snyder advocates, adds depth and thoroughness to
her experience of loss as it floods through these knowiedges.
This is why her awareness of larger geological processes, for instance, has such
poignancy. in an autobiography of loss, the account of the rise and fall of Lake
Bonneville (30-32), familiar to Williams since her childhood shell hunts on the bench of
land where her family lived, becomes overwhelming proof of fluctuation and loss in all of
nature. Indeed, when Williams exclaims of Halley's Comet that "It hung in the sky like a
tear" (130), she offers an image that extends her experience of loss beyond the terrestrial.
It is an accurate comparison, since comets do take that shape. But this accuracy
also earns the sentimentality of the word "tear," since the fact of endless motion and
change in nature is presented incontrovertibly with her view of the comet. It functions as
an image of the loss she is enduring. This becomes clearer in the lines immediately
following the tear comparison: "As the morning light leached into darkness, the comet
vanished. / 'One more time ... I kept whispering under my breath. 'Let me see it one
more time' (130). The flux of night giving itself into day produces one kind of
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experiential loss, while the sense of her own impending mortality intensifies her prayer
for longevity. Human life is thus humbled when measured against this sign of cosmic
time, which is a conventional theme of nature writing. But Williams compellingly adds
pathos to the theme, writing a natural occurrence into its place in a human story of loss.
In this figure, we see her connection of the women's diary tradition to the nature writing
tradition.
This sequence can be understood as a synecdoche for the function of writing in
Refu ge more generally. Williams first puts the comet into a familial context, printing the
letter she received from her grandmother Mimi instructing her where to find the comet.
She then narrates her experience of seeing it, and finally offers words to replace its
disappearance. The distance of loss, the removal of words from the experiences they
narrate is signified by the quotation marks that surround the spoken words of prayer,
words she was driven to pronounce by that sense of loss looming over this text. This
printed prayer thus implies a kind of double removal.
So these marks on the page replace the experience of the comet, just as the whole
text stands in for as well as represents Williams's loss of her mother. Again we see how
language functions as an incorporation of the sort discussed by Kristeva above. I have
mentioned the thickness of such language, and here we sense the quality of opacity in that
thickness insofar as the words describing the comet do not replace the original experience
Williams had. Narrating her experience surely enriches Williams's sense of its meaning,
even raising it into the realm of shared, public discourse that can be read and that, indeed,
critics can address. Writing therefore gives the experience a kind of lucidity, which is the
"clarity" that reasonable writing is often said to possess. But that clarity is not entire.
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The opacity, the density, the weight of loss is also implicit in the writing. An awareness
of this tendency in writing is necessary to a rigorous, embodied conception of language,
and perhaps especially to ethical claims about language use. Williams's exposure of this
reality in language use is thus closely parallel to Levinas's skeptical claims about
knowledge discussed in Chapter I.
We have seen language similarly exposed in each of the writers considered in
previous chapters. The process of language gathering in a place of loss is analogous to
the writing on and of the body throughout Williams's work especially. Scars are a
recurring example. At one moment in Refuge, having just returned from the hospital,
where she had a small cyst removed from her breast, Williams writes, "My scars portend
my lineage. I look at Mother and I see myself' (97). This thought triggers memories at a
further remove: "As a child, I was aware that my grandmother, Lettie, had only one
breast. It was not a shocking sight. It was her body" (97). These words mark the place
of that memory like scars, portending lineage. A self-consciousness of lineage is crucial
to the intersubjectivity under discussion in this dissertation, but in this case that
awareness sharpens Williams's sense of loss. This view across generations points to a
notion addressed more fully below, that both bodies and words acquire greater thickness
and opacity in time. New words must be produced in response to new circumstances, like
scars performing the body's natural defense against injury. Both mark the trauma of time
and demonstrate the fluidity of the subject which is a fluidity present in the world itself.
These marks, on this strange border between the subject who is writing memories and the
subject who experienced the memories, are themselves a kind of abject, neither the
subject precisely nor objects.
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It is his own experience of the trauma of time that provokes Jacques Derrida's The
Work of Mourning, written about the far side of the subject's trajectory. It reads from
death backwards, into the life of the subject, This book, which is my source for the term
thickness, houses Derrida's eulogies for such intellectuals as Roland Barthes, Sarah
Kofman, Michel Foucault, and Emmanuel Levinas. Like Kristeva's Powers of Horror, it
is a text that complicates the distinction between the personal and the theoretical.'
Indeed, this complication is one of the animating issues in Derrida's book. In each
mourning essay, he is driven to respond both personally and generally as a eulogist,
demonstrating (and enacting) the tension in the eulogy genre between an individual's
mourning, an utterly solitary experience in one sense, and the shared, public version of
mourning. These particular eulogies present this tension with special intensity, since the
individuals being mourned have so public a public side as well-known theorists. In
marking the general loss, Den-ida is obliged to take up and commend their intellectual
contributions, to mourn theoretically. And yet Derrida remains painfully aware that each
eulogistic word testifies to the personal loss that motivates them, as though they were
marks of pain, symptoms, hardly reasonable words at all.
A different way of framing this tension is to set it between clarity and obscurity,
as Derrida shows when writing "The Deaths of Roland Barthes": "These thoughts are for
him, for Roland Barthes, meaning that I think of him and about him, not only of or about
his work. 'For him' also suggests that I would like to dedicate these thoughts to him,
give them to him, and destine them for him" (35, original emphasis). The rhythmed
10 For instance, Thea Harrington points out that Kristeva shifts between the theoretical
"we" and the personal "I" in Powers of Horror,
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repetition of the objective pronoun him, as well as the italics, emphasize Derrida's
gesture here towards Barthes the man, the physical being who has been lost. That
pronoun "him" is thus a kind of thickness in the writing, an acknowledgment of Barthes's
otherness, now complete: "Yet they will no longer reach and this must be the
starting point of my reflection; they can no longer reach him, reach all the way to him,
assuming they ever could have while he was still living." Derrida explains further, "We
must hold fast to this evidence, to its excessive clarity, and continually return to it as if to
the simplest thing, to that alone which, while withdrawing into the impossible, still leaves
us to think and gives us occasion for thought" (35). .
It is death, then, that gives this "excessive clarity" to his thoughts, that provides
the stark truth and the sense of meaning to his discourse. But, death is also proof of
meaning's obscurity and singularity, of the fact that the person Roland Barthes can no
longer be reached, that he can no longer be asked what a given sentence or idea means to
him. It reminds Derrida that each mourner will suffer differently and to some extent
alone, and that Derrida's words must respect those differences in deference to his
audience and as part of his respect even for Barthes himself. For the value of Barthes's
ideas, who or what Barthes is at the time of Derrida's writing, lives in those differences
partly.
Working, then, between his own sense of loss and his desire to recognize the
social importance of Barthes's work, Derrida turns to the texts that embody that work.
His discussion of Barthes's work alternates between intellectual clarity and personal
obscurity. The very method of discussion, tending to be a phenomenology of his reading
experience in preparation for this eulogistic writing, emphasizes the particularity of that
186
reading and its personal inflection, its thickness. In the mourning situation, the ethical
element of the thickness in language becomes especially clear, since Derrida is
responding with language to a highly significant moment. This thickness, which often as
here shows itself as a sentimentality, is crucial to his language having any meaning worth
the occasion. A purely rational discussion of these thinkers lost to us would be, as
Derrida says, "saying and exchanging nothing," as though, Barthes, say, were pure
theorist, pure ideas, not a person, a human, a loved friend. But recognition of this
thickness is also itself admission of further loss. The opacity of language, I have been
claiming, ironically becomes clearer in moments of trauma and crisis, but the fact of the
trauma itself, the "excessive clarity" of the death, brings a thickness to reasoning. Thus
Den-ida worries--in the rich, embodied sense—about what happens to Barthes's writings
now that he has died. Derrida himself takes up Barthes's first and last books in place of
his lost friend, and self-consciously reduces person to oeuvre, oeuvre to milestone texts,
and those texts to points of significance for him as a reader. Thus Derrida thickens as he
clarifies Barthes's work, and Barthes as a person, thereby. Here again we have this
ethical uncanny, the doubleness of ethical discourse. But as he makes clear throughout,
there is no other choice but to speak carefully, ethically, since the only type of speaking
that would not impose some kind of reduction onto Barthes would be silence, which is a
respectfulness more killing than speech.
The shared eulogistic circumstances of Williams's and Derrida's writings explains
why their texts speak to one another. But these texts' lessons do not apply only in trauma
and loss. The traumatic circumstances, the approach toward limits, reveals how language
functions more generally. Like Williams, Derrida states clearly in the beginning of his
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remarks on Barthes that language itself always moves between these poles of memory and
loss, of clarity and obscurity, of damage and regard. He glosses the plural in his title
"The Deaths of Roland Barthes" as acknowledgment of the plurality of loss,
acknowledgment that this one event is a loss for many people, and different for each one;
yet, he points out that "the proper name [. . .] alone and by itself says death, all deaths in
one. It says death even while the bearer of it is still living" (34). This naming, which
here can be understood as a synecdoche for language itself, is "the unique disappearance
of the unique" (34). The move to give even a unique label to this complex and multiple
being will simplify and reduce in the same way Derrida shows death to reduce the living
person. But the key point is that this reduction is necessary in life as it is in confronting
death. Without the reduction of the world's complexity that language provides, there can
be no shared understanding via language, no shared speech.
The tortured constraints of the mourning eulogist, Derrida insistently implies, are
really the constraints of all language users, who must speak to reach across the divides
between people, but who must do so with infinite care, as much care as they can possibly
manage. This is, of course, precisely the situation of Terry Tempest Williams, writing for
the women in her family, for the suffering of birds and snakes, for sickness in the land.
Williams's wariness of such reduction appears particularly in her resistance to
objectification, discussed above, but she has made general statements that testify more
broadly to her awareness of the association between suffering and writing. In the opening
essay of Red, "Home Work," she says, "The region of the American West shares common
ground with the South: each has found its voice in loss" (7). Later in that essay she refers
to political policy she disagrees with as leaving an "open wound" in the West (10).
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The close association between loss and writing persists throughout Williams's
work. And while Derrida acknowledges this loss as a thickness in more theoretical terms,
even while attending to the personal, Williams emphasizes such opacity at the level of the
body. Thus, Derrida's ethical balance between the theoretical and the subjective is
parallel to Williams's more embodied ethical balance between the personal and the
political. This is partly why Alexander Hunt's claim that Williams raises the abject into
view is so important. Her texts testify to the thickness that bodies, like language, take on.
Her testimony signals this weight in the human subject, this body essential to vitality, life,
meaning.
To put this idea broadly, we can say language and bodies are always in relation to
one another, and must answer each to the other, and keep answering. There is an ethical
component both in the reserve and humility this awareness requires--be careful not to say
or to assume too much--and in the obligation to speak out, to keep renewing the language
and the ideas it embodies. Language use appears thus, in Derrida's words, as "the gift
and the revocation of the gift, just try to choose" (38, original emphasis).
Williams's work helps us better understand what more such bodily awareness can
be or mean. She brings the loss of her mother into clarity, telling the story of the
disruptions that this experience sent through her life, so that her mother's life and her
body must factor into our social renewal, into the changes of our present social living; but
she also marks out the pain and loss she experienced that escapes representation. In
Williams's work, such experience beyond representation appears in the life of the subject
as well as in the death. In Refuge, she sits with her mother as she suffers, putting their
bodies together to ease their pain (e.g. 162, 230); she returns to consciously inhabit her
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own body as a way of enduring her loss, often by putting it into relation with the physical
earth, as we saw above (e.g. 240). She also works in more affirmative fashion, hoping to
better understand birds by seeing in the ways and from the places they do. At one
moment in Refuge, for instance, she goes on a count of breeding pelicans in an airplane.
Her treatment of the experience recognizes the importance of flying as birds do in order
to better understand them (103-07). This is embodied understanding. These efforts
amount to her notion of an erotics of place, practiced most especially in texts like An
Unspoken Hunger and Desert Quartet. Such experiences cannot be fully conveyed, as the
first of these two titles indicates. Furthermore, bodily awareness in each of these
instances of Williams's larger oeuvre acts as an interruption of the coherent subject,
wounding her and informing her, always altering her, unsettling her.
So what of Williams bringing this understanding of the subject into the public
arena with her writing and with her activism? Testimonies of pain upset the policies that
produced them and drive the improvement of those policies. Their sentimentality goads
us to become better at our rational work, not worse. They also goad us to persist in
revelations of the bodily and the sentimental. They ask us to acknowledge the thickness,
the loss, even the horror central to the life of the subject. Much of this problematic is
presented, again in synecdoche, in the demonstration at the Nevada Test Site for which
Williams is arrested 'in protest against that testing. This form of activism makes literal
the idea that bodies accompany the subject at every stage. Putting the body in the way of
policy is a form of dramatization, an incorporation of a rational and emotional response to
those policies. The drama is a kind of complex language and an example of how
language works, marking the place of pain, moving toward the social good. These
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interruptions do disturb, but without violence. They are a relatively speechless speaking-
out, the negotiating that intercedes before violence, a thickness that is peaceful.
The subject, if it is rational at all, is precisely this ability to "be there" for the
Other, to respond. It is, to return to this chapter's epigraph, "to remember," to come to
terms with the body, with the enervation of body whose sensitivity has been structured by
shocks and losses in the world, and which produces a language and a reasoning. More
than any one belief or word or body, what lasts is this position, this orientation, this
pathos. The texts or the bodies that remain behind will always gather more thickness,
will perhaps dry up to leave small, thick marks behind, like a salt residue, as from a tear.
CHAPTER VI
THE REBIRTH OF STORY IN SILKO'S ALMANAC OF THE DEAD
"We don't believe in boundaries. Borders. Nothing like that. We are here
thousands of years before the first whites. We are here before maps or quit
claims. We know where we belong on this earth. We always moved
freely. North-south. East-west. We pay no attention to what isn't real.
Imaginary lines. Imaginary minutes and hours. Written law. We
recognize none of that."
{Leslie Marmon Silko, Almanac of the Dead 216)
This chapter calls into question the national designation meant to organize this
dissertation. Can Leslie Marmon Silko be positioned in the American literary sphere?
Her work interrupts such designations, as the passage cited above indicates. Writing
from the margins of the "American" literary, Silko helps us see the constructedness of
that category. Indeed, her work, while in one sense on the boundary of the literary, in
another sense denies the literary/worldly distinction altogether. Her stories function
partly as political doctrines, as declarations of sovereignty, which reverse the
center/margin polarity as well. The stories of Almanac of the Dead attenuate America
and the American literary by positioning them in a larger historical context. Indeed, this
text reveals the political contestation involved in story creation in general. Its dramatic
enactment of competing stories therefore represents the political effects of literature.
Silko's perspective is importantly earned by her own "hybrid" identity status.
Though her Laguna Pueblo heritage is very important, Silko's background also includes
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white and Mexican ancestors) As Louis Owens points out in Other Destinies, this
"mixedblood" status positions Silko between worlds. This uncertain identity status
underscores the importance of identity in American Indian fiction more generally.'
Indeed, Owens claims that "The recovering or rearticulation of an identity, a process
dependent upon a rediscovered sense of place as well as community [. . is at the center
of American Indian fiction" (5). All of the authors treated in this dissertation have shared
these concerns. What the situation of Silko, and American Indian authors more generally,
makes clearer is the political element of this concern with identity. Owens demonstrates
this idea by discussing how the discursive innovations of Indian novels involve and create
political changes (8-9 especially). He shows how Indian novelists frequently write
toward "another destiny or another plot," outside the too common idea of the vanishing
(or vanished) Indian.' This overtly political conception of literature reveals how
questions of literary subjectivity, questions of identity, relate directly to questions of
ethics, as we saw with Beat writers, and as I suggest in Chapter I.
The American Indian literary work of writing "another destiny," probably most
important in its actual effects for Native peoples, also helps us understand writers like
Hemingway or Kerouac in new ways. Ultimately, such revisions of more canonical
I Silko discusses her ethnic identity in many places. See, for examples, Yellow Woman
and a lkauty of the Spirit 17, and passim. See also Louis Owens's treatment of this issue
in his chapter on Silko in Other Destinies, (especially 167).
2 Owens uses the term "American Indian." I follow his lead here, as well as Shari
Huhndorfs in Going Native. Huhndorf explains that "Native" is a more general term that
includes indigenous groups like Eskimos who are not included in the more specific term
"Indian" (1, note 2).
3 Owens quotes Balchtin in this passage. See 18.
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interpretations return to affect readings of and the future possibilities of Native or other
marginalized literatures. My own interpretive trajectory, I should note, has moved
anachronistically in this fashion, from Silko backwards. Some of the reading strategies I
learned in dialogue with Silko's work, especially Almanac of the Dead, I later applied to
readings of earlier writers like Hemingway.
The importance of acknowledging hybrid identity aligns with the formal hybridity
involved in renewing the novel genre. Both acts have political ramifications. Owens
demonstrates this with regard to Silko's earlier novel Ceremony, claiming that "The
dissolution of generic distinctions effected by Silko's interweaving of poetry and prose
throughout the novel further underscores the permeability of all boundaries, the
interpenetrability of 'conceptual horizons' within all discourse" (171). Such resistance to
generic distinctions appears in different and perhaps more vigorous form in Almanac of
the Dead., a 763-page novel, considering over five hundred years of history, that took over
ten years to write, and which hosts, by Yvonne Reineke's count, more than eighty
characters. It earns a status as hybrid in these very characteristics, and Silko names this
generic resistance in the book's title. An almanac is a collection of facts and
interpretations from many discourses, oriented toward daily actions_ Joni Adamson
claims that "almanacs challenge the very notion of authoritative discourse" because of
this mixture {134).
Silko makes other significant challenges to prevailing modes of understanding.
Reineke asserts that Almanac of the Dead contests historical and continued colonialism
(that now tends to take the form of transnational capitalism rather than blatant colonial
nationalism) by redescribing time and space in Mayan, and more generally Native
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American, terms. These terms spell out a circularity of events and of time, in which
predictions presage European arrival and announce, before the arrival itself, the eventual
departure of European life-styles and worldviews. Linear conceptions of time and
European mappings of space are both shown to be impermanent parts of a larger and
longer story in which Native inhabitation and control of the Americas continues.'
Reineke established the background for her essay by arguing that Western
philosophical conceptions of linear time correspond directly to abstract ideas of space
expressed in the modern, Western nation-state. She reminds us, following Jonathan
Boyarin, that particularly modem conceptions of the state developed since the
Renaissance in Europe alongside the theorization of time in terms of "Cartesian
coordinates" (66). As time became a demarcated line, maps marked discrete boundaries
around spaces. Of course, all this was involved practically, politically, and
philosophically in colonization. European nation-states drew boundaries around their
territories and identities, then competed to apply this process to other places like the
Americas.
1 argue below that in Almanac of the Dead, Silko asks stories to do this work of
resistance by imputing them with agency. This notion of story as something more than
simple text appears in the critical responses to her book, though in rather general terms.
Describing both the Almanac within the novel and the novel itself, Reineke remarks on
"the living nature of the book" {74). David Moore describes Almanac of the Dead's
"open-endedness" (164). Joy Harjo indicates a sense of excessiveness that I equate with
4 Alex Hunt's recent essay on Almanac of the Dead also attends to Silko's remapping of
space, arguing that the very establishment itself of boundaries calls for their transgression.
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stories that go beyond themselves when she says the book "is larger than the five hundred
years it encompasses, larger than the story or the storyteller" (210). All these
formulations evoke the resistance to containment theme of Almanac of the Dead.
Tread containment to represent generally the hopes of the "Destroyers" that Silko
works against in the novel. In the text's affirmative stories, boundary-breaking liberatory
narratives counter the drive to contain and control, a drive that Donna Haraway identifies
in Primate Visions as promoting a culture of death. This epistemological work parallels
and produces the text's depictions of worldly events: border crossings, prison riots,
movements across class boundaries, even the breeching of Glen Canyon Dam. Even
Silko's sometimes gruesome presentation of murderous stories, often explicitly circling
around abjection and dread of the abject, exposes the consequences of narratives of
control.
The worldly work of this exposure--it disturbs most readers--corroborates Silko's
notion of the power of stories. This work also reminds us of the ethical potential of texts
that can seem to be "bad company," to return to Wayne Booth's figure of the book as a
friend.' John Skow's review of Almanac of the Dead, published in Time magazine,
provides an example of a disturbed response. Skow calls Silko a "very angry author" and
makes frequent use of words like "vengeful" to describe the book (86). Skow's
summarizing characterization of Almanac of the Dead, though, is even more germane
here:
The author's sentences have a drive and a sting to them. But the
receptacle of her crowded, raging, enormously long book swirls with half-
5 See Booth's The Company We Keep and my previous chapter.
196
digested revulsion, half-explained characters and, a white elitist must add,
more than a little self-righteousness. (86)
This dismissal touches on several elements that are key to reading the text. His
accusation of "self-righteousness" on Silko's part is accompanied by his own self-
conscious and perhaps ironic admission of possessing that very attribute in the words
"white elitist." This complex moment foregrounds the importance of identity and politics
for this book and for Indian literatures more generally. Skow shows an awareness that his
identity status is likely to be connected to his dismissal of the book by those who disagree
with his judgment. Identity is therefore connected to aesthetic standards.
The terms of Skow's review, such as "half-digested revulsion," also recall the
(sometimes unconsciously) contested state of the abject in contemporary literature. Skow
is frustrated by the book's unruliness, by its enormity and its open-endedness. He refers
to the whole as a "receptacle," with overtones, in so negative a review, of a trash
receptacle. His dismissal contains this book's obviously revolutionary ideas by recourse
to generic expectations. Its generic hybridity gives Skow a way to dismiss both the text
and its political ambitions.
Our critical response to this text indicates our political position. The question is
not so much whether Almanac of the Dead is full of revulsion and awfulness. It is. Skow
is right on this count. The question is whether to read such revulsion as indicative of
actual, worldly conditions, or, as Skow does, as the angry and messy scratchings of a
misguided individual. Of course, a nuanced criticism should be able to . do some of both
of these options where appropriate, but Skow leaves little room for nuance. Skow's
aesthetic dismissal of the book also supports his personal critique of its author, and vice-
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versa. His characterizations of Silko define bel: as outside the acceptable culture, as
abject. For instance, we might suspect racist overtones when he refers to Lecha and Zeta
as "half-breed witches," an ethnic appellation that could also be applied to Silko. This
mixed-blood status defies conventional categories, much as the text itself does, provoking
anxieties of identity that connect to aesthetic judgments. Furthermore, in this context,
Skow's critique of Silko's "rage" and "fury" racializes and abjects political upheaval.
Edward Said explains in Culture and Imperialism that the operation of criticism
delineates culture (and therefore cultural identity) by making a "protective enclosure" that
excludes certain kinds of beliefs and practices (xiv). Skow is excluding Silko and her
political text.
I read Almanac of the Dead, therefore, in much the same vein as Howl. Both texts
are so preoccupied with destructive, worldly realities that the possibility of traditional
artfulness becomes problematic; both texts are thus partly symptoms of the status of the
literary at their moments in American culture. This status, reflected in Silko's case with
generic hybridity and more especially with the unreliability of sincere speech in her text
(more on this below), functions therefore as a form of cultural critique. Reviews like
Skow's suffer from an anxious separation between the political and the literary that is
conventional but inappropriate to much contemporary writing, especially American
Indian writing. Skow clearly recognizes the identity politics of his judgments, but feels
compelled within his critical framework to make those judgments anyway.
Silko reveals how policing the boundaries of culture produced many of the
problems Almanac lac of the Dean considers. While the United States carried on its policies
of containment on fronts in Korea and elsewhere, this containment worldview brought the
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Jackpile uranium mine to the Laguna Pueblos in 1949, as depicted in Almanac of the 
Dead (and in Ceremony). Sterling decides early in Almanac of the Dead that the mine
had "destroyed" his life because it brought out the stone snake that ultimately got him
banished (35). In other words, he ultimately learns that his banishment story is rooted in
U.S. foreign policy. Furthermore, Silko has argued for a connection between the mine
and the actual occurrence of a teenage suicide pact in Laguna (Yellow Woman and a
Beauty of the Spirit  130-31).
Clearly, the World Wars and the conflicts that followed disrupted the Laguna
community. Silko explains that when community members began working at the mine, it
provoked contention. The elders particularly resisted the mine, putting young and old at
odds (131). Disruption also came into the community with the loss of men in war and
with the psychic trauma of veterans who returned. The mine symbolically and actually
represents all these changes.
Sterling's education process over the course of the novel indicates how global
anxiety about national identity, as revealed in containment policies, cannot be
disconnected from individual experiences. He first explains his banishment by
considering only immediate, local circumstances: He blames the snake, the mine, and
himself. His later and more informed position recognizes the effects of broader events in
the world on his life. Sterling's trajectory through the novel from the reductive, early
account of his banishment to his more experienced view of it at the conclusion models the
learning process occasioned by this book's stories for all those who experience them,
including Silko.
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Silko's own account of writing this novel, then, importantly parallels Sterling's
experience. She explains in an interview with Laura Coltelli that she "started out with the
idea of writing about Tucson." She "meant to write a novel about the spiritual identity of
a place, a location" (119). Silko's initial sense of the story, like Sterling's sense of his
own story, was primarily local, particular to her homeland. But as she wrote the book,
she found herself considering stories that interweave tremendously various histories.
Silko's history of a particular place became a nearly global history seen through a place.
As she describes it, the stories refused to be contained either by a local geography or by
an author's intentions.6
While many writers feel that their stories produce themselves, this feeling is
especially valuable in relation to this novel, which, I have suggested, thematizes the
agency of stories. The last of the "Fragments from the Ancient Notebooks" announces
this:
One day a story will arrive in your town. There will always be
disagreement over direction—whether the story came from the southwest
or the southeast. The story may arrive with a stranger, a traveler thrown
out of his home country months ago. Or the story may be brought by an
6 Silko's book can therefore be likened to what Terry Gifford calls the "post-pastoral," a
mode of considering text/environment relations "that transcends the closed circle of the
pastoral and anti-pastoral modes" (78). Silko values the local, "spiritual identity" of
places in keeping with pastoral conventions, but recognizes the broader circumstances
that impinge on the local. Gifford uses Gary Snyder as his test case in putting forth this
claim, a fact which appropriately reminds us of similarities in the type of literary work
Snyder and Silko do.
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old friend, perhaps the parrot trader. But after you hear the story, you and
the others prepare by the new moon to rise up against the slave masters.
(578)
The story's arrival is the real interest in this passage; the bearers' arrival is only incidental.
Further, a story that "will arrive" is one that apparently has its own will. Indeed, the story
can come from different directions and with different company, reinforcing the notion
that it travels with its own volition. In this way, the relationship between story and its
bearer is much like the relationship between poem and creek that Snyder describes, as we
saw in Chapter IV. The unknown status of the story's bearers also enables a hybrid,
cross-fertilizing conception of culture.
This passage also implicitly justifies the larger narrative in which it appears.
Silko's notion of an Almanac, she has said, comes partly from surviving Mayan codices
(Yellow Woman and a Beauty of the Spirit 136). Those codices are stories that have
come from another culture in the south to Silko, who is rendering them into signs of a
coming (and ongoing) uprising. The stories cross cultural and geographical boundaries in
the above description, as would the potential "stranger" who might be carrying them, In
short, this passage instructs its reader to open to a wider set of circumstances, as Sterling
is forced to do in the text, and as Silko has claimed the stories made her do.
A second example of the agency of stories explains more directly that
Yoeme had believed power resides within certain stories; this power
ensures the story to be retold, and with each retelling a slight but
permanent shift took place_ Yoeme's story of her deliverance changed
forever the odds against all captives; each time a revolutionist escaped
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death in one century, two revolutionists escaped certain death in the
following century even if they had never heard such an escape story [...]
(581)
This passage underscores Silko's point that the narratives are themselves a kind of power,
beyond being simply relational tools or merely fictive creations. The power implicit in
enunciation, furthermore, implies an ethics of speech, comparable to Levinas's insistence
on the ethics of "saying" anew.
But liberating stories are not the only ones with power. Much of the book is
dominated by other stories of murder, destruction, and desolation, stories which also
perpetuate themselves. Constructive and destructive stories are one of many pairings in
Almanac of the Dead. Trigg's craven Diaries, for example, can be understood as an
inversion of Yoeme's Almanac. The ending of Trigg's Diaries reveals elements of his
bioproducts plan that would absolutely commodity humans by selling their body parts.
His diaries are therefore an abject version of the book's affirmative stories, and the
differences are apparent in the nature of the texts themselves. The diaries reveal self-
interest, while the more affirmative stones bear as many interests in mind as possible.'
The "Destroyers'" stories consistently reveal an aspiration to contain forces and
beings in the world. Beaufrey is one of the best examples of a malicious, self-interested,
conniving character.' Silko's presents him as a kind of type, whose characteristics are
exaggerated enough for us to read his description going beyond critique into parody:
"Even as child, Beaufrey had realized he was different from the other children. He had
7 We might further suggest that the power Trigg's plan has over him reveals a
heterogeneous subjectivity that Trigg seems to disavow because his actions being driven
by his own foul stories reveal how will is determined partly by forces beyond it.
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always loved himself, only himself. [. .] He disliked noise and disruptions in his
perfect, drowsy pleasure and daydreams" (533). His ideal world is self-contained, pure,
undiluted. This isolationist solipsism makes Beaufrey's obsession with pure blood,
sancri ura, unsurprising. As Silko expounds his theories about blood purity, taking her
descriptions further toward caricature as she often does in this novel, she aligns his
thinking with class systems, particularly those in Europe:
As Beaufrey had read European history in college, he had realized there
had always been a connection between human cannibals and the
aristocracy. Members of European aristocracy were simply more inclined
to hunger and crave human flesh and blood because centuries of le droit du
seigneur had corrupted them absolutely. Beaufrey was bored by anything
less than the absolute; of course "blue bloods" such as himself were
different. Bluebeard in his castle hung "his" wives from meat hooks in the
tower; the "wives" had been the brides of serfs raped by the master on the
evening of their wedding night. (534-35)
As one in a lineage of such thinking, Beaufrey is made into a type, a representative. As
such, he also appears to be subject to the stories, which persist through this history of
numerous believers.
Silko's history seems partly sincere criticism and partly exaggerated, unstable
discourse in which she has allowed the stories to drive themselves. It is difficult to
separate the two. In a text that is quite critical of Europeans and European culture, this
critique of Beaufrey's lineage can be read as serious, but we should also recognize that
Silko means Beaufrey to be seen as insane. Because of this, it is hard to accept his
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account of European history as standing more generally for European beliefs. Such
moments characterize Silko's strangely unstable text, and that instability can be read to
signify the uneasy and political position of literary discourse more generally, much as I
suggested of Ginsberg's and Kerouac's texts in Chapter III.
The destructiveness Silko attributes to characters like Beaufrey in this historical
passage also appears in the mocking creation story Silko attributes to Beaufrey:
In the beginning, European aristocracy had risen above the common soil;
the royalty had been superior beings who had survived the test of combat's
fire and steel. But two world wars had consumed Europe's best blood;
after the First World War, true aristocracy had virtually been annihilated.
{535)
We recognize the opposition to the earth--rising "above the common soil"--as part of what
Silko's work sincerely criticizes. But this passage also reveals itself as unstable and
insane discourse by moving so quickly from creation to destruction, from "rising above"
to annihilation. In that sense, the paragraph models Silko's larger argument about the
eventual destruction of all things European by mocking European creation stories,
especially this tale of blood purity.
Silko's critique becomes more pronounced and parodic in the paragraph that
follows the previous quotation: "So much for the blue blood. Those with sangre pura
were entirely different beings, on a far higher plane, inconceivable to commoners. They
might crave human flesh. What of it?" (535). With this addition of cannibalism, Silko
puts the humanity of such adherents into question. Rather than confronting his
selfishness, Beaufrey is depicted as a character who will excuse any horror with this
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separatist blood logic, He never grows out of his childhood love of solitude, instead
producing a story to understand world history that justifies his desires and that accounts
for his identity. The story confirms his identity, and identity enables unethical action.
This habit of believing his own invented stories translates into Beaufrey's
gruesome treatment of his "rough trade" lovers, as we see particularly in David's case:
Beaufrey loved the theater. Players such as Eric or David and the cunt
were a dime a dozen; Beaufrey was the director and the author; he was the
producer. One act followed another; Eric had performed the last act of his
life farce perfectly; uncanny how Eric's blood and flesh had become a
medium consumed by a single performance. (537)
The language is meant to reveal Beaufrey's fantasy of himself as God (director, author,
and producer). People are thus reduced to and contained by the dramatic roles he invents
for them. They have no other value. Likewise, the acceptance in the previous quotation
of aristocratic cannibalism echoes in the word "consumed" above, where Beaufrey
understands his dramatic stories to eat the likes of Eric. Indeed, when Beaufrey thinks
approvingly of David, he considers him "delectable" (535). This reading aligns with
numerous other details: Beaufrey's interest in the torture films that render lives into
consumable commodities; his marketing of David's pictures of Eric's suicide, which
preys on the most abject of David's and his audience's desires; and the transformation of
,David's death into the controlled frames of photographs.
The culmination of the David plot dramatizes the story Beaufrey has devised as
that story reproduces itself in both the photographs that will undoubtedly find a place
among the torture documentaries and in David's own thought process just prior to his
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death. David seems in certain ways to have accepted Beaufrey's views of the world, to be
living by his story: "For weeks David had ridden the mare to practice control. He had
practiced to please Beaufrey, but also to prove to himself he could control the mare.
Sports and games were always about control; control was everything" (564). Yet, as the
horse runs faster, David's "arms ached from fighting the mare. He hated the fever of the
mare's need to run. He hated Beaufrey's gibe that the rider must 'husband' his horse"
(564).
Ultimately, David rejects the ethic of control and lets the horse run freely. Silko's
description of this moment fuses horse and rider as they break out of a repressive
philosophy: "David felt a great sense of relief and freedom as he let the reins go slack.
He crouched low over the neck and clutched mane and reins in both hands" {564). But
having long submitted to that philosophy, horse and rider take their departure from it too
far. In their escape, the animal and the human are joined in their response to the same
system of control, pushed here to the point of crisis, then to death and abjection. David's
naive liberation, moreover, mocks simplistic accounts of the "free" subject. It is another
example of Silko's unstable discourse in Almanac of the Dead. This story, then, indicates
story's position M general in the novel. It strains under formal and political limits and
then explodes into the abject consequences of those systems. Part of the abject element
of this particular story is its gruesome absurdity.
Other characters are capable of recognizing the malevolence of these stories in
time to respond against them more constructively. These characters dramatize the role of
criticism in a book that is metaliterary in its concern for what story does. Clinton, for
example, is described as a character outraged by a controlling culture in which "white
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man's words were always being shoved in the black man's mouth" (405). He develops
first a "pure contempt for any authority but his own" (404), and then begins to apply his
authority: "Clinton no longer felt himself choking on anguish—on the rage and pain he
had felt every day of his life, even in the army. What had made the difference were the
spirits, and the army he and Rambo were putting together" (426). He also finds an outlet
in his radio broadcasts, where he formulates an account of slavery that highlights its effort
to contain: "Wealth from slavery buys storehouses of food and armies and the finest
physicians. Wealth obtains more slaves and more property to barricade the Master in the
world of the living" (428, my emphasis).
Several other characters in the novel bear Clinton's theory out. Menardo and
Alegria are the most blatant examples. It is key that Menardo runs an insurance empire, a
business that is oriented by the attempt to control risks. Menardo's forays into the
security business also indicate his obsession with danger. The failure of this
philosophical system to bring the desired comfort is attested to by Menardo's absurd
demise. He so wants an absolute safety that he provokes his own death by commanding
Tacho to shoot him in order to try out his bulletproof vest.
Root comes to a critical view of the stories that had oriented his life through
physical trauma. While his motorcycle crash brings him close to death, he prefers to
think "that all his family had died in his accident" (169). He explains to Lecha, "all they
cared about was how much I was going to cost them [. . .1" (170). This view is
substantiated when we learn that the insurance company compensated Root for the
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accident, but that his mother had invested that money as she saw fit, apparently ignoring
his will along with what the doctors said about Root's still fully present mental capacities
(205-6).
Essentially disowned by this family that had made its fortune by selling whiskey
during the Indian wars, Root is accepted into Calabazas's business. Root explains,
Being around Mexicans and Indians or black people, had not made him
feel uncomfortable. Not as his own family had. Because if you weren't
born white, you were forced to see differences; or if you weren't born what
they called normal, or if you got injured, then you were left to explore the
world of the different. (202-3)
Root learns to listen to Calabazas's stories, even though they first "drove Root crazy"
with their indirect mode of expression (215).
Root's border crossing offers him access to the type of theoretical position Silko
advocates generally in Almanac of the Dead, here presented in a Calabaza lecture:
"We don't believe in boundaries. Borders. Nothing like that. We are here
thousands of years before the first whites. We are here before maps or quit
claims. We know where we belong on this earth. We always moved
freely. North-south. East-west. We pay no attention to what isn't real.
Imaginary lines. Imaginary minutes and hours. Written law. We
recognize none of that." (216)
This passage stakes Calabaza's and his people's claim to ownership of the land. This
"novel," this "story," is acting as a political declaration of sovereignty. It does this partly
with its deliberate confounding of English grammar. When Calabazas says we have been
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here for thousands of years, using the present tense of "to be," he justifies his ostensibly
illegal conduct (carrying drugs across the border) by showing it consistent with a much
older, and ongoing, cultural system. The "thousands of years" equals "we are"; identity is
linked to long-term inhabitation. This present-tense construction also makes room for
newcomers like Root who elect to (and are permitted to) share this identity status.
Moreover, Root's position as an open-minded outsider makes him a model for many of
Silko's readers, particularly those unfamiliar with the method or message of Calabaza's
talk. His process of learning how to listen can be the readers' too.
Root's (and the reader's) initiation into Calabaza's stories is exactly opposite the
education process modeled with Beaufrey and David. While Beaufrey excludes David
from his treasured blue-blood status and ultimately destroys him, his physical "lover,"
Calabazas decides to trust a man he would have every right to revile as a descendant of
those who took advantage of the colonialist situation. Root has seemingly enacted part of
the prophecy that all things European will leave the Americas by driving out (and having
knocked out) his own European habits of mind. The violence of his education aptly
parallels the unstable discourse typical of the whole novel. Yet, it is vitally important to
the logic of this book that Root earns his place and listens to stories that are traditional
from those who have a right to tell them. Those who produce purely fantastic stories,
stories that narrowly account for the world, do so in their own interests, and do so always
at the expense of others.
Silko's novel identifies this drive to contain as a leitmotif of this larger historical
moment, what she calls the Reign of Death-Eye Dog. Thinking broadly and openly this
way, and privileging stories as agents of history, confounds our "normal" expectations of
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literary texts. This is one reason, I suspect, Silko's book has seen mixed and often
nervous critical responses. The hybrid and political work she asks story to do answers to
the literary anxieties we have seen in writers ranging from Hemingway to Terry Tempest
Williams by renewing the purpose of texts for culture. For Silko, literature that merely
confirms an unjust cultural life is not satisfactory. Rather, concern for the just practice of
culture in the larger world, for the collective embodiment of heterogeneous life, drives the
birth of this political almanac.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION: UNIQUELY COMMON, POLITICAL ANIMALS
It is difficult to connect these different realms, to show the involvements of
culture with expanding empires, to make observations about art that
preserve its unique endowments and at the same time map its affiliations,
but, I submit, we must attempt this, and set the art in the global, earthly
context. Territory and possessions are at stake, geography and power.
Everything about human history is rooted in the earth j. . .]
(Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism 7)
One of the main roots of this dissertation traces back to my uncanny experience of
reading Emmanuel Levinas's Otherwise Than Being around four years ago. In another
part of my thinking at that time, which I imagined to be entirely separate from the work
on Levinas, I was re-reading Gary Snyder's 1990 book The Practice of the Wild and
following some of his leads into Buddhist literatures. Snyder, though he is a syncretic
thinker, takes most of his influence from Asia and the East, and from his experiences in
wild nature. Levinas, born in Lithuania and a long-time professor of philosophy at the
Sorbonne in France before passing away in 1995, was very much a Western thinker.
Despite these rather significant differences in orientation, I noticed fundamental
likenesses between these thinkers' ethical conceptions.
Both are strongly committed to ideas of an ethical subjectivity estranged from
itself. Both, indeed, find in estrangement a sign or indication of ethics. The important
access to this version of subjectivity for Levinas is speech. The possibility of exchanging
meaningful words, of signification, indicates the self s invasion by the Other. The Other
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speaks us, speaks through us in language, which is why speech is a sign of ethics. Thus it
is that, as Levinas writes in Otherwise Than Being, "The command," and this is the
ethical command, "is stated by the mouth of him it commands" (147). The speaker is not
at home even in her or his own words.
Snyder's account of human subjectivity shows perhaps as much of this Levinasian
strangeness, this estrangement from the home of the self. True to Snyder's lifelong
interest in nonhuman nature, to the physical world, though, he presents his version of
ethicality in terms of physical bodies (as we have seen, Levinas also finds signs of ethics
in embodied subjectivity). Snyder makes this case most fully and clearly in The Practice
of the Wild. The following 
is one significant passage:
It would appear that the common conception of evolution is that of
competing species running a sort of race through time on planet earth, all
on the same running field, some dropping out, some flagging, some
victoriously in front. If the background and foreground are reversed, and
we look at it from the side of the "conditions" and their creative
possibilities, we can see these multitudes of interactions through hundreds
of other eyes. We could say a food brings a form into existence.
Huckleberries and salmon call for bears, the clouds of plankton of the
North Pacific call for salmon, and salmon call for seals and thus orcas.
The Sperm Whale is sucked into existence by the pulsing, fluctuating
pastures of squid, and the open niches of the Galapagos Islands sucked a
diversity of bird forms and functions out of one line of finch. (109; see
also 15-17, 27, 29 and passim)
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In Snyder's account, animals, human and nonhuman, are urged into particular physical
forms by the Others of and in their environments, much as Levinas describes the Other
urging the subject into subjectivity. The Snyder passage also reminds us of the key
difference between these thinkers: the status of the animal. For Levinas, ethics are
characteristically human, while for Snyder, ethics can be discerned more generally in
nature.
Though I think the types of ethical reversals effected by Levinas and Snyder have
much in common, significant questions remain about the value of calling either account
"ethical." For one, the temptation is strong in reading a passage like Snyder's to suggest
that all of nature behaves ethically. This is the type of argument that Christian Diehm has
published, which I address in my Introduction. Such an idea raises a set of questions,
however, that put the whole ethics discourse at risk. Most directly, the risk is this: If all
of nature is ethical, is not the idea of ethics entirely meaningless? Is not everything that
happens part of nature and therefore ethical? A short-hand answer to this question might
be that each form of ethics is unique, that, indeed, uniqueness is crucial to the very notion
of ethics. Much as individual people are uniquely called to ethical actions, then, what can
be called ethical with reference to other living beings is utterly unique. A predator's
ethical acts, then, would differ significantly from a deer's (or, for that matter, a human's).
However, this answer restores the problem of what "ethical" means in general.
Indeed, as we have seen, many questions have been raised about even Levinas's
more constricted conception of ethics that applies only to humanity. I treat many of these
in my Introduction, too. For instance, as Judith Butler asks, if being ethical involves this
somewhat violent invasion of the self by the Other, what room can there be for peace, for,
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indeed, calm breathing itself? Butler's interrogation reminds us that a Levinasian ethics
can seem to restore an account of nature and reality as inherently violent. Derrida, in a
related, skeptical attitude, suggests that an "ethics" cannot adequately describe the
subjection of the subject to the Other. For him, doubt is in fact more essential to
subjectivity and even to ethicality than "ethics." I connect Butler's concerns about the
ordinary needs of the human, like breathing, to Derrida's argument for doubt by recourse
to Derrida's term "thickness." "Thickness" usefully conjures the materiality, the
embodiment of the subject and the attendant consequences of that status for reasoning.
Thickness acknowledges the material, situated, rhetorical character of knowledge, making
room for doubt.
In other words, for now, my best resolution to this dilemma of the value and
meaning of this word "ethics" depends partly on the inability to resolve the question in
any final way. I would rely on a heterogeneous account of reason that admits some
measure of contradiction, without, I hope, resting in that contradiction in a comfortable
way. Reason's thickness must be acknowledged such that these various accounts cannot
be expected to be perfectly resolved, or perhaps dissolved, into some transparent solvent
that passes all light through it. The particularity of each of these accounts requires that
we allow them to sustain their differences from each other, and this is an ethical
command of critical work.
More specifically, I mean by this that holding Levinas and Snyder together (and
the other thinkers doing similar work) can provide two parallel, yet persistently differing
accounts of subjectivity and ethicality. Part of what I take from Levinas is that an ethical
subjectivity must always take as much responsibility as possible. Responsibility must
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come home to the subject in an utterly unique way in each unique situation. Utter
uniqueness, the singularity of each physical being, is one way to gloss the meaning of
embodiment. The consequences of this uniqueness are not only that each person must be
open to each Other, but also that a person must make new choices about behavior
moment to moment. This is necessary not just for the possibility of ethics, but also for
the well-being of the individual who would be responsible in a genuine fashion. Similar
conclusions can be drawn from Snyder about individual ethicality.
But Snyder's greater attention to nature and to the prevalence of natural
intersubjectivity can mollify the stringency of Levinasian ethical subjectivity. Snyder can
help us hold our uniqueness (and therefore our ethical responsibility) next to an
awareness that much is common among all living and nonliving systems, making room
for embodied peacefulness as part of nature. Snyder's perspective resembles Derrida's
notion of the living as a combination of the living and the nonliving. Remembering such
intersubjectivity restores the other perspective to embodiment: Living in a unique body
means being utterly singular, yet the boundaries of the body are porous, with the very
material of the body being replaced in our interactions with our food and environment.
My reading of the trajectory of Hemingway's work also finds him presenting a more
complex view of nature later in his life that has room for lions playing as well as killing.
Likewise, I argued above that Terry Tempest Williams's Refuee reminds us of the ethical
call for peaceful inhabitation of the body as part of our obligations to Others.
Admitting to contradiction can seem to be a surrender in reasonable work. It can
seem to be the easy way out. But, on the contrary, I would argue that a rhetorical
conception of reasoning, concerned with its applications, makes the acceptance of
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contradiction a laborious task. The thinker cannot rest in the resolution of a single, lucid
idea, but must labor, situation to situation, to apply the various sets of ideas in specific
ways suited to particular circumstances. This is also what an ethical, intellectual practice
means to me. This approach, in my view, confirms much of what already tends to happen
in literary studies. Literary scholars pay attention to the details, to the way experiences,
emotions, and ideas are embodied in unique ways, but in language that also makes
uniqueness communicable.
Other important, specific questions are raised, or left unresolved, by this
dissertation that I should mention: I have only begun to address the questions of identity
that have come to seem more and more essential to ethical inquiries. In the Introduction,
I mention that the Greek roots of the word "ethics" trace back to identity by way of
"character." One's character is a sign of one's ethics. In Orientalism and Culture and 
Imperialism, Edward Said has helped us see the political and worldly implications of the
identity-confirming work of literature, especially in the post-Renaissance age of nation-
states. If an ethical identity entails an openness to Others, and to Others whom we have
tended to become more and more wary of characterizing or assuming knowledge about,
identity itself has become an increasingly evasive notion. I believe this has made ethical
action more difficult in many cases. If one does not know who she or he is, how can one
know how to act? Such anxieties of identity, I argued above, destabilize the word itself in
Silko's Almanac of the Dead. We also saw how Kerouac's The Subterraneans focuses its
ethical questions on anxieties of identity.
Yet, clearly, the unsettling of identity in philosophy and critical discourse is driven
partly by ethical impulses. For instance, the construction of hegemonic identity at the
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expense of Others has been importantly criticized and therefore unsettled. Even with
these critiques in view, though, it has become clearer and clearer that identity is always
constructed with reference to Others. Our task is to theorize relations with alterity in an
ethical way, which is why Levinas seems so useful.
More questions then arise: How are we to understand an American literature that
is necessarily open to many identities, and how can we understand ethics in such
situations? We should think more about the idea that American identity depends heavily
on this kind of openness to process because it is democracy, itself a political process, that
unites America as a coherent category. This recognition entails destabilizing firm ideas
of national identity. 
The political scientist Anne Norton pushes such destabilization, I
think, beyond the bounds of the ethical, indicating ways that openness to process and to
saying anew can potentially conflict with ethical sensibility. Norton argues in Republic 
of Signs that at the core of democracy is desire, a remaking of the self dependent on the
possibility of renewing one's identity. The problem is to align this type of recognition
with Levinas's notion of "saying," which involves a similar type of perpetual renewal,
without losing sight of the ethical and ecological consequences of such renewals.
Literature is one way to keep such consequences in view. For example, Silko's and
Ginsberg's texts discussed above register some of the consequences of more narrow
applications of desire when coupled with power. Ginsberg raises the abject into view,
while Silko exposes the politics of stories.
Other questions that might be further pursued: How do landscape and
environment play into this construction of the self and of ethics? What role does gender
play in these questions? Gender is an important to many of the texts I have analyzed, but
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I have not had room to work out these issues. Also, how might acknowledging our
physicality not only imply the ethically controlled conduct toward environment that many
discourses, including ecocriticisni, have asked for, but also indicate new, more
constructive possibilities? How might literature not only help us rein in harmful practices
of mastery, but also present new potential for enriching practices of intersubjectivity?
The possibility of perpetual identity renewal must be put in dialogue with greater
awareness of our responsibility to Others, human and nonhuman.
Applying these ideas to literary discourse partly involves acknowledging the
alterity within it. This means not only the alterity of relationships with Other groups
frequently discussed as marginalized: non-European ethnic groups, marginal gender
groups, and so on, but also, clearly and importantly, with the nonhuman. This is where I
locate many of this dissertation's analyses, beginning with Hemingway's The Old Man 
and the Sea. Hemingway does not exactly present an ethical relationship with nonhuman,
but he does, quite clearly, disrupt accepted notions of what such ethical relationships
might be. He upsets the absolute human/animal distinction. Such disruptions from
within are precisely what Said says are so often missing from imperialist literature (e.g.
Culture and Imperialism 82). Snyder and Terry Tempest Williams move beyond
disruption, articulating ways that posthuman cultures might be practices in localized,
embodied fashion, without restoring an imperialistic subject.
To conclude with a final example representing many of these concerns:
Hemingway's importance to American literary identity is so strongly felt that, as Paul
Hendrickson reported in the New York Times on Sunday, August 7th, Hemingway's
house in Cuba, which is in considerable disrepair, "was named was named to the 2005 list
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of America's 11 Most Endangered Historic Places by the National Trust for Historic
Preservation in Washington." It is a strange irony that Hemingway, one of America's
most famous ex-patriots, would be adopted into the American identity such that his
Cuban home (Finca Vigia), standing on soil forbidden for Americans to tread, would be
so highly valued by the National Trust. In Kristeva's terms, Hemingway's foreign house
thus appears as an incorporation of American identity, one that indicates the
homesickness operating in that identity system.
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